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A b stra c t
This dissertation is a reconstruction and analysis of Thomas Reid’s epistemology, based 
upon an examination of his extant manuscripts and publications. I argue that, in Reid’s 
view, there are three necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for that degree of 
epistemic justification which constitutes knowledge: the agent must have a “sound 
understanding”; she must have a distinct conception of the object of her belief; and she 
must form the belief “without prejudice”. By way of explicating these conditions, a wide 
range of Reid’s philosophical views are examined. Beginning with the subject of 
knowledge, I present Reid’s ontology of the mind and its operations. With a view to 
determining Reid’s psychology of belief-formation and, in particular, the degree to 
which Reid is a voluntarist with respect to belief, I examine his account of causation, the 
distinction between scientific, causal and teleological explanations, the nature of moral 
liberty, the principles that influence or motivate voluntary action, the formation of 
instincts and habits, and the nature of ‘self-evident’ beliefs. I then examine Reid’s 
account of the operation of judgment or belief and its objects, looking in particular at 
Reid’s adverbialism, his account of universals, of general conceptions, his theory of 
meaning, and the obligations that attach to the voluntary intellectual powers. Having 
thus set out the relevant philosophical background, I concentrate directly on Reid’s 
epistemology, beginning with his account of the nature of evidence and epistemic 
justification, and concluding with an examination of his three conditions for knowledge.
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THE P H I L O S O P H Y  OF T H O M A S  REID
Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to present an account of Reid’s epistemology, in as 
philosophically concise and rigorous a manner as the textual evidence will permit. In 
the following, I provide a brief explanation as to how I intend to achieve this objective.
Reid claims that the source of Hume’s scepticism was his mistaken account of the 
mind and its operations; and that the only adequate epistemological response would 
therefore be to provide an alternative, correct account.1 The implication of this claim is 
that no exposition can hope to capture what Reid took to be his response to Hume’s 
scepticism without, at the same time, exploring almost every aspect of his philosophy: 
his views on metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral obligation, agency, and so on. It 
is this, little recognised feature of Reid’s epistemology that explains the broad scope of 
the present thesis, and, of course, the title by which it has been adorned.
Reid is an exemplary systematizes His work is characterised by numerous terms of 
art, such as ‘power’, ‘operation’, and ‘instinct’. Each is given a definition or 
description, and, with rare exception, is thereafter used in that singular sense. This is, 
again, a feature of Reid’s work that is often overlooked. I have thus provided, as a 
central feature of my exposition, a philosophical reworking or ‘tidying up’ of Reid’s 
definitions (e.g. ‘D /) and analyses (e.g. ‘A/).2
Another key feature of this exposition is that it is grounded upon a revaluation and 
reworking of the existing category of relevant Reid manuscripts (see Appendix 2), the 
transcription of extensive portions of otherwise unreadable handwriting, most of which 
is not submitted here, and the preparation of critical editions of Reid’s Inquiry and the 
Intellectual Powers, the former of which has been submitted as Volume II of this Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Given the enormity of textual material involved in this project, I have tried 
to assist the reader by providing, in footnotes, the key portions of text that I take to 
support my exposition, rather than supplying references only. Quotations presented in 
the main body of the thesis are, for the most part, limited to passages that require a 
close analysis or explanation.
1 “as Mr Humes sceptical System is all built upon a wrong & mistaken Account of the intellectual Powers 
of Man, so it can onely be refuted by giving a true Account of them.” MS 7 /V /4 ,4.
2 It should be noted that the definitions and analyses I present under labels such as ‘D ,’ are occasionally 
doctrines that I suggest Reid would have rejected.
IN TR O D U C TIO N x
It may appear from the forgoing that the focus of this thesis is predominantly 
historical. This is far from the truth. My primary intention is to construct a textually 
accurate philosophical exposition of Reid: that is, I am primarily interested in 
formulating his philosophical claims, arguments and distinctions, in exhibiting the 
coherence of various elements in his work, and in determining how, given the evidence 
available, Reid might have responded to various objections: all with as much precision 
and rigour as the available textual evidence will permit In short, the aim of this thesis 
is not to provide a comprehensive intellectual biography of Reid, to record the nature of 
his academic environs, or to compare his work with either preceding philosophers or 
Reid’s contemporaries.1 Such information is utilized only in so far as it has been 
deemed necessary for philosophical purposes, for example, in clarifying an argument 
by identifying the view it is attempting to refute.
Finally, my philosophical defense of Reid is strictly limited to showing how, given 
the textual evidence, he might have responded to various objections. The philosophical 
labour exhibited herein should not therefore be taken to constitute an evaluation of 
Reid. It may or may not be possible to perform this task from the perspective of the late 
twentieth-century; and my exposition may or may not contribute to such an end. 
Whatever the case, this is not my objective here.
1 For exemplary examples of this kind of work, see David Fate Norton, “From Moral Sense to Common 
Sense”, Ph.D Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of California, 1966; Paul B. Wood, The 
Aberdeen Enlightement: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 
1993); and Paul B. Wood “Thomas Reid, Naturell Philosopher. A Study of Science and Philosophy in the 
Scottish Enlightenment”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Leeds, 1984.
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Mind
INTRO DUCTIO N
Reid claims that it is by the exertion of our intellectual powers that we may come to 
know the operations of our own minds and the external world. There are several key 
assumptions regarding the nature of mind, upon which the truth of such a claim 
depends. For example, what is it that stands in an epistemic relation to the world? Is it a 
substance we call ‘mind’, of which the operation of knowing is an attribute? Or is it 
merely the operation of knowing? Reid, as we shall see, holds the former. But this 
option is notoriously problematic. For example, how is it that we come to know of a 
mind if we are only conscious of its operations? How can there be a continuously 
existing subject of continuously changing operations? In this Chapter, I present Reid’s 
response to such questions, looking in particular at his views regarding the distinction 
between the mind and its operations and the nature of personal identity.
1 THE M IN D -O PER A TIO N  D ISTIN C TIO N
Reid holds that “every operation we are conscious of supposes an agent that operates, 
which we call mind“ .1 The distinction Reid draws here, betw'een the mind and its 
operations, is based upon the Aristotelian distinction between substance and attribute,2 
the definitions for which he gives as follows:
D, x is a substance = df (i) it is possible that x should exist by itself: that is, there 
is no y  such that y  is non-identical to x and x exists only if y  exists; and (ii) x 
stands in the relation of ‘being a subject of’ to its attributes.3
D2 F  is an attribute = df it is not possible that F should exist by itself: that is, F  
exists only if there is some x such that x is non-identical to F  and x stands in 
the relation of ‘being a subject of’ to F .4
Reid was not unaware of the philosophical controversy regarding this distinction. 
However, his approach is not to justify his adherence to the distinction by philosophical
1 IP, p. 42.
2 Reid describes Aristotle’s distinction in BA, p. 317.
3 “Things which may exist by themselves, and do not necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else, 
are called substances; and with relation to the qualities or attributes that belong to them, they are called the 
subjects of such qualities or attributes.” IP, p. 41.
4 “there are some things which cannot exist by themselves, but must be in something else to which they 
belong, as qualities or attributes.” IP, p. 41.
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argumentation; for the distinction, he suggests, is not a mere philosophical opinion, but 
rather a claim that has all the ‘marks’ of a first principle.1 For example, (i) the 
distinction is reflected in all languages,2 (ii) its denial leads to absurdities,3 and (iii) of 
any thing we perceive or of which we are conscious, it is self-evident to us that that 
thing must have a subject to which it belongs as an attribute.4 Thus, Reid advances the 
following as a first principle of metaphysics:
NPM1 The “qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which 
we call body, and . . .  the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, 
which we call mind”.5
2 KNOWLEDGE OF MIND
NPM] implies that the only objects of perception and consciousness are qualities of body 
and operations of mind; hence, the knowledge of bodies and minds themselves could 
not be a deliverance of perception or consciousness. Reid therefore owes us an account 
of how such knowledge is otherwise obtained. To this end, he begins by distinguishing 
between three kinds of conception:6 7
Aj S has a direct conception of x if and only if x is an object of either the 
perception or consciousness of S7
A2 S has a relative conception of x if and only if (i) S has a direct conception of y,
and (ii) S conceives of y as bearing a relation R to x, where Rxy = either (a) y is 
an attribute of x, or (b) y is an effect of x, or (c) y is a relation that x bears to 
other things.8
1 Reid’s account of what constitutes a ‘mark’ of a first principle will be examined in Chapter 4, § 7.
2 IP, p. 42
3 For example, Descartes’ rejection of the distinction, Reid argues, led him to conclude that “the material 
world has no bounds nor limits”, and that “the soul must have had ideas in its first formation, which, of 
consequence, are innate”. Others, such as Hume, were led to infer that “body is only a collection of qualities 
to which we give one name; and that the notion of a subject of inhesion, to which those qualities belong, is 
only a fiction of the mind”; or again, that “the soul is only a succession of related ideas, without any subject of 
inhesion”. IP, pp. 140-41 Along a similar vein, Reid rejects Priestley’s claim that the term ‘substance’ is 
“nothing more than a help to expression,. . .  but not at all to conception”, that is, by arguing thus: “If the 
term Substance express any conception of the mind, though even an obscure conception, it must be a help to 
conception; and if it be no help to conception, it can express no conception clear or obscure, and then I 
apprehend it can be no help to expression but an incumbrance upon it, as till unmeaning words are.” MS 
3061/1/4 ,5 ; in AC, p. 176.
4 Reid’s concept of ‘self-evidence’ will be explained in Chapter 5, § 6.
5 IP, p.444. For a complete list of Reid’s first principles, see Appendix 1.
6 Reid uses the terms “knowledge”, “notion” and “conception” interchangeably in speaking of direct and 
relative conceptions. But, as we shall see, they are strictly speaking, quite distinct.
7 More precisely, the objects of perception are primary and secondary qualities, and it is only the primary 
qualities of which we have a direct conception:“all the primary qualities of body . . .  we have a direct and 
immediate knowledge from our senses. To this class belong also all the operations of mind of which we are 
conscious.” AP, p. 9.
8 “A relative notion of a thing, is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation
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A3 S has a mere relative conception of x if and only if (i) S has a relative 
conception of x and (ii) S does not have a direct conception of x.* 1
Reid’s claim, then, is that our conception of mind is merely relative. That is to say, (i) 
we have a direct conception of operations such as judgment and perception; (ii) we 
conceive of these operations as standing in the relation of ‘being an attribute of’ to a 
substance we call ‘mind’; but (iii) we do not have a direct conception of this substance.
The crucial issue, then, is how it is that we come to know that these operations do in 
fact bear this relation of ‘being an attribute of’ to something of which we do not have a 
direct conception. Reid’s solution is to distinguish between two ways by which we 
come to know of relations:
A4 S knows that Rxy if and only if (i) S has a direct conception of x and y, (ii) S 
compares x and y, and (iii) upon making the comparison, either (a) S 
immediately judges that Rxy, or (b) S constructs a sound argument, the 
conclusion of which is that Rxy.2
For example, I know that “my foot is longer than my finger” just in case (i) my foot and 
my finger are both objects of my perception, (ii) I compare my foot with my finger, and 
(iii), upon making this comparison, I immediately judge that my foot is longer than my 
finger. Again, I know that “the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal” just 
in case I have a direct conception of both the angles at the base of the triangle, and I 
construct a sound argument, the conclusion of which is that these angles are equal.3
Now, A4 is immediately ruled out as the means by which we come to know of the 
relation between an attribute and a substance: for we do not have a direct conception of 
any substance. However, to conclude that substances do not exist on these grounds 
alone would, Reid argues, be quite unjustified. For, upon careful reflection, we will 
discover a second source of our knowledge of relations:
A5 S knows that Rxy if and only if (i) S has a direct conception of x, (ii) S does not 
have a direct conception of y, and (iii) upon attending to x, S immediately 
judges that there must be some y such that Rxy.4
which it bears to something else.” IP, p. 178; “Of other things, we know not what they are in themselves, but 
only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our 
conception is only relative.” AP, p. 8.
1 This definition is required given the possibility of a conception that is both direct and relative: “I can
directly conceive ten thousand men or ten thousand pounds, because both are objects of sen se-----But I can
form a relative notion of the same number of men or of pounds, by attending to the relations which this 
number has to other numbers, greater or less.” AP, p. 10.
2 “by comparing the related objects, when we have before had the conception of both . . .  we perceive the 
relation, either immediately, or by a process of reasoning.” IP, p. 517.
3 IP, p.517.
4 “by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge, that it must, from its nature, have a
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This is precisely the means, Reid argues, by which we know that the operations of 
which we are conscious are attributes of a substance. For we have a direct conception of 
these operations, and no direct conception of mind. Yet, upon attending to the 
operations, we immediately judge that they cannot exist without a subject to which 
they belong, and of which they are attributes.* 1
By way of qualification, Reid is not claiming that the mere relative conception we 
have of substances is “clear and distinct”: it is rather an “obscure” conception.2 Indeed, 
it is so obscure, he suggests, that all that we can claim to know about any substance, is 
that it is that subject without which certain attributes cannot exist.3
3 PERSONAL IDENTITY
We now have Reid’s account of how it is that we know that the operations of which we 
are conscious cannot exist without a subject, which we call ‘mind’ .4 But several 
important problems remain. For example, Reid’s solution assumes that the operations 
of which a person is conscious belong to one and the same subject. But this claim requires 
some kind of defence, or at least an explanation as to how it might be possible. In other 
words, Reid owes us an account of the nature of personal identity.
Reid holds that one necessary condition of identity is continuous, uninterrupted 
existence. That is:
A6 x and y  are identical only if there is no time t such that x exists at t and y  does 
not exist at t.
certain relation to something else, which before perhaps we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of 
the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them.” IP, p. 517-518; 
“It is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation, and then comparing them together, that we 
perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation: on 
the contrary, one of the related things, to wit, sensation, suggests to us both the correlate and the relation.” 
HM, p. 35.
1 “By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge, that there must 
be something which thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we call the mind.” IP, p. 518; cf. IP, pp. 257-58. 
Other examples of R^  include the conception of causes by their effects, and of space by bodies. See IP, p. 518. 
Cf. J. H. Faurot, “Thomas Reid, On Intelligible Objects”, Monist 61 (1978) 229-244: p. 238-39.
2 Reid argues in the Intellectual Powers that a mere relative conception must always be obscure, “because it 
gives us no conception of what the thing is, but of what relation it bears to something else.” IP, p. 236. 
However, in the AP, he allows that, “our relative conceptions of things are not always less distinct. . .  than 
those that are direct” AP, p. 10. However, every example Reid gives is of an object of which we also have a 
direct conception, that is, the examples are of relative, rather them mere relative conceptions. They are also all 
examples in which the object of the relative conception is a number or quantity, rather titan a quality of body 
or an operation of mind. Either or both of these differences together, may account for the difference in clarity 
and distinctness.
3 “Nature teaches us, that thinking and reasoning are attributes, which cannot exist without a subject; but 
of that subject I believe the best notion we can form implies little more them that it is the subject of such 
attributes.” IP, p. 441.
4 For Reid’s account of knowledge itself, see Chapter 5.
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Thus, suppose x exists at to, but then ceases to exist at f,, whilst y begins to exist at t2. 
In this case, x exists at a time that y does not exist, namely f0; and y exists at a time that 
x does not exist, namely t2. So, by A6, x and y are not identical: their existence is 
successive, rather than continuous.1
Now Reid’s view is that the operations of mind are, “in their nature”, successive. 
What he means by this, I take it, is that every individual operation of mind is of a 
limited duration: it begins to exist at a time and ceases to exist at a time.2 And if any 
two individual operations are of the same kind and degree,3 then they could not exist at 
the same time; for then they would be one and the same individual operation. Hence 
they must occur successively, in which case, by A6, they could not be identical. Suppose 
a certain feeling of pain occurs at t0, but then ceases at tv If a pain, of the same kind and 
degree as that which occurred at t0, begins to exist at t2, it could not, by A*, be identical 
to the former pain. Operations of mind that are of the same kind and degree, are 
therefore individuated by their successive existence.
The changes that occur in the operations of mind are not due merely to the 
successive occurrence of individual operations. There is also a succession of change in 
the degree or modifications of those operations. More precisely, Reid distinguishes 
between two kinds of attributes:
D3 Primary attributes = df attributes belonging to individual objects.
D4 Secondary attributes = attributes belonging to attributes, such as a certain 
degree or modification of a primary attribute.4
For example, the primary attribute of being removed may have the secondary 
attributes of being quick or slow, rectilinear or curvilinear, accelerated or retarded, and 
so on.5 Likewise, the operations of mind may be strong or weak, of greater or lesser 
force and vivacity. In other words, A^does not apply merely to primary attributes: the
1 “That which hath ceased to exist, cannot be the same with that which afterwards begins to exist; for this 
would be to suppose a being to exist after it ceased to exist, and to have had existence before it was produced, 
which are manifest contradictions.” IP, p. 317.
2 Reid states that operations “are all successive in their nature like time itself, no two moments of which 
can be the same moment.” IP, p. 317. I take it that he does not mean to suggest that the succession of 
operations occurs with some kind of temporal regularity (e.g. one operation per second), or temporal 
extension (e.g. each operation endures for one second). Nor is he suggesting that operations are successive 
just because they have temporal parts: otherwise even space, being “at all times” (IP, p. 313), would be 
successive. Rather, Reid is merely attempting to describe the phenomena discovered to us by consciousness 
or reflection, namely, that our individual operations of mind are, by their nature, of a limited duration. They 
are not, in other words, like space, of which no limits can be set, “either of extent or of duration.” IP, p. 262.
3 Reid clearly held that more than one operation could occur at a time; hence, he must have individuated 
such co-occurring operations according to differences in kind and degree, or so I will argue.
4 Reid’s ontology of attributes is examined more detail in Chapter 4, § 43-4.
5 IP, p.p 433-34.
1 MIND 6
substituends for x and y could also be secondary attributes. Thus, every modification of 
an individual operation of mind is of a limited duration: it begins to exist at a time and 
ceases to exist at a time. And if any two modifications are of the same kind and degree, 
then they could not exist at the same time; for they would then be one and the same 
modification. Hence they must exist in succession. Suppose, for example, we feel a 
certain degree of pain at t0, which, at f, subsides or weakens, but then at t2 increases to 
precisely the same degree of pain felt at t0. It follows that, by A*, the operations of mind 
occurring at t0 and at t2 are not identical. For although they are the of same kind and 
degree of operation, and there is even continuity with respect to the kind of operation it 
is, there is no continuity with respect to the degree of the operation. Operations of mind 
that are of the same kind and degree may therefore be individuated by the succession 
of their various degrees or modifications. In sum, the operations of mind, in Reid’s 
view, change over time by virtue of their limited duration, successive existence, and the 
successive changes of their attributes.
The problem, then, is this: with such change occurring in the attributes of mind, how 
is it possible that the subject of such attributes should nevertheless have a continuous 
uninterrupted existence? In what does the mind’s identity consist if its attributes are 
changing over time? Reid’s solution is based on his rejection of the following principle:
A7 If x has a (primary or secondary) attribute F at f, and y does not have F at t2, 
then x is not identical to y.
That is to say, a change in a primary attribute does not necessarily imply a change in 
a substance: for example, a person may lose a limb, and yet remain the same person.1 
Likewise, a change in a secondary attribute does not necessarily imply a change in the 
primary attribute: for example, movement is still a movement, whether it is quick or 
slow. However, if the attribute concerned is essential to the object, rather than 
accidental, then the matter is quite different. That is, where:
Ds F is an essential attribute of x = df it is not possible that x should exist and fail 
to b e f .2
D6 F is an accidental attribute of x = df it is possible that x should exist and fail to 
bef.
Reid would accept the following principles:
1 “If [a man] has a leg or an arm cut off, he is the same person he was before. The amputated member is 
no part of his person” IP, p. 317.
2 Eg., “a triangle cannot exist without a particular quality of angles and relation of sides” IP, p. 484.
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Ag If x has an essential attribute F at tj and y does not have F at t2, then x is not 
identical to y.
A9 It is possible that x is identical to y, even if x has an accidental attribute F at t} 
and y does not have F at t2.
Thus, a person may lose a hand and yet remain the same person, simply because 
such a limb is an accidental, not an essential attribute of persons. This is, indeed, the 
force of Reid’s objection to Hume’s attempt to distinguish the operations of belief and 
conception in terms of their varying degrees of force and vivacity: that is, degrees of 
force and vivacity, he argues, are secondary accidental attributes of every operation of 
mind; hence, belief and conception cannot be defined by reference to them.1
Now Reid’s claim is that the mind has a continuous uninterrupted existence, even 
though its individual operations do not, just because the existence of this or that 
individual operation is an accidental, not essential attribute of mind. Hence, by A*, it is 
possible that a mind which exerts one kind of operation at f, should be identical to a 
mind which exerts a quite distinct kind of operation at t2.
This is not to say that the mind has no essential attribute. However, as we have seen, 
our knowledge of mind is severely limited. Indeed, we know of only one essential 
attribute: the mind is that which stands in the relation of subject to its operations.2
4 KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
We have seen that personal identity, for Reid, consists in the continuity of mind 
through the successive existence of its accidental attributes. The problem, as Reid 
recognises, is to show how it is that we know that the mind is thus continuous.3 For 
example, how can we rule out the possibility that there exists a multitude of unique 
substances, having only one operation per substance? Or that minds exist successively, 
being replaced periodically by other minds? 4
1 “ To say . . .  that two different dasses, or spedes of perceptions, are distinguished by the degrees of then- 
force and vivadty, is to confound a difference of degree with a difference of species” IP, p. 28. For a more 
detailed examination of Reid’s objection to Hume, see Chapter 4, § 3.
2 “There are other relative notions that are not taken from acddental relations . .  . but from qualities or 
attributes essential to the thing. 1 Of this kind are our notions both of body and mind. . . .  if it should be 
asked. What is mind? It is that which thinks. I ask not what it does, or what its operations are, but what it is? 
To this I can find no answer; our notion of mind being not direct, but relative to its operations" AP, p. 8-9. Cf. 
IP, p. 326. This account, I believe, answers Chisholm’s question regarding Reid’s view on whether or not we 
can know the essential attributes of substances. See R. M. Chisholm, “Keith Lehrer and Thomas Reid”, 
Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), 33-38: p.36
3 “How do you know; what evidence have you, that there is such a permanent self which has a daim to 
all the thoughts, actions, and feelings, which you call yours?” IP, p. 318.
4 For various other possibilities, see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993): p. 51.
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Reid’s approach to this epistemic puzzle, is to appeal to two first principles relating 
to memory, that is:
CP4 “those things did really happen which I distinctly remember“ 1
CPS “[we havel our own personal identity and [a] continued existence, as far back 
as we remember anything distinctly” 2
The full weight of this solution will surface in our discussion of Reid’s epistemology 
of first principles. At this point, we need to explain just how it is that these two 
principles, taken together, might be understood to solve the puzzle. Suppose that S is 
conscious of an operation of mind O occurring at t 0. Suppose also that, at some later 
time t5, S remembers having been conscious of O. Reid’s claim is that, in accordance 
with CP4, this act of remembrance would produce in S the following self-evident belief:
(1) The person who was conscious of O at t 0 is identical to the person who is 
remembering O at f5.3
Now it follows from (1) and A6 that:
(2) The person who is remembering O at t5 has had a continued existence since f0-4
Reid does not, however, suggest that S must perform any such act of reasoning in 
order to form the belief that she has had a continued existence since f0. We know that 
this could not be Reid’s solution since (2) is an instance of the first principle CP5; and 
such beliefs are, by definition, not formed by way of reasoning.5 Reid’s point, then, is 
this: if S remembers O at t5, it would be self-evident to her, in accordance with CPS, that 
she has had a continued existence since ts. Thus, if S can remember distinctly an 
operation of mind O that occurred in her childhood, then it matters not if she fails to 
remember most of the operations that occurred between the occurrence of O and the 
time of her remembrance of O. For the mere remembrance of O produces in her the self- 
evident belief that she has had a continued existence since the time of O, and was thus 
the subject of all the operations of which she was conscious in the intervening duration, 
even those of which she has no memory.
1 IP. p.583.
2 IP, p.586.
3 “Every mein in his senses believes what he distinctly remembers, and every thing he remembers 
convinces him that he existed at the time remembered.” IP, p. 236.
4 “If it was done by me, I must have existed at that time, and continued to exist from that time to the 
present” IP, p. 318.
5 See Chapter 4, § 7.
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As for her existence prior to the earliest distinct memory, Reid argues that we have 
the evidence of testimony: that is, we may take, as good evidence, the reports of those 
who remember events of which we appear have been conscious during our infancy.1
5 THE UNIQUENESS OF M IN D
There is an apparent problem with this interpretation, however. Reid advocates a first 
principle which suggests that he thought memory was an unnecessary source of 
evidence with regard to the belief in our continuous existence, namely:
CP2 “the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call 
myself, my mind, my person”.2
Or, with elaboration:
“The thoughts and feelings of which we are conscious are continually changing, and the 
thought of this moment is not the thought of the last; but something which I call myself, 
remains under this change of thought. This self has the same relation to all the successive 
thoughts I am conscious of, they are all my thoughts; and every thought which is not my 
thought, must be the thought of some other person.” 3
Thus, for any operation of mind O of which I am conscious, it is self-evident to me 
that O belongs to the same identical subject, namely myself. Now Reid thinks that there 
is no thought of which we are not conscious;4 hence, all the operations of my mind 
belong to the same continuously existing subject, namely myself. But if so, the appeal to 
memory, as captured in CP5, appears to be redundant.
However, it may be that Reid was intending CP2, among other things,5 as a way of 
eliminating a related puzzle: Why should we think that each operation to which we 
attend, belongs to only one substance? We have nothing so far that would disallow the 
possibility that each operation to which we attend belongs not only to us, but to another 
distinct mind, or perhaps several.
Reid’s answer is given in the elaboration of CP2 above: namely, that, for any 
operation of mind 0 , if I am not conscious of 0, then some other mind with which I am 
not identical must be conscious of 0. For example, suppose two individual operations
1 “Although memory gives the most irresistible evidence of my being the identical person that did such a 
thing, at such a time, I may have other good evidence of things which befel me, and which I do not 
remember: I know who bare me, and suckled me, but I do not remember these events.” IP, p. 318.
2 IP, p. 581.
3 IP, p.582.
4 “an operation of mind of which we are not conscious, is, we know not what; . . .  No man can think, 
without being conscious that he thinks.” IP, p. 222.
5 Reid’s objection to Hume’s bundle theory of mind in the context of CP2 suggests that he takes it to 
perform a similar function to NPM1, namely, giving us a self-evident belief in the operation-mind distinction.
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of mind, 0, and 0 2, occur at the same time and are of the same kind and degree. By A*, 
they should be identical operations. However, suppose I am conscious of O, and some 
other mind, with which I am not identical, is conscious of 0 2. Should we still say that Oj 
and 0 2 are identical? Could the very same individual thought of which I am conscious, 
also be that individual thought of which another mind is conscious? Reid’s reply is 
that, whilst we may have no good reason to exclude this possibility, it is self-evident to 
us that O, and 0 2are not identical. More precisely, where S, and S2 are non-identical 
persons or minds, and O is any individual operation of mind, it is self-evident to us, in 
accordance with CP2, that if O is an attribute of St, then O is not an attribute of S2.
6 THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL D IST IN C T IO N
This brings us to a related point. Reid distinguishes between things that are ‘in’ the 
mind and things that are ‘external’ to the mind. What precisely does he mean by this 
distinction? What, for instance, would count as an ‘external object’ in Reid’s view?
Reid makes two disclaimers regarding the preposition ‘in’. First, it is not to be taken 
in a spatial sense: to say that a thing is ‘in’ the mind does not mean that it is located 
within the spatial dimensions of the mind, whether or not the mind has any such 
location.1 Second, it is not to be taken in its figurative sense, where we say that 
something is ‘in’ our minds, meaning that it is the object of our thought.2 The sense 
Reid wishes to advocate is this:
A10 x is in the mind if and only if x is an attribute of the mind.3
What, then, is Reid’s criterion for a thing being ‘external’ to the mind? Taking it for 
granted that no mind can be external to itself:
1 In his manuscripts, Reid indicates his uncertainty as to whether the mind or its attributes are spatially 
located. “Perhaps neither the Mind, nor the things said to be in it, can be said to be in any place; but whether 
this be so or not” 4 /I I /2 ,13; cf. “When we speak of the place of a Body we know distinctly what we mean. 
But tho the mind may have a place for what we know, we have no knowledge [how or] in what manner it 
occupies a place, or how it is related to extension or space. As little can we ascribe place to its operations so as 
to understand (what) we mean. Let it be granted then that we cannot with propriety and understanding 
ascribe a place to a meer Sensation. We can only ascribe to it a subject, and that is the Mind or sentient Being.” 
8/II/24a, 2
2 IP,p. 15
3 IP, p. 15; cf. “the things said to be in the Mind, are things that have a Relation to the Mind as their 
Subject”. MS 4 /I I /2 ,13. This distinction enables Reid to avoid the passive, mechanistic, or ‘container’ view of 
the mind upon which the Ideal System based it claim that external objects cannot be immediate objects of 
thought. As Ben-Zeev notes, “Since mental properties are not internal entities, but properties of a whole 
organic system, the internal-external dichotomy, which is at the basis of the theory of ideas, does not arise.” 
A. Ben-Zeev, “Reid’s Opposition to the Theory of Ideas”, in M. Dalgamo and E. Matthews, eds. The Philosophy 
of Thomas Reid (Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, PSS 42,1989): p. 92.
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An x  is external to a mind S if and only if x  is either a substance, or an attribute 
that belongs to a substance that is not identical to S.1
For example, this stone before me is a substance; hence, it is external to my mind. 
The motion, weight and dimensions of the stone are attributes; but they belong to the 
stone, and therefore, to a substance that is not identical to my mind; hence, they are 
external to my mind. Finally, your mind is a substance, and your thoughts are 
attributes of a substance that is not identical to my mind; hence, your mind and your 
thoughts are external to my mind. 2 In short, “Excepting the mind itself, and things in 
the mind, all other things are said to be external” .3
1 External things “are either other Substances that is other Minds, or bodies, which are not in any Subject, 
or the Accidents belonging to other Substances which have their own proper Subjects.” MS 4 / 11/ 2, 13.
2 “A House, a tree, or a Stone, are things that are not in the Mind but external to it, because these are 
Substances, and are not in any Subject. The motion of a Stone, the weight, or the figure of it, are not things in 
the Mind but external, because these, though they are accidents and therefore must be in some Subject, yet 
they are not in the Mind as their Subject but in the Stone The Mind of another Man is not in my Mind because 
it is in no Subject, the thoughts of another man cannot be in my mind because they must be in his own Mind 
as their Subject” MS 4 /II/2 ,13-14.
3 “When we attend to any change that happens in Nähme, judgment informs us, that there must be a 
cause of this change, which had power to produce it,” IP, p. 518.
2
Agency
INTRODUCTION
Reid claims that the intellectual powers, such as judgment, conception, consciousness 
and perception, are, to some degree, subject to the will.1 Whether or not, or to what 
degree Reid is a voluntarist with respect to the operation of believing is, of course, 
crucial to determining his concept of epistemic justification.2 However, we cannot 
formulate Reid’s view on this matter with any precision without first exploring his 
account of what constitutes a voluntary action. And this, in turn, requires a full-scale 
examination of Reid’s view of agency. We begin, then, with his account of causation.
1 CAUSATION
Reid claims that, upon attending to some event in nature E, we believe that there must 
be a cause that had the power to produce E.3 But how is it that we come to form this 
belief? Upon what grounds is it based?
Reid’s answer here is to appeal to precisely the same process by which we arrive at 
our knowledge of mind, namely, that we have only a mere relative conception of 
causes. For, upon attending to any event in nature E, we find that: (i) we have direct 
conception of some event E, (ii) we conceive of E as bearing the relation of ‘being an 
effect o f to some cause C, and (iii) we do not have any direct conception of C. It follows 
that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect could not arrive by way of 
a comparison between E and C; nor could it arrive by way of any deductive or 
inductive argument. For example, if we observe that E has been regularly conjoined to a 
certain preceding event D, we would tend to pick out D as the ‘cause’ of E. But it is 
clear, Reid argues, that our observation gives us no warrant for claiming anything more 
than that D is related to E merely as a sign is to a thing signified.4 That is, we are so 
constituted that D functions as a sign signifying to us the occurrence of E, whether 
immediately or soon thereafter. But we can provide no explanation, in terms of the
1 “the understanding is always more or less directed by the will, mankind have ascribed some degree of 
activity to the mind in its intellectual operations.” IP, p. 67-68.
2 For a recent comprehensive discussion of this issue, see William P. Alston, “The Deontological 
Conception of Epistemic Justification”, in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1989): Essay 5.
3 IP, p.518.
4 “effects and causes, in the operations of nature, mean nothing but signs, and the things signified by them. 
We perceive no proper causality or efficiency in any natural cause, but only a connection established by the 
course of nature between it and what is called its effect.” HM, p. 47.
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nature of D and E themselves, as to why they should be regularly connected. More to 
the point, we can perceive no necessary connection between the two, such that we 
could confidently dte the occurrence of D as the efficient cause of E. We cannot cite D as 
that without which E would not have occurred. For all we can tell, E might well have 
occurred without D. 1
As a consequence, we have no grounds for ruling out the possibility that D and E 
might not be conjoined in the future; and we rarely have either the cognitive ability or 
the evidence to construct a sound inductive argument to the effect that the future will, 
in this respect, resemble the past; at least, not such evidence as to warrant the kind of 
certainty we ordinarily take ourselves to have in the uniformity of nature. Indeed, if we 
were so constituted that we could not obtain any confidence in the regularity of natural 
phenomena until we could provide a proportionate degree of evidence, we would 
perish for the lack of it.2 For this reason, Reid suggests, we have been so designed that 
our belief in the regularity of nature is a first principle, namely:
CP6 “in the phaenomena of nature, v/hat is to be, will probably be like to what has 
been in similar circumstances” .3
In short, Reid concludes that our belief that some event E must be the effect of some 
cause C is produced in us by way of the same process that we form our belief that 
thinking is an attribute of the mind: upon forming a distinct conception of E, we 
immediately judge that there must be some C such that E is the effect of C.4
Reid is not, therefore, a regularity theorist: he does not accept the view that “priority 
and constant conjunction is all that can be conceived in the notion of a cause” .5 This 
might have been so, he argues, if our concept of causation arose merely from our 
observation of regularities in the material world.6 But this is not the case: it arises from
1 “We see events, but we see not the power that produces them. We perceive one event to follow another, 
but we perceive not the chain that binds them together.” AP, p. 313.
2 The epistemological framework within which Reid’s claims here must be understood, will be examined 
in detail in Chapter 5.
3 IP, p. 603; cf. “the principle is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning, and 
therefore is made a part of our constitution, and produces its effects before the use of reason.” Ibid
4 Reid draws this parallel explicitly in the following passage: “By attending to the operations of thinking, 
memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge, that there must be something which thinks, remembers, and 
reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in Nature, judgment informs 
us, that there must be a cause of this change, which had power to produce it; and thus we get the notions of 
cause and effect, and of the relation between them.” IP, p. 518.
5 AP, p. 290. Reid attributed this view to Hume; but there is considerable scholarly disagreement as to 
whether or not Hume was indeed a regularity theorist. See Edward Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of 
Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David 
Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
6 Reid also argues against the regularity theory on the grounds that (i) we would need to conclude that 
“night is the cause of day”, (ii) “all reasonings from final causes, must be given up as fallacious”, (iii) “we 
would have no reason to conclude, that every event must have a cause”; (iv) “we would have no reason to
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the consciousness we have of the exertion of power in ourselves. When we are 
conscious of some change in the direction of our thought or when we observe some 
bodily movement, we again find ourselves with a conception of a cause that brings 
about these changes. However, unlike our conception of causes in nature, this is not a 
mere relative conception: for we have a direct conception of the cause in question, 
namely, our willing to exert some power of our mind.* 1 It should be made clear that 
Reid does not claim that we have anything like a complete grasp of how our exertions of 
power bring about E.2 However, we are at least conscious that E would not have 
occurred unless we had willed to exert some power of mind so as to bring about E. That 
is, upon comparing the event of our willing to exert some power with E, we 
immediately judge that E must have been produced, at least in part, by that willed 
exertion of power.3
Consequently, Reid argues, while we may obtain an obscure conception of a cause 
by attending to changes or events in nature, we can only obtain a distinct conception of 
a cause by means of the consciousness we have of our own volitions to exert a power of 
mind to bring about some effect.4 Thus, it is by virtue of their provenance, Reid 
suggests, that our concepts of cause, effect, power and action may be set out as follows:
D7 Cause = dj a substance which, by willing the exertion of its power, brings 
about a change either in itself or in some other substance.
D8 Effect = df that change which is brought about by a cause. 5
conclude that there was any cause of the creation of this world”; and (v) there exists a plausible definition of a 
cause which does not entail (i)-(iv), namely, Reid’s own account. AP, pp. 342-43.
1 More precisely, in any causal activity, we can only have a direct conception of the exertion of power. We 
do not, in Reid’s view, have anything more than a mere relative conception of either the mind itself or any 
power of the mind. (See AP, p. 8).
2 “when I attempt to comprehend the manner in which an efficient cause operates, either upon body or 
mind, there is darkness which my faculties are not able to penetrate.” AP, pp. 52-3; Again, “That there is an 
established harmony between our willing certain motions of our bodies, and the operation of the nerves and 
muscles which produces those motions, is a fact known by experience. This volition is an act of the mind. But 
whether this act of the mind have any physical effect upon the nerves and muscles; or whether it be only an 
occasion of their being acted upon by some other efficient, according to the established laws of nature, is hid 
from us. So dark is our conception of our own power when we trace it to its origin.” AP, p. 50.
3 “Power without will produces no effect; but, where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced.” 
AP, p. 343.
4 “It is very probable, that the very conception or idea of active power, and of efficient causes, is derived 
from our voluntary exertions in producing effects; and that, if we were not conscious of such exertions, we 
should have no conception at all of a cause, or of active power” AP, p. 278. Cf. “If it be so that the conception 
of an efficient cause enters into the mind, only from the early conviction we have that we are the efficients of 
our own voluntary actions, (which I think is most probable) the notion of efficiency will be reduced to this. 
That it is a relation between the cause and the effect, similar to that which is between us and our voluntary 
actions. This is surely the most distinct notion, and  I think, the only notion we can form of real efficiency.” 
AP, p. 40. Note, Reid, in this final phrase, is not ruling out the mere relative conception of causes we obtain 
from natural events. He is simply rejecting the regularity theory.
5 “That which produces a change by the exertion of its power, we call the cause of that change; and the 
change produced, the effect of that cause.” AP, p. 13; “The name of a cause and of an agent, is properly given to
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D9 Active power = ^that attribute in a cause, the exertion of which is brought 
about by the agent’s volition in order to bring about an effect.
D10 Act or operation = df that attribute in a cause, which is the exertion of a 
power to bring about an effect* 1
Now if these are indeed the concepts with which we are working, it is hardly 
surprising that we cannot locate any causes in the material world. For, as D7 implies, a 
cause is that which exerts its power by the exercise of its will. But no inanimate thing 
has a will, and hence no active power.2 It moves as it is moved: it does not perform 
‘actions’, in the sense of D10.3 To be sure, Reid argues, natural philosophers commonly 
state that matter has ‘the power of gravitation’, and other ‘attractive or repulsive 
powers’. But philosophers also teach that matter is “a substance altogether inert, and 
merely passive”; and that the power of gravitation and other active powers are not 
inherent in the nature of matter, but are impressed upon it by some unknown, and 
unexplained external cause. Hence, either philosophers hold contradictory doctrines, or 
they expect their ascriptions of active power to matter ‘‘not to be understood strictly, 
but in some popular sense. ” 4 Indeed, they would, with Reid, argue that to attribute 
causal powers to inanimate objects is the product of a pre-scientific understanding of 
natural causes. Upon perceiving changes in some inanimate object, a person, who is 
otherwise uninformed of the laws of nature, will, by analogy with the changes they 
them selves bring about, tend to  ascribe a similar agency to the object itself. Reid th u s 
takes his account of the origin of our concept of causation, to further provide a probable
that being only, which, by its active power, produces some change in itself, or in some other being.” AP, p. 
276.
1 “The exertion of active power we call action” AP, p. 12; “every operation of the mind is the exertion of 
some power of the mind.” AP, p. 7.
2 “All proper Causation supposes activity, and we have no sufficient reason to believe that there is any 
real Activity in any part of the material System.” MS 4/1/23,2 . Cf. AP, p. 41. Stalley argues that Reid cannot 
justify his position here: Reid, he states, “allows that we can form a conception of things of which we have no 
direct awareness - active power is itself a case in point. It is difficult to see therefore why he should think that 
we cannot conceive of any kind of power which could subsist in inanimate bodies.” R. F. Stalley, “Causality 
and Agency in the Philosophy of Thomas Reid”, in M. Dalgamo and E. Matthews , eds. The Philosophy of 
Thomas Reid (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, P SS42,1989): p. 276. However, whilst Reid would 
accept that we have only a mere relative conception of the active powers in ourselves, he would argue that 
we do have (i) a direct conception of our willed exertions of those powers and (ii) a relative conception of the 
necessary connection between such willed exertions and the effects they produce; and that it is this that 
marks the distinction between our conception of changes that occur in ourselves and changes that occur in 
nature. If this were otherwise, Reid would say, we should not so readily cast aside anthropomorphisms.
3 “To body we ascribe various properties, but not operations, properly so called; it is extended, divisible, 
moveable, inert, it continues in any state in which it is put; every change of its state is the effect of some force 
impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that 
force.” IP, p. 16.
4 AP, p. 44.
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explanation for the origin of anthropomorphisms.1
Reid not only held that, for any event we observe, we immediately judge that it must 
have a cause; he also thought that we believe every event must have an cause. But on 
what grounds might we form such a belief? It could not be on the basis of our 
experience. For we have no experience of causation in nature; and our experience of 
causation in ourselves is insufficient evidence upon which to base such a general 
conclusion.2 Indeed, no amount of such evidence could be sufficient. For the principle in 
question is a necessary truth; and no necessary truths can be derived from experience. 
Hence, not even the strongest inductive argument would suffice.3 In short, this belief 
has all the marks of a first principle, namely;
NPm2 “whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced it.” 4
Now Reid held that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as event-causation: the 
only causes are agent-causes. It follows that, if there is some event in nature which is 
not caused by some human agent, it must be ascribed to some non-human agent, 
namely God or some intermediate agent that serves as the instrument of God’s will.5 
NPvq is therefore equivalent to the occasionalist doctrine that:
A12 Every event must be caused by either God or a created agent.6
1 “it is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we perceive any thing to be 
changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can believe to be the cause of that change, to impute 
it to the thing itself, and conceive it to be active and animated, so far as to have the power of producing that 
change in itself.. . .  The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourselves, and 
therefore are disposed to ascribe to them that life and activity which we know to be in ourselves.” AP, p. 17.
2 “Causation is not an object of sense. The only experience we can have of it, is in the consciousness we 
have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a 
foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a beginning must have a 
cause.” IP, p. 616. It is interesting to note, that Reid makes a similar objection against the regularity theory, 
namely, that it would give us“no reason to conclude, that every event must have a cause”, for this would 
require an inductive inference to a necessary truth. AP, p. 342.
3 “the proposition to be proved is not a contingent but a necessary proposition. It is not, that things which 
begin to exist commonly have a cause, or even that they always in fact have a cause; but that they must have 
a cause, and cannot begin to exist without a cause. Propositions of this kind, from their nature, are incapable 
of proof by induction. Experience informs us only of what is or has been, not of what must be; and the 
conclusion must be of the same nature with the premises.” IP, p. 615.
4 IP, p. 613. A contemporary defence of this principle is given by T.D. Sullivan, “Coming To Be Without a 
Cause”, Philosophy 65 (1990), 261-270.
5 Del Ratzsch appears to hold a similar view; “there have been philosophers who have argued that our 
concepts of cause, power, and so forth have grown out of our own experiences as agents who cause things, 
who have various powers. If those concepts are indeed fundamentally agent-concepts, then in attributing 
them to other sorts of objects we may be anthropomorphizing nature (or agentmorphizing it), whereas a 
more occasionalistic agent-based view may have some inherent conceptual advantages.” Del Ratzsch, 
“Nomo(theological Necessity” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990): p. 205.
6 “When we say of any thing, that it is the work of nature, this is saying that it is the work of Goo, and can 
have no other meaning.” AP, p. 308; “ it has pleased the Almighty to bestow upon some of his creatures.
2 AGENCY 17
2 SCIEN TIFIC EXPLANATIONS
Reid pleads ignorance with respect to the precise means by which God brings about 
events in the natural world. He does, however, make two important claims: first, it is 
likely that God acts in the world either “immediately”, or by “subordinate intelligent 
agents”, or by “instruments that are unintelligent” .* 1 Second, the regularity we perceive 
in natural phenomena may be explained or accounted for by reference to the laws of 
nature, which, in turn, are explained as being “the rules by which the Supreme Being 
governs the world” .2
This second claim regarding what it is to ‘account for a phenomena’3 is of utmost 
centrality to Reid’s philosophy, both in terms of his criticism of the ideal system, and 
his own constructive philosophy.4 It is an especially central claim in his epistemology. 
Hence, in the present section, I shall explore this claim in some detail.
We may gain a degree of clarity in our exposition of Reid’s Newtonian concept of 
‘accounting for a phenomenon’, by reference to Hempel and Oppenheim’s “basic 
pattem of scientific explanation” .5 First, an explanation, they suggest, is an argument, 
the premises of which describe laws of nature together with antecedent or initial 
conditions (explanans). The conclusion describes the phenomenon to be explained, 
which may either be a particular event or a law of nature (explanandum). Second, they 
propose four conditions of adequacy for a scientific explanation:
particularly upon man, some degree of active power”. AP, p. 109. See AP, pp. 289-90, where Reid argues that 
there would be no reason to admit the existence of an intelligent cause of the universe, if the regularity theory 
is true. Cf. the discussion of Reid's occasionalism in C.J. McCracken, Malbranche and British Philosophy 
(Oxford, 1983): pp. 308-11; and Alfred J. Freddoso’s definition of occasionalism in “Medieval Aristotelianism 
and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”, in T.V. Morris, ed.. Divine & Human Action: Essays in 
the Metaphysics of Theism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988): p. 80.
1 AP, p. 34
2 IP, p .695.
3 Reid’s expression “accounting for a phenomenon of nature” is equivalent to the following: “solving it”, 
“shewing the cause of it” MS K160,1; “the solution of natural phaenomena” HM, p. 127; “to show us the cause 
of any natural effect” , the effect [a cause] is brought to explain” IP, p. 51; “investigation of what we call the 
causes of natural phenomena” Letter to Karnes, in W H, p. 57a; “inquiries into the causes of natural 
appearances”, “to shew the cause of [natural) appearances”, “assign its cause” IP, p. 113; ““to explain the 
phaenomena of Nature” IP, p. 134.
4 “accounting for a phaenomenon, or showing its cause,. . .  ought to be well understood, in order to judge 
of the theories by which Philosophers have attempted to account for our perception of external objects by the 
senses.” IP, p. 115.
5 Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, (1948), in Theories of 
Explanation,]. Pitt, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988): p. 11. Hempel and Oppenheim’s account 
(later refinements notwithstanding) is a useful exegetical tool, given (i) the absence of modem technicalities, 
and (ii) their own acknowledgment that the description merely “summarizes and states explicitly some 
fundamental points which have been recognized by many scientists and methodologists” (p. 41, n.7), among 
which we would find Isaac Newton, of whose philosophy of science Reid was an avid disciple. See“ Of 
Newton’s Rules of Philosophizing’ MS 361 / I  /4 ,12-23; in AC, pp. 182-92.
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“(RI). . .  The explanandum must be logically dedudble from the information contained in the 
explanans; for otherwise, the explanans would not constitute adequate ground for the 
explanandum. (R2) The explanans must contain general laws, and these must actually be
required for the derivation of the explanandum___ (R3) The explanans must have empirical
content; that is, it must be capable, at least in principle, of test by experiment or observation..
. .  (R4) The sentences constituting the explanans must be true.”1
In the following, I will show that Reid’s notion of accounting for a phenomenon 
adheres to this schema, and to Hempel and Oppenheim’s four conditions of adequacy.
First, Reid argues that, among other things, explanations give us ‘rational ground’ 
for believing that a certain phenomenon will occur: those grounds consisting of 
antecedent conditions and the relevant laws of nature:
“A person who has lived so long in the world, as to observe that nature is governed by fixed 
laws, may have some rational ground to expect similar events in similar circumstances”2
Second, Reid regards the relationship between explanatory facts (“general rules”) 
and the phenomena to be explained (“conclusions”) to be such as to constitute an 
argument:3
“if ever our philosophy concerning the human mind is carried so far as to deserve the name of 
science, . . .  it must be by observing facts, reducing them to general rules, and drawing just 
conclusions from them.”4
Third, Reid held that the premises of this argument must be true: that is to say, any 
claim regarding the existence of some phenomena or regularity in nature, must be 
sufficiently well supported by observation and experiment:
“laws of Nature, being general propositions, must be true or false. Sir Isaac Newton’s rule 
requires that none be admitted but such as are true.”5
1 Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” p. 11.
2 AP, p. 116. cf. “With regard to the phenomena of nature, the important end of knowing their causes, 
besides gratifying our curiosity, is, that we may know when to expect them, or how to bring them about. This 
is very often of real importance in life; and this purpose is served, by knowing what, by the course of nature, 
goes before them and is connected with them; and this, therefore, we call the cause of such a phaenomenon.” 
AP, pp. 44-45.
3 Reid does not give any explicit argument schema; nor does he state that, if the explanandum is a 
particular phenomenon, then at least one premise must include a description of the antecedent conditions. 
However, Reid was well aware that such a premise (i.e. a singular proposition treated as universal) would be 
required for a valid deductive inference. “Singular propositions have the force of universal propositions, and 
are subject to the same rules.” BA, pp. 367-68; cf. BA, pp. 348-49.
4 HM, p. 56.
5 MS 3061 /I  / 4 , 18; in AC p. 187; cf. “whatever is built upon conjecture, is improperly called science; for 
conjecture may beget opinion, but cannot produce knowledge. Natural philosophy must be built upon the 
phaenomena of the material system, discovered by observation and experiment.” IP, p. 40;“This is not true; 
and therefore it is no law of nature.” HM, p. 121.
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Fourth, Reid claimed that explanations must, for epistemic reasons, be deductive 
arguments.1 For example, he states that an explanation ought not to be “trusted”, unless 
the logical relationship between the explanandum and the explanans is “mathematical” 
or “demonstrative”: that is, the relationship between premises and conclusion must be 
such that it is impossible that the premises be true and the conclusion false:2
“The reasoning from the Laws of Nature to the Phaenomena to be accounted for by them, 
ought to be strictly Mathematical & demonstrative, otherwise it cannot be trusted, nor ought 
to be admitted in Philosophy” .3 4
Again, Reid states that, whether the explanandum is a description of a particular 
phenomenon or of a law of nature, it must be a “necessary consequence” of the 
explanans:
“By the cause of a phenomenon, nothing is meant but the law of nature, of which that 
phenomenon is an instance, or a necessary consequence.'*
1 Reid’s use of the word “deduction” (and cognates) may refer to either deductive or inductive inference. 
For example, Reid often uses phrases such as “by mathematical reasoning, be deduced” HM, p. 91; “deduced 
by demonstrative reasoning” IP, p. 456, or “deduced, in a mathematical form” IP, p. 84. If “deduction” were 
equivalent to “demonstration”, the qualification would hardly be necessary. Again, Reid uses the word in 
contexts where the inference is clearly inductive: “The laws of nature . . .  are justly deduced from observation: 
Like other general facts, they are not to be drawn from a few particulars, but from a copious, patient, and 
cautious induction” HM, p. 121; “We deduce [the laws of Nature] only from facts that fall within our own 
observation.” IP, p. 695. Perhaps the most explicit evidence is this: “if they can be shown to be dedudble from 
selfevident truths by demonstrative or probable reasoning” MS 6 /III/5 ,7.
2 “In every step of demonstrative reasoning, the inference is necessary, and we perceive it to be 
impossible that the conclusion should not follow from the premises. In probable reasoning, the connection 
between the premises and the conclusion is not necessary, nor do we perceive it to be impossible that the first 
should be true while the last is false.” IP, p. 675. See § 2.2 for an ambiguity in Reid’s use of the word 
‘demonstration’.
3 Student notes from Reid’s King’s College lectures (Session 1757-58), MS. K160,1.; Cf. “It is sufficient for 
our present purpose (to observe) that all just reasoning in Physidcs is either inductive or mathematical, when 
we infer the laws of nature from Phaenomena we reason by induction,. . .  when we deduce the phaenomena 
from the laws of Nature [we do so] by mathematical Reasoning” MS 4/1/23, 2; “In that branch of Natural 
Philosophy which explains phaenomena, there is no need of any other Rules of Philosophizing, than the rules 
of demonstrative reasoning. For a phaenomanon which is not demonstrated to be a necessary consequence of 
a law of Nature is not explained or accounted for.” MS, 3061/1/4,13; in AC, p. 183.
4 Letter to Karnes, in WH, p. 57b. Other examples: “we proceed to consider the phaenomena of single and 
double vision, in order to discover some general principle to which they all lead, and of which they are the 
necessary consequences.” HM, p. 28; “from particular phaenomena, we may, by induction, trace out general 
phaenomena, of which all the particular ones are necessary consequences.’’ HM, p. l27;“Facts reduced to general 
rules, and the consequences of those general rules, «ire all that we really know of the material world.” IP, p. 697; 
“This relation and sympathy between corresponding points of the two retime, I do not advance as a 
hypothesis, but as a general fact or phaenomenon of vision. All the phaenomena before mentioned, of single or 
double vision, lead to it, and are necessary consequences of it." HM, p. 132; “When we consider what a 
prodigious variety of effects depend upon the law of gravitation; how many phaenomena . . .  are shown to be 
the necessary consequences of this one law.” IP, p. 657; “If a Philosopher, therefore, pretends to show us the 
cause of any natural effect, whether relating to matter or to mind; let us first consider . . .  whether the effect it 
is brought to explain necessarily follows from it.” IP, p. 51. (My italics)
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“according to the just rules of philosophizing, we may hold it for a law of nature, until some 
more general law be discovered, whereof it is a necessary consequence.’*1
It might be thought that Reid is using the phrase “necessary consequence” to refer to 
a causal connection.2 However, (i) the phrase is more often than not used in the logical 
sense3; (ii) Reid commonly fails to articulate the distinction between events and the 
statements describing them (e.g. “we infer the laws of nature from Phaenomena”4); and 
(iii) Reid, as we have seen, claimed that we cannot discover any causal connections 
between natural events.5 Hence, there is good reason to think that Reid uses “necessary 
consequence” to refer only to the logical relationship between the explanandum and the 
explanans.
I shall now consider two possible objections to this exposition of Reid’s concept of 
explanation, both of which attempt to show that it is inconsistent with other claims that 
he makes.
2.1 ARE EXPLANATIONS DEDUCTIVE?
Reid seems not to allow the possibility of statistical or probabilistic explanations: that is, 
where law-statements are of a statistical form,6 and where the phenomenon is explained 
by showing that, given the antecedent conditions and the statistical laws, its occurrence 
is to be expected only with a high probability. However, Reid also held that law- 
statements, being obtained by induction, are, at best, only probable.7 If this is so, the 
objection goes, then Reid surely ought to have held that law-statements are of a
1 HM, p. 118. “If we can discover any such generell principle, it must either be a law of nature, or the 
necessary consequence of some law of nature” HM, p. 128. (My italics)
2 Reid uses it in this sense when describing Leibniz’s views: “Every perception or apperception, every 
operation, in a word, of the soul, is a necessary consequence of the state of it immediately preceding that 
operation” P , p. 221. (My italics)
3 “Thus the evidence of the fifth proposition of the first book of Eucuds Elements consists in this. That it is 
shown to be the necessary consequence of the axioms, and of the preceding propositions.” P , p. 273. (My italics)
4 MS 4/1/23, 2 . Cf. “we can say that there is a relation of logical necessity between the laws and the initial 
conditions on the one hand, and the event-to-be-explained on the other - though it would be more accurate to 
say that the relation of logical necessity holds between the explan an s-statements and the explanandum- 
statements.” W. C. Salmon, “The Causal Structure of the World”, in D. Ruben, Explanation, pp. 78-112 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993): p. 79.
5 This is particularly clear in the following passage, where Reid rejects the notion of ‘necessary 
consequence’, in this sense, as implying determinism:“that every event must be necessarily consequent upon 
something . . .  that went before i t . . .  is a direct assertion of universal fatality, and has many strange, not to 
say absurd, consequences.” AP, p. 339.
6 That is, “assertions to the effect that if certain specified conditions are realized, then an occurrence of 
such-and-such a kind will come about with such-and-such a statistical probability.” Carl G. Hempel, 
“Explanation in Science and History” (1962), in D. Ruben, Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993): p. 23.
7 “General maxims, grounded on experience, have only a degree of probability proportioned to the extent 
of our experience, and ought always to be understood so as to leave room for exceptions, if future experience 
shall discover any such.” IP, p. 615.
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statistical form, and so, that scientific explanations are probabilistic rather than 
deductive.
The problem with this kind of objection, as Hempel recognized, is that it fails to 
distinguish between the logical form of the claim made by a law-statement, and the 
degree of probability which it possesses. Statistical law-statements assert that some 
property is true of a proportion of the members of the class referred to by the subject 
term .1 But Reid holds that law-statements are universal propositions as defined by 
classical logic: that is, they assert that some property is true of all the members of the 
class referred to by the subject term.2
2.2 IS THE EXPLANANDUM DEMONSTRABLE?
Before presenting the second objection, we shall require a few definitions. First, the 
expression “propositions with empirical content” will be used, in relation to Reid, to 
mean the following:3
A13 Proposition p has empirical content if and only if p describes either (i) the 
existence of any created things, (ii) their attributes and relations, or (iii) the 
laws of nature.4
Second, Reid defines contingency and necessity as follows, where p is any proposition:
Au p is contingent if and only if the truth-value of p depends on some voluntary 
action.5
A! 5 p is necessary if and only if the truth-value of p is independent of some 
voluntary action.
1 Hempel, pp. 23-4.
2 “The Laws of Nature are general propositions, & the Phaenomena of Nature we derive from these are 
particular Propositions.” Student notes from Reid’s King’s College lectures (Session 1757-58), MS. K160,1.
3 Reid does not used the word “empirical” anywhere in his works: “matters of fact”, or “the truths/objects 
of natural philosophy” would be equivalent expressions: for example,‘The properties of body, and the laws 
that obtain in the material system, are the objects of natural philosophy, as that word is now used.” IP, p. 3.
4 “all the truths we know concerning the real existence of things; the truth of our own existence; of the 
existence of other tilings, inanimate, animal and rational, and of their various attributes and relations . . .  may 
be called contingent truths.” IP, p. 543. The MS version adds after ‘relations’ the following: “the Laws by 
which they are governed and all matters of fact concerning them” MS 8 /I I /6 ,6.
5 “That the planets of our system go round the sun from west to east, is a contingent truth; because it 
depended upon the power and will of him who made the planetary system, and gave motion to it. That a 
circle and a right line can cut one another only in two points, is a truth which depends upon no power nor 
will, and therefore is called necessary and immutable.” AP, p. 36; cf. IP, p. 576. Reid’s account of ‘voluntary 
action ’ is examined in § 5.
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Now Reid held that;
(1) If p has empirical content, then p is contingent.1 
But, as we shall see, he also held that:
(2) If p is the explanandum of any scientific explanation, then p has empirical 
content.
Reid must therefore accept that:
(3) If p is the explanandum of any scientific explanation, then p is a contingent 
truth.
Now, we have seen that Reid holds the following condition of adequacy:
(4) A scientific explanation is adequate only if the inference from the explanans to 
the explanandum is demonstrative.
But if he accepts that some scientific explanations satisfy this condition, then, given (3), 
Reid must also accept that:
(5) Some contingent truths are capable of strict demonstration.
The problem is that Reid explicitly argues in Intellectual Powers that:
(6) “No contingent truth is capable of strict demonstration”.2
Hence, Reid’s first condition of adequacy appears to lead him into an inconsistency. Of 
course, this result could be avoided if we could find reason why Reid would have 
denied any of the above premises. Unfortunately, they are each non-negotiable claims 
in Reid’s philosophy. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarifying Reid’s position, it will be 
useful to explore the consequences for Reid, were he to deny premise (3), that is, 
claiming instead that:
(3*) If p is the explanandum of any scientific explanation, then p is necessary.
First, Reid held that the conclusion of a sound argument “must be of the same nature 
with the premises”.3 More precisely:
1 “the truths of natural philosophy are not necessary truths, but contingent, depending upon the will of 
the Maker of the world” IP, p. 607; cf. IP, p. 577.
2 IP, p. 689. “demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to truths that are necessary, and not to those 
that are contingent” IP, p. 675.
3 “whatever can, by just reasoning, be inferred from a principle that is necessary, must be a necessary 
truth,. . .  no contingent truth can be inferred from principles that are necessary.” IP, p. 577. Reid appears to
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A16 Argument A  is sound only if A  is such that, (i) the conclusion is necessary if 
and only if the premises are necessary; and (ii) the conclusion is contingent if 
and only if the premises are contingent.
It follows from (3*) and A16 that Reid must also hold that
(7) If p  is the explanans of any scientific explanation, then p is necessary.
That Reid might have taken any particular antecedent condition to be a necessary truth 
is clearly out of the question. Suppose, however, that an explanation were to consist of 
only statements describing laws of nature. Is there any evidence that Reid understood 
law-statements to be necessary truths? Perhaps. First, Reid thought that a proposition 
that was independent of some voluntary action is such that it could not fail to be true. 
That is:
A17 p is a necessary truth if and only if “it is impossible [it] should not be true at 
all times and in all places”.* 1
Second, Reid states that the laws of nature are “fixed and immutable”,2 that the 
connections they describe will “continue from age to age”,3 or “to the end of the 
world”;4 that they are “invariable and uniform”, and that some are “exactly regulated 
by mathematical rules”.5 In short, he seems to hold that:
Ajg If p is a law-statement, then p is true at all times and in all places.
Could it be that Reid held that law-statements were propositions with empirical 
content, that their truth-value depended on upon God’s voluntary action, but that, 
along with God’s existence, they were uniquely necessary truths? To ascribe this view 
to Reid, we would need to show that he held the following:
A19 If p is a law-statement, then (i) God brings it about that p is true, and (ii) it is 
impossible that God should, at any time or place, bring it about that p  is false.
allow only one exception: “although the existence of the Deity be necessary,. . .  we can only deduce it from 
contingent truths.” IP, p. 453. However, Reid, I believe, is inconsistent on this point, inasmuch as he argues 
that our belief in the existence of God is not grounded upon the evidence of reasoning. See § 3.
1 IP, p. 543. In Chapter 4, § 6, I argue that a possible worlds interpretation of Reid’s view of modality best 
captures how it is that Reid perceives the connection between A 15 and A,7.
2 HM, p. 151.
3 HM, p. 91.
4 IP, p.603.
5 HM, p. 51.
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For then, the truth-value of a law-statement could depend upon God’s voluntary action 
even if it is, by definition, a necessary truth; and so, if explanations consist entirely of 
law-statements, (3*) would be true. Unfortunately, Reid would have rejected clause (ii). 
Although Reid thought that we have good reason to think that God will not at any 
future time permanently1 alter the laws of nature,2 he also held that God, being a free 
agent could do so if and when he pleased.3 In other words, even if, for all practical 
purposes, we may take the laws of nature to be “fixed and immutable”:
A20 If p  is a law-statement, then (i) God brings it about that p  is true, and (ii) it is 
possible that God should, at some time or place, bring it about that p is false.
But then, given A21, it follows that:
A2i If p is a law-statement, then p  is contingent.4
Must we conclude from all this, then, that Reid is simply inconsistent? I shall argue 
that we can avoid this implication by showing that Reid used the term ‘demonstration’, 
and cognates, ambiguously: that is, in (5), the sense of ‘demonstrative’ is logical; in (6) 
it is epistemological. More precisely:
A22 p  is logically demonstrated on the basis of q (call this ‘L-demonstration’) if
and only if the relationship between p and q is such that, if q is true, it is 
impossible that p should be false.
A23 p is epistemically demonstrated on the basis of q (call this ‘E-demonstration’) 
if and only if q affords the highest possible degree of justification for p : that is, 
q is such that we can be absolutely certain of the truth of p.
1 Reid allowed for temporary alterations: “since everyone who acknowledges the Being of a Deity, must 
know that He governs the universe by fixed & Stated laws, what Absurdity is there in conceiving that this 
Superior Governor should for reasons known to Himself, deviate from & suspend for a little these laws in 
evidence of his Power & authority in some extraordinary manner?” Thomas Reid, “A System of Logic Taught 
at Aberdeen, 1763”, Lectures on Logic, transcribed by John Campbell, 1774, Shelf Mark Dx. 3.2: p. 76 
(Abbreviations are lengthened in my transcription.); cf. AP, p. 338.
2 “because, if he did otherwise, we could learn nothing from what is past, and all our experience would 
be of no use to us.” HM, p. 191. Cf. AP, p. 338.
3 “The laws of Nature may be changed by him who established them.” IP, p. 697; “Neither miraculous 
events, which are contrary to the physical laws of nature, nor such ordinary acts of the Divine administration 
as are without their sphere, are impossible.” AP, p. 345.
4 By way of additional evidence for this doctrine, Reid argues against Priestly’s suggestion that the laws 
of nature are necessary truths: “although Aristotle taught the World long ago, that necessary Truths are onely 
known by Demonstration or by shewing the contrary to be imposible, & the World was so silly as to beleive 
him, yet Dr Priestly discovered a few months ago, that the proper Proof of necessary Truths is by Induction: 
And the evidence that any two things or Properties ae necessarly United. This was a great discovery. For it 
follows from it that before Mankind had ever observed Silver to be fusible by Heat it was necessarily hard. 
But as soon as this observation was made; A truth which before was necessary immediately changed its 
nature and became contingent.” MS, 3061 /9 ,2, in AC, p. 133.
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How do we obtain the kind of evidence required for an E-demonstration? Reid holds 
the following principle:
A24 If an argument is deductive, then the degree to which the conclusion is 
justified for a person by virtue of the premises alone, will be equal to the 
degree to which the premises are justified for her.1
So a conclusion is E-demonstrated just in case we have the highest possible degree of 
justification for the premises, and the argument is deductive. For then we will have the 
highest possible degree of justification for the conclusion: absolute certainty. The only 
kind of premises that will provide this kind of justification are necessary truths: for 
necessary truths are such that it is impossible that they should be false. It is for this 
reason that only necessary truths are E-demonstrable.2
L-demonstrations, on the other hand, afford no such certainty. For, if the degree to 
which the premises are justified for a person is only a high probability, then, by A24, 
even if the argument is deductive, the degree to which the conclusion is justified for her 
by virtue of the premises alone, will be only a high probability.3 Now only contingent 
truths are such that the degree to which they can be justified for a person is a high 
probability. Hence, contingent truths can be L-demonstrable and can serve as premises 
in an L-demonstration. But then it seems our interpretative problem is solved. Reid is 
speaking only of L-demonstration when describing the nature of scientific explanation, 
which explains (5); but when he defines “demonstrative reasoning“, he is referring to E- 
demonstration, which explains (6).
The cause of the ambiguous usage is this: Reid seems to think that, for any 
argument, if it is impossible that the premises should be true and the conclusion false, 
then it is impossible that the conclusion should be false. In other words, if an argument 
is an L-demonstration then it must also be an E-demonstration:4
1 “In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the 
weakest link of the chain, whatever may be the strength of the rest.” IP, pp. 674-74; “no conclusion of 
reasoning can have a greater degree of evidence than the first principles from which it is drawn.” IP, p. 560.
2 See IP, pp. 675-76.
3 “In games of chance, it is a first principle, that every side of a die has an equal chance to be turned up; 
and that, in a lottery, every ticket has an equal chance of being drawn out. From such first principles as diese, 
which are the best we can have in such matters, we may deduce, by demonstrative reasoning, the precise 
degree of probability of every event in such games. 1 But the principles of all this accurate and profound 
reasoning can never yield a certain conclusion, it being impossible to supply a defect in the first principles by 
any accuracy in the reasoning that is grounded upon them.” IP, p. 560.
4 This mistake is all the more surprising, given that Reid would have known from his reading of Aristotle 
that a deductive argument may be valid even if the premises are only probable: “When the premises are 
certain, and the conclusion drawn from them in due form, this is demonstration, and produces science. Such 
syllogisms are called apodictical; . . .  When the premises are not certain, but probable only, such syllogisms are 
called dialectical." BA, pp. 395-%.
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“In every step of demonstrative reasoning, the inference is necessary, and we perceive it to be 
impossible that the conclusion should not follow from the premises.. . .  ^ Hence [it follows 
that1] demonstrative reasoning has no degrees, nor can one demonstration be stronger than 
another, . . . Every demonstration gives equal strength to the conclusion, and leaves no 
possibility of its being false.“2
The hidden premise in this inference, of course, is this: ‘it is impossible that the 
premises should be false’ - which explains why Reid thought that the premises of an E- 
demonstration must consist of necessary truths.
Further evidence for this confusion is found Reid’s manuscripts. Take, for instance, 
John Campbell’s transcriptiöh of Reid’s 1763 lectures on logic: Reid begins by 
describing L-demonstrations (“the links of which are necessarily connected“), and then, 
apparently presupposing that if an argument is an L-demonstration it must also be an 
E-demonstration, he argues that an argument can be demonstrative only if the premises 
are mathematical, that is, necessary truths:
“Reasoning may be distinguished into that which is Probable & that which is Demonstrative. 
Mathematics afford the best Evidence of the latter kind, where from a few Axioms long trains 
of Reasoning are carried on, all the links of which are necessarily connected to with one
another___It has been disputed whether demonstrative evidence can be applied to any other
subject than Mathematics. For my part I don’t think it can . . .  if any thing is once 
demonstrated, & that demonstration is satisfactory, there is no room left for us to determine. 
We are necessarily obliged to credit the Demonstration. & can bring no objection against it, 
unless some Paralogism has been committed”3
There is, however, a passage in which Reid appears to acknowledge the possibility 
that the premises of an L-demonstration could be neither necessary truths nor 
deducible from necessary truths: in which case, as we have seen, the conclusion could 
not be E-demonstrated. However, even here, Reid unhelpfully uses the single word 
“demonstration” to refer to both senses. To clarify his point I have supplied the prefixes 
‘L-’ and ‘E-’ :
1 The text between the brackets is a variant from MS 7 /V /1 6 ,2/94.
2 IP, p.675.
3 Thomas Reid, “A System of Logic Taught at Aberdeen, 1763”: pp. 83-84. (Abbreviations are lengthened 
in my transcription.) See Michael FS. & E. “Reid’s Hume: Remarks on Hume in Some Early Logic Lectures of 
Reid”, Monist 70 (1988): pp. 508-526. In each of the following MS, Reid makes the same mistake: 
“Demonstration concludes necessarly so as that it is impossible the thing should be otherwise . . .  There are 
many things to which Demonstrative Evidence cannot be applyed nor ought it to be required.” MS 4 /II/1 2 ,3- 
4; “Demonstration is chiefly used in Mathematical Conclusions and these indeed are peculiarly adapted to 
Reasoning of this kind.” MS 4/1/26; “Mathematical Truths admit of Demonstration more than other truths” 
MS 4/1/19,1.
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“It is true, we often meet with L-demonstration in astronomy, in mechanics, and in other 
branches of natural philosophy; but I believe we shall always find that such L- 
demonstrations are grounded upon principles or suppositions, which have neither 
intuitive nor E-demonstrative evidence. 1 Thus when we L-demonstrate. that the path of 
a projectile in vacuo is a parabola, we suppose that it is acted upon with the same force, 
and in the same direction through its whole path by gravity. This is not intuitively 
known, nor is it E-demonstrable: And in the L-demonstration. we reason from the laws of 
motion, which are principles not capable of E-demonstration, but grounded on a different 
kind of evidence.”1
3 CAUSAL EXPLANATIO NS
We have seen that, in Reid’s view, because we can perceive no necessary connection 
between any antecedent condition C and event E, we cannot explain E merely by 
reference to C. Put another way, our knowledge of the occurence of C does not 
constitute sufficient evidence for the claim that E is to be expected. For we have only 
our experience of past conjunctions of C and E; and this gives us no guarantee that the 
future will resemble the past in this respect.2
We have also seen that the conjunction of law-statements with descriptions of 
antecedent conditions would, in Reid’s view, constitute a valid deductive argument, 
the conclusion of which is a description of the phenomena in question; that is, we may 
infer that the phenomenon-to-be-explained is to be expected, given the laws of nature 
and the occurrence of certain antecedent conditions. In short, Reid held that the laws of 
nature explain regularities, in the sense that they provide us with some rational ground 
to which we can appeal when the Humean sceptic objects that we have no explanation 
as to why this event occurred in these conditions, rather than some other event.3
The problem with this account is that laws of nature, on Reid’s view, are themselves 
contingent. Even if the laws are themselves explained by subsumption under higher- 
order laws, this approach will not give us the kind of explanation that would satisfy the 
Humean sceptic.4 One option is to conceive of the laws of nature as necessary truths. 
But this, as we have seen, is not an available option for Reid. Another possibility is to 
appeal, as Armstrong suggests, to an hypothesis which “traces back all appearance of 
contingency to a single necessary being, the Absolute, which is the sole reality.” 5
1 IP, pp. 539-40.
2 “experience informs us that they have been conjoined in time past: but no man ever had any experience 
of what is future: and this is the very question to be resolved” HM, p. 191.
3 Cf. “when making inferences to particular matters of unobserved fact. . .  [it is] the supposed laws which
ground our inferences___on the supposition that there are no laws, the inferences would not be rational.” D.
M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1983): p. 4.
4 Cf Armstrong, p. 159.
Armstrong rejects this option on account of its failure to produce explanatory results. Armstrong, p. 159.5
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Indeed, given Reid’s occasionalism, it might look as if this is his preferred solution. For 
example, he writes:
“The chain of natural causes has, not unfitly, been compared to a chain hanging down from 
heaven: A link that is discovered supports the links below it, but it must itself be supported; 
and that which supports it must be supported, until we come to the first link, which is 
supported by the throne of the Almighty.”1
But precision is crucial here. We may perhaps best clarify what kind of explanation it 
is that Reid thinks the First Cause provides, by examining his discussion of Leibniz’s 
Principle of Sufficient Reason as applied to natural phenomena, namely:
A25 “for every event,. . .  there must be a sufficient reason.”2
Reid argues that the only plausible rendering of this principle, is to take ‘sufficient 
reason’ to refer to the explanans of a scientific explanation.3 But laws of nature are not, 
in Reid’s view, causes; for a law is a mere conception of a general rule. Hence, Reid’s 
appeal to laws as a sufficient reason, is not an attempt to provide a causal explanation.4 
Laws of nature, then, are, in Reid’s view, general rules conceived in the mind of God 
according to which God has a determination of the will or a ‘fixed general purpose’5 to 
bring about, among other things, the general end of “enabling intelligent creatures to 
conduct their affairs with wisdom and prudence, and prosecute their ends by proper 
means.”6 It is crucial to note that laws of nature do not necessitate God’s action. Nor is 
he necessitated by any character trait, judgment or intention.7 In short, if, as Reid seems
1 IP, p. 115.
2 AP, p. 334. (The original italidzation of this sentence has been removed.)
3 “When we say that a Philosopher has assigned a sufficient reason for such a phaenomenon. What is the 
meaning of this? The meaning surely is. That he has accounted for it from the known laws of nature. The 
sufficient reason of a phaenomenon of nature must therefore be some law or laws of nature, of which the 
phaenomenon is a necessary consequence.” AP, pp. 337-38.
4 “When an event is produced according to a known law of nature, the law of nature is not the efficient 
cause of any event. It is only the rule, according to which the efficient cause acts. A law is a thing conceived in 
the mind of a rational being, not a thing that has a real existence; and, therefore, like a motive, it can neither 
act nor be acted upon, and consequently cannot be an efficient cause. If there be no being that acts according 
to the law, it produces no effect.” AP, 344; cf. “The laws of nature are the rules according to which the effects 
are produced; but there must be a cause which operates according to these rules.” AP, p. 47.
5 For an examination of Reid’s account of fixed general purposes, see Chapter 3, § 3.4. The application of 
the term ‘general fixed purpose’ in this context is, I suggest, confirmed by Reid’s letter to James Gregory, in 
which he states: “A law of nature is a purpose or resolution of the author of nature, to act according to a 
certain rule . .  . There must be a real agent to produce the phenomenon according to the law.” WH, p. 66b. 
Thus, where Reid states that some events are “directed by particular acts of the Divine government”, (AP, p. 
338), I take this to refer to the'particular fixed purposes’ of God.
6 AP, p.338.
7 “These laws of nature neither restrain the power of the Author of nature, nor bring him under any 
obligation to do nothing beyond their sphere.” AP, pp. 344-45; “Every natural cause must have a cause, until 
we ascend to the first cause, which is uncaused, and operates not by necessity but by w ill” IP, p. 115.
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to think, God’s free action may be thought of as, in some sense, analogous to our own 
free actions, then we may present Reid’s causal explanation of the regularities in nature 
as follows (A full explanation of this kind of analysis is given in § 7):
A26 Antecedent circumstances C and event E are constantly conjoined in nature if 
and only if God’s judgment regarding what is best upon the whole inclines 
him toward the exertion of his power of liberty so as to bring about a 
determination of will to act according to the rule: if, at any future time or 
place, C occurs, then bring about E.1
We have seen that our belief that the future will resemble the past, is, in Reid’s view, 
a first principle. However, he also held that this belief could be confirmed by reasoning: 
for we may appeal to the same kind of evidence we have for consistency in the future 
free actions of human agents. That is, our belief in the continuance of the laws of nature 
may be based on the evidence we have for the following two propositions:
(1) God is consistently wise and good in exerting his power of liberty;
(2) God’s character is such that he is consistent in adhering to the determinations 
of his will.2
If God failed to adhere uniformly to the laws of nature, human agents could learn 
nothing from what is past, and their experience would be of no use to them. In such a 
case, they would be unable to bring about their own ends by efficient and proper 
means; and, as a consequence, would either be unlikely to survive as a species; or they 
would be unable to act with wisdom and prudence.3 But these would be the general 
ends of a wise and good creator. Hence, to the extent that we find regularities in nature, 
(1) and (2) tend thereby to be confirmed.4
1 Del Ratzsch presents a contemporary defense of this kind of account regarding the laws of nature. In 
Chapter 3, I present Reid’s attempt to fill the “one substantial incompleteness” Ratzsch acknowledges in his 
paper: namely, an explanation of the “relationship among character, choice and freedom”. Ratzsch, p. 205. Cf. 
Strawson on occasionalism versus the regularity theory: “at least the Cartesians have God as the reason why 
there is regularity in nature. Their view is not simply crazy. But the standard modem ‘Humean’ view 
apparently has nothing at all as the reason why there is regularity in nature. And so it is that some positivists 
and ‘Humeans’, congratulating themselves on purging the excesses of the bad old metaphysics, finish up 
with the most rococo, the most magical metaphysics ever proposed.” Strawson, pp.199-200, n.2.
2 See Chapter 3, § 3.4 for a detailed examination of Reid’s view of character, and what is involved in 
adhering to the determinations of one’s will.
3 “We perceive that Nature is governed by fixed laws, and that if it were not so, there could be no such 
thing as prudence in human conduct; there would be no fitness in any means to promote an end; and what, 
on one occasion, promoted it, might as probably, on another occasion, obstruct it.” DP, p. 603.
4 “if we believe that there is a wise and good Author of nature, we may see a good reason, why he should 
continue the same laws of nature, and the same connections of things, for a long time: because, if he did
otherwise, we could learn nothing from what is past, and all our experience would be of no use to us-----this
consideration, when we come to the use of reason, may confirm our belief of the continuance of the present 
course of nature” HM, p. 47.
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And if, in any particular instance, God ‘suspends’ or ‘counteracts’ a law of nature,1 
he would do so precisely because he has judged that adherence to the law, in that 
circumstance, would fail to be what is best upon the whole: for example, bringing it 
about that human agents are, thereby, induced to acknowledge a dependency upon his 
providential power and purposes.2
4 TELEOLOGICAL EXPLA N A TIO N S
Reid does not consider inquiries into the efficient causes of natural phenomena to be 
the proper task for ‘natural philosophy’. Rather they are to be thought of as a branch of 
‘natural theology’ or ‘metaphysics’. The fixed purposes of God, Reid argues, are not 
discoverable by experiment and induction. The task of natural philosophy therefore is 
merely to discover, by “just induction”, the laws of nature; and so, it should be neutral 
with respect to any theological interpretation. For example, any claim regarding design 
or purpose, or, more precisely, whether or not there is a Supreme Being who acts 
according to the laws of nature to bring about certain general ends, is, Reid held, a 
matter to be decided upon by the metaphysician.3
Although Reid thus made a clear division between natural philosophy and 
metaphysics, he nevertheless argued that design and purpose could be ‘seen’ in natural 
phenomena: “final causes, good causes, are seen plainly everywhere: in the heavens 
and in the earth; in the constitution of every body and of mind” .4 More precisely, Reid 
argued that it was a first principle of metaphysics that:
NP^g “design and intelligence in the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from 
marks or signs of it in the effect.” 5
Reid’s expression of this principle is ambiguous, and therefore requires comment.6
1 AP, p. 345; cf. AP, p 338.
2 “it may be fit, that some particular events should not be fixed by general laws, but be directed by 
particular acts of the Divine government, that so his reasonable creatures may have sufficient inducement to 
supplicate his aid, his protection and direction, and to depend upon him for the success of their honest 
designs” AP, p. 338.
3 Letter to Karnes, WH, p. 58a. See also Reid’s letter to Karnes, 1 Oct. 1782 in Ross, pp. 60-61. This view is 
consistent with Hem pel and Oppenheim’s condition of adequacy, (R3): Teleological explanations, they argue, 
“are intended somehow to express the idea that the purposes they refer to are inherent in the design of the 
universe, then clearly they are not capable of empirical test” Hempel and Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation”, p. 16
4 Letter to Karnes, WH, p. 58b.
5 IP, p. 621.
6 Additional expressions of this principle are as follows:“ from certain signs or indications in the effect, 
we may infer, that there must have been intelligence, wisdom, or other intellectual or moral qualities in the 
cause” IP, p. 628; “it is . . .  a part of the human constitution, to judge of mens characters, and of their 
intellectual powers, from the signs of them in their actions and discourse . .  . intelligence, wisdom, and other 
mental qualities in the cause, may be inferred from their marks or signs in the effect.” IP, p. 622; “That effects 
which have all the marks and tokens of design must proceed from a designing cause.” IP, p. 626.
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First, NPfcß should not, I suggest, be read as follows:
If argument A is such that (i) its premises assert that some event E exhibits 
signs of design and intelligence, and (ii) its conclusion asserts that E was 
brought about by the design and intelligence of some cause, then -A is a 
sound argument.
Reid goes to considerable length in his discussion of NPm3 t 0  show that we do not 
construct any such inference. Indeed, Reid mentions that he is aware of such an 
argument, based on the doctrine of chances, which attempts to show that it is 
improbable that the “regular arrangement of parts” in nature, “should not be the effect 
of design”. But even if this argument were sound, Reid argues, it could not be the 
means by which we have arrived at this belief. For (i) the argument is based upon a 
branch of mathematics that is less than a hundred years old; (ii) the conclusion would 
be more certain than the doctrine of chances upon which the argument depends; (iii) 
the argument is likely to be circular, given that the doctrine of chances may itself be a 
particular instance of the conclusion.1
In short, the phrase “inferred, with certainty” should be taken in the same sense of 
the word “must” in NPM1 (“the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which 
we call mind”2). For, as the following text indicates, Reid held that N P^ produces the 
same kind of conception as NPM1, that is, a mere relative conception:
“The mind is not an immediate object either of sense or of consciousness. We may therefore 
justly conclude, that the necessary connection between thought and a mind, or thinking 
being, is not learned from experience. H The same reasoning may be applied to the connection 
between a work excellently fitted for some purpose, and design in the author or cause of that 
work. One of these, to wit, the work, may be an immediate object of perception. But the 
design and purpose of the author cannot be an immediate object of perception; and therefore 
experience can never inform us of any connection between the one and the other, far less of a 
necessary connection.”3
In other words, Reid’s claim is that we have a mere relative conception of “design 
and intelligence in the cause”, which arises immediately within us upon obtaining 
direct conception of “marks or signs of it in the effect”. More precisely:
1
2 
3
IP, p. 626.
IP, p. 612.
IP, pp. 627-28.
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A27 S knows that event E was brought about by the design and purpose of cause C 
if and only if (i) S has a direct conception of E, (ii) S does not have a direct 
conception of the design and purpose of C and (iii) upon attending to E, S 
immediately judges that E must have been brought about by the design and 
purpose of C.
What, then, is the task of the natural theologian, in Reid’s view? Given A&, Reid’s 
view is clearly not that she must defend or advocate her beliefs by constructing various 
design or cosmological arguments.1 For we are so constituted, in Reid’s view, that such 
beliefs are not formed on the evidence of reasoning. The natural theologian’s task is, 
rather, as follows: Suppose a natural philosopher explains the occurrence of some event 
E by deduction from the occurrence of antecedent conditions C and a certain law of 
nature L. The aim of the natural theologian would then be to show that C is conjoined 
to E just because God’s judgment regarding what is best upon the whole inclined him 
toward the exertion of his power of liberty to bring about a determination of will to act 
according to L, so as to bring about the general end of, say, the preservation and well­
being of some organism.
Now while the natural theologian may, and, indeed, should use the findings of 
natural philosophy, she cannot construct an argument from those findings to her 
conclusion. For natural philosophy provides her with only contingent premises. And 
her conclusion is that E must have been brought about by the design and purpose of the 
Supreme Being, which, Reid argues, is a necessary truth.2 Hence, the best she can do, by 
way of persuasion, is (i) to remove the prejudices that her audience holds against E, and 
(ii) to exhibit E in such a way that her audience perceives that it has the ‘marks’ of a 
first principle.3 The effect of this procedure, Reid suggests, would be that her audience 
might find themselves, upon attending to E, with the immediately formed judgment 
that E must have been brought about by the design and purpose of the Agent in 
question. In Reid’s terms, she must ‘appeal to their common sense’.4
1 Stalley, among others, is thus mistaken in his interpretation of Reid at this point. (Stalley, pp. 280-81.)
2 We cannot “learn from experience that certain effects must proceed from a designing and intelligent 
cause. Experience informs us only of what has been, but never of what must be.” IP, p. 627.
3 “There are ways by which the evidence of first principles may be made more apparent when they are 
brought into dispute; but they require to be handled in a way peculiar to themselves. Their evidence is not 
demonstrative, but intuitive. They require not proof, but to be placed in a proper point of view.” IP, p. 39. See 
Chapter 4 § 10 for an examination of the ‘marks’ of a first principle.
4 By way of example, Reid quotes from Cicero and from Tillotson, commenting thus; “Now, in all this 
discourse I see very good sense, and what is apt to convince every unprejudiced mind; but I see not in the 
whole a single step of reasoning. It is barely an appeal to every man’s common sense.” IP, p. 624; “although 
there is much good sense, as well as wit , . . .  I cannot find one medium of proof in the whole.” IP, p. 626.
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5 VOLUNTARY ACTIO N
Reid’s claim that human agents may bring about a change by the exertion of their 
powers, requires a considerable degree of qualification and explanation. For instance, 
Reid does not claim that every power of the mind may be thus exerted by the agent; or 
so I shall argue.
We can find in Reid a distinction between what I shall call first-order and second- 
order powers of the mind:
D„ Second-order power = df a power of the mind that (i) stands in an 
asymmetrical epistemic or active relation to certain first-order powers; and (ii) 
is lawfully connected to other first-order powers.
D12 First-order power = df a power of the mind that (i) stands in an epistemic or 
active relation to external things1; and (ii) is lawfully connected to other first- 
order powers.
An example of a second-order power is the power of consciousness, which stands in 
an asymmetrical epistemic relation to all other powers of mind: consciousness, when 
exerted, give us “that immediate knowledge which we have of . . . all the present 
operations of our minds” .2 But the operations of which we are conscious, are not the 
means by which we know of our consciousness.3 Again, the power of consciousness is 
lawfully connected to the power of judgment, in that, if x is an object of S ’s 
consciousness, then x is an object of S’s judgment.4
An example of a first-order power is perception, which stands in an epistemic 
relation to external objects: the power of perception, when exerted, gives us “the 
evidence which we have of external objects by our senses” .5 Again, like consciousness, 
perception is lawfully connected to the first-order power of judgment, in that, if x is an 
object of S’s perception, then x is an object of S’s judgment.
Now, to say that a second-order power stands in an asymmetrical active relation to a 
first-order power is just to say that: (i) were the agent to exert the second-order power, 
this would bring about an exertion (or the cessation of an exertion) in some first-order
1 The relation is not, by definition, asymmetrical, given that the object of a first-order power of the mind 
might be another mind. See Chapter 1, § 6 for Reid’s account of what constitutes an ‘external thing’.
2 IP, p. 17.
3 See Keith Lehrer’s “Reid on Consciousness” Reid Studies 1 (1986-87): pp. 1-9, for a discussion on the 
regress problem that appears to threaten Reid’s view of consciousness by virtue of the fact that consciousness 
is itself an operation of mind, and therefore, such that we must be conscious of it.
4 “It is a Law of our Nature that the Operations of our Minds are attended with Consciousness, so that 
every man who thinks, knows by his Consciousness that he does think; and this Consciousness gives him 
infallible assurance of the Fact.” MS 4 /I I /1 ,48.
5 IP,p. 16.
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power; and (ii) there is no first-order power such that its exertion could bring about the 
exertion of a second-order power. As it happens, there is only one second-order power 
that bears such a relation to a first-order power, namely, the will:
D13 The will =  df  a second-order power, the exertion of which involves the 
agent’s determining to exert or not to exert a first-order power.1
Du Volition (or willing) = df the exertion of the will.2
Not all first-order powers stand in an active relation to the will. Those that do not, 
are called “mechanical powers”3; those that do are called “active powers”:
D15 Active power = df a first-order power of the mind the exertion of which (i) is 
brought about by the agent’s volition and which (ii) enables the agent to bring 
about an effect.4
D16 Mechanical power = df a first-order power of the mind the exertion of which 
(i) is not brought about by the agent’s volition and which (ii) brings about an 
effect.
An action is said to be ‘voluntary’ if and only if it is subject to the will. More 
precisely, an exertion of some power of the mind in producing an effect is voluntary if 
and only if that exertion is brought about by the agent’s volition. And since, by 
definition, only the exertion of active powers are brought about by the agent’s volition, 
Reid distinguishes voluntary from involuntary acts in the following manner.
Dj7 Voluntary action = df the production of an effect by the exertion of an active 
power.5
D18 Involuntary action = df the production of an effect by the exertion of a 
mechanical power.
1 “[The will is the] determination of the mind to do, or not to do something which we conceive to be in 
our power.” AP, p. 60.
2 “Volition . . .  signifies the act of willing and determining, and will is put indifferently to signify either 
the power of willing or the act.” AP, p. 59.
3 AP, p. 109. It should be noted that Reid does not always use this term to refer to powers of the mind, 
but also to the ‘powers’ ascribed to body (see IP, p. 253). The distinction between both used of the term may 
be cashed out in terms of strict or literal usage. Given Reid’s view that no body can, strictly speaking, be a 
cause, the term ‘power’, in its strict sense, is not applicable to body.
4 Many Reid commentators have used the term ‘active power’ to refer to the power of liberty and the 
power of the will. Reid is indeed ambiguous in his usage: in some instances, ‘active power’ is described in a 
way that would include the powers of liberty and the will: “Active power . . .  is a quality in the cause, which 
enables it to produce the effect” AP, p. 276. Yet on other occasions, Reid uses the term to pick out just those 
first-order powers that are subject to the will, the implication being that the will is not itself an active power 
“we are unable to conceive any active power to be exerted without will.” AP, p. 38. For the purposes of clarity 
and consistency, I will use the term ‘active power’ only as defined in DlS, and shall refer to the ‘power of 
liberty’ and ‘power of the will’ using only those specific terms.
5 This definition assumes that the exertion of an active power is always brought about by the agent’s 
volition: and hence, that volition is an essential component of any voluntary action. As Reid states, “In every 
voluntary action, the determination of the will is the first part of the action” AP, pp. 272-73.
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6 FREE ACTION
The exertion of the will, as we have seen, involves a determination to exert or not to 
exert a certain kind of power to a certain degree. But what is it that brings about one 
particular determination, rather than another? If it is not the agent, then, Reid argues, 
the agent is not free with respect to his voluntary actions. For voluntary actions are 
brought about by a determination of will; and if the bringing or not bringing about of 
any such determination is not ‘up to the agent’, that is, if it is not within his power to 
will or not to will some voluntary action, then he is clearly not free with respect to that 
action.1 More precisely, where S is an agent, D  is a particular determination of S’s will, 
and <p is that voluntary action consequent to D, Reid holds that:
A28 S freely brings about <f> if and only if S brings about D and S could have 
refrained from bringing about D.
Now to say that a determination of the will is ‘brought about’, is to say that it is an 
effect. But an effect can only be brought about by the exertion of a power. Thus Reid 
posits what might be classified as a ‘third-order’ power of the mind, that is, a power 
bearing an asymmetrical active relation to the will. Reid calls this ‘the power of liberty’.
D19 The power of liberty = df  a power of the mind, the exertion of which (i) is 
brought about by the agent, and which (ii) enables the agent to bring or not to 
bring about a particular determination of the will.2
Thus, in Reid’s view, no voluntary action <pis such that it is within the agent’s power to 
will or not to will <p, unless the determination of will to produce <p is brought about by 
the exertion of the agent’s power of liberty. That is;
A29 S brings about D  and S could have refrained from bringing about D only if S
exerts her power of liberty in bringing about D.
1 “If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in 
every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary 
in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free” AP, p. 267; cf. “If the
person was the cause of that determination of his own will, he was free in that action.........But, if another
being was the cause of this determination, either by producing it immediately, or by means and instruments 
under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being” AP, p. 273.
2 “I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect must have a cause which had power to 
produce it”, AP, p. 273; “By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his 
own will. . . .  This liberty supposes the agent to have understanding and will; for the determinations of the 
will are the sole object about which this power is employed.” AP, p. 267; “Liberty . . . extends to the 
determinations of the will only, and not to what is consequent to the will.” AP, p. 272; “I grant, then, that an 
effect uncaused is a contradiction, and that an event uncaused is an absurdity. The question that remains is 
whether a volition, undetermined by motives, is an event uncaused. This I deny. The cause of the volition is 
the man that willed i t ” Letter to Gregory, WH., p. 88a.
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It follows from A &  and A29 that an agent is free with respect to the production of an 
effect by the exertion of an active power if and only if the determination of her will to 
bring about that effect is brought about by the exertion of her power of liberty. In short:
A30 S  freely brings about 0 if and only if S exerts her power of liberty in bringing 
about D.
7 THE REGRESS OBJECTION
There is a serious problem with this account of freedom. As we have seen, Reid holds it 
to be a first principle that
(1) Every event E must have a cause which, by the exertion of its power, brings 
about E.1
The problem is that Reid also thought of the exertions of power as effects; but since all 
effects are events, it follows that:
(2) Every exertion of power is an event.
And so, Reid must also hold that
(3) Every exertion of power E must have a cause which, by the exertion of its 
power, brings about E.
We have seen that Reid holds that the determination of the will, being an effect 
must have been brought about by the exertion of the power of liberty. But it follows 
from (3) that the exertion of the power of liberty itself must have been brought about by 
the exertion of yet another power in the agent. In short, (3) generates an infinite regress 
of powers and exertions of those powers. This regress is, of course, fatal to Reid’s 
account of freedom. To bring about any determination of the will, the agent must bring 
about an infinite series of exertions. But then no agent can bring about any 
determination of will. Hence, no agent can perform free actions.2
1 “In order to the production of any effect, there must be in the cause, not only power, but the exertion of 
that power” AP, p. 276; “every event must have a cause which had power to produce it” AP, p. 313; “an event 
uncaused is an absurdity” Letter to Gregory, H., p. 88a.
2 I discovered this regress problem independently of reading Rowe’s almost identical objection: “When 
conjoined with the principle that every event has a cause, Reid’s theory of agent-causation leads to the 
absurdity of an infinite regress of agent-produced exertions for every act of will the agent produces.” W illiam  
Rowe, “Two Concepts of Freedom”, Proceedings and Addresses of AP A, vol. 61, no.l (1987): pp. 53-54. See also 
W illiam  Rowe, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991): 
Chap. 8.
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By way of clarification, the objection here is not that a regress arises if we couple (1) 
with the claim that every cause is an event-cause.1 For Reid’s view, as we have seen, is 
that only agents are causes. Rather the problem arises just because Reid claims that an 
agent cannot bring about an event other than by the exertion of some power, and that 
any such exertion is itself an event.2
William Rowe offers two possible solutions to the regress problem.3 The first 
requires, as Rowe acknowledges, a “significant change in Reid’s view of agent- 
causation”.4 First, Reid would need to incorporate the notion of a “basic act”:
D20 Basic act = df an exertion of power which the agent directly brings about, that 
is, not by any prior exertion of power.
Second, he could then argue that the agent directly brings about the determination of her 
will. In other words, he could modify A30 as follows:
A31 S freely brings about (p if and only if S‘s bringing about of D is a basic act that 
is, S does not bring about D by any prior exertion of power.5
Since no prior exertion of power would thus be involved in bringing about the 
determination of will, the regress of exertions would have been effectively blocked.
The problem with this view is that it does not, as Rowe thinks, require a mere 
modification to Reid’s view of agent-causation, but rather a wholesale rejection of that 
view. As we have seen, Reid’s account of freedom depends crucially on his claim that 
the determination of the will is “effect” brought about by the power of liberty. And
1 Cf. “Two Concepts of Freedom”, p.50.
2 The regress problem arises in a slightly different manner, as a consquenee of Reid’s presentation of the 
following argument: “In common life, when men speak of what is, or is not, in a man’s power, they attend 
only to the external and visible effects, which only can be perceived, and which only can affect them. Of 
these, it is true, that nothing is in a man’s power, but what depends upon his will, and this is all that is meant 
by this common saying 1 But this is so far from excluding his will from being in his power, that it necessarily 
implies it. For to say that what depends upon the will is in a man’s power, but the will is not in his power, is 
to say that the end is in his power, but the means necessary to that end are not in his power, which is a 
contradiction.” AP, p. 274. Now, Reid holds that any particular determination of the will is the end, or effect, 
of which the exertion of the power of liberty is the necessary means. It follows from his argument above, 
therefore, that the exertion of the power of liberty must be in our power. But that is just to say that there must 
be some further power, the exertion of which is the necessary means for bringing about the exertion of the 
power of liberty, and so on, ad infinitum.
3 Rowe rejects other options as inconsistent with Reid’s other views: “we must either accept the absurdity 
of the infinite regress, view some act of the agent as itself uncaused (thus abandoning the causal principle [i.e. 
NPmj]), or take the view that an act of will is not itself an event and, therefore, does not fall under the causal 
principle. This last move, however, would leave the act of will as a surd in Reid’s theory and plainly conflicts 
with his stated position that acts of will are effects.” Rowe, “Two Concepts of Freedom”, p. 54.
4 Rowe, “Two Concepts of Freedom”, p. 54.
5 “Acts of will that are produced by the agent whose acts they are, we shall say, are such that the agent 
causes them but not by any other act or any exertion of the power she has to produce the acts of will.” Rowe, 
“Two Concepts of Freedom”, p. 54.
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Reid explicitly denies the possibility of an agent bringing about an effect without the 
prior exertion of some power. The analysis in A31 is not, therefore, available to Reid.
One option that may be available to Reid, is this:1 Reid states that some universal 
propositions admit exceptions, in particular, propositions that express an asymmetrical 
causal relation. That is, when we say that ‘all things depend upon x \  x itself is not 
included in the subject term:
“In many propositions which we express universally, there is an exception necessarily 
implied, and therefore always understood. Thus when we say that all things depend upon 
Go d , God  himself is necessarily excepted. In like manner, when we say, that all that is in our 
power depends upon the will, the will itself is necessarily excepted: For if the will be not, 
nothing else can be in our power.”2
We can use this line of reasoning to construct a deductive argument from premises 
that Reid holds, to a conclusion which states that exertions of the power of liberty are 
not events. First, Reid, as we have seen, holds that:
(4) All exertions of power are (ultimately) brought about by an exertion of the 
power of liberty in a cause.
Of course, Reid would mean by this that the class denoted by the subject term in (4) 
excludes exertions of the power of liberty. Second, Reid also held that:
(5) All exertions of the power of liberty in a cause (ultimately) bring about events. 
And (4) together with (5), yields the conclusion that:
(6) All exertions of power are events.
However, since the subject term of (4) does not include exertions of the power of 
liberty, neither can the subject term of (6): that is, if (4) and (5) are true, the exertion of 
the power of liberty cannot be an event. Hence, we can deny (2), and replace it with the 
following:
(2*) Every exertion of power, except the exertion of the power of liberty, is an event.
Since (3) does not therefore apply, there is no need for some prior exertion of power 
to produce the exertion of the power of liberty; and so, the regress is blocked. Put 
another way, the agent directly brings about the exertion of the power of liberty, not by 
any prior exertion of power: the exertion of the power of liberty is thus a basic act
1 This option is similar to Rowe’s second solution, but is expressed in a manner that has more substantive 
textual support. See “Two Concepts of Freedom”, p. 63, n.19.
2 AP, p.274.
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The problem, of course, is that this is precisely the kind of move we could have 
made (and indeed tried to make) with respect to the determination of the will: that is, 
by revising (2) to the following:
(2**) Every exertion of power, except the exertion of the power of will, is an event.
So why should we attribute (2*) to Reid, but not (2**)? There are two reasons: First, if 
(2**) were true, then the exertion of the power of will could not be an effect; and if (2*) is 
false, Reid must face an infinite regress. In either case, Reid’s account of freedom would 
collapse. Second, Reid explicitly states that “the determination of the will is an effect”. 
Nowhere does he claim that the exertion of the power of liberty is an effect. It seems, 
then, that Reid could well have thought of the exertion of the power of liberty as a basic 
act. We can therefore modify Reid’s definition of liberty thus:
D20 The power of liberty = df a power of the mind, the exertion of which (i) is a 
basic act, and which (ii) enables the agent to bring about or not to bring about 
a particular determination of the will.
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3
Principles of Action
INTRODUCTION
Our exposition of Reid’s account of voluntary action is, as yet, lacking a crucial 
element: namely, the principles that influence or motivate the agent to act, such as 
beliefs, passions, and instincts. Now exertions of the power of judgment or belief, as we 
shall see, arise upon the ‘influence’ or ‘government’ of certain ‘principles of belief’; 
principles which Reid also calls the ‘original evidences’. In other words, Reid’s concept 
of evidence falls, into the category of principles of action. This point in itself is central to 
understanding his concept of epistemic justification. However, there are three kinds of 
principles of action in Reid’s taxonomy: ‘animal’, ‘rational’ and ‘mechanical’; and, as 
we shall see, it is of utmost importance that we correctly identify into which of these 
categories we ought to place Reid’s concept of ‘evidence’. To this end, however, we 
must first explore Reid’s concept of the principles of action.
1 INCLINATIONS
Having the power of liberty over the determinations of will is necessary, but not 
sufficient for the agent’s bringing about some effect. For without some “preceding state 
of the mind” to incline us toward some determination, Reid argues, we would never 
exercise our power of liberty over any determination, and so would be “altogether 
inactive, and never will to do any thing”1. In this section, I shall examine in detail Reid’s 
account of this requirement.
First, these ‘preceding states of mind’ are otherwise called “principles of action”. The 
relation between principles of action and their objects are picked out by a range of 
terms: “influence”, “motive”, “inclination”, “impulse”, “impulsive force”, “ tendency”, 
“proneness”, that which “disposes”, “draws”, “directs”, “leads”, “incites”, and so on. For 
clarity, I shall refer to this relation by the single term “inclination” (and cognates). The 
direct object of this inclination, or that which the principle immediately inclines, appears 
to be the agent. The indirect object, or that which the agent is inclined toward, is the 
exertion of some power. Thus:
Dji Principles of action = df that which inclines an agent toward the exertion of a 
certain power2 of the mind so as to bring about an effect.3
1 AP, p. 66.
2 I have used the term ‘power' rather than ‘active power’, because some principles of action, namely
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Reid argues that there are three basic kinds of principles of action: rational, animal 
and mechanical, each of which is defined by its relation to the power of will and 
“practical judgment”, which Reid defines as follows:
D22 Practical judgment = df “the judgment to discern one determination [of the 
will] to be preferable to another, either in itself, or for some purpose which 
[the agent] intends”.1
The three basic kinds of principles may thus be defined as follows:2
D23 Mechanical principles (instincts, habits) = df that which inclines an agent 
toward the exertion of a power of the mind to produce an effect, without the 
exertion of the agent’s will or practical judgment.3
D24 Animal principles (appetites, affections, passions) = df that which inclines an 
agent toward a particular determination of the will, without the exertion of 
the agent’s practical judgment.4
D25 Rational principles (prudence, duty) = df that which inclines an agent toward 
the exertion of her power of liberty to bring about a particular determination 
of the will, and which involves the exertion of the agent’s practical judgment.5
Although the logic of ‘inclination’ requires the agent for its direct object, this does 
not entail that the agent is causally responsible for all the resulting exertions to which 
he or she is inclined thereby. For instance, animal and mechanical principles incline the 
agent toward the exertion of some power without the exertion of the will; but no 
involuntary action can be said to have been brought about by the agent.6 In short, the 
term ‘agent’ in D23 and D24 should not be taken to imply agency or causality. It merely 
picks out that substance of which the exerted power is an attribute.
mechanical principles, are not subject to the will and so do not fall under Reid’s strict sense of the term ‘active
power’, which is the only sense of the term used in this exposition.
3 “By principles of action, I understand every thing that incites us to act.” AP, p. 77.
1 AP, p.267.
2 Reid leaves the term ‘intention’ (and cognates) undefined. My suggestion is that he thought of intention 
as a purpose or resolution to perform an action to bring about some end; in which case intentions would fall 
into Reid’s category of general and particular fixed purposes (See § 3.4). But fixed purposes are acts of the 
will; hence, we may take intentions to be included in references to ‘will’, as indeed I have done in the 
following definitions.
3 “Mechanical principles produce their effect without any will or intention on our part.” AP, p. 205; “By 
instinct. . .  and by habit, we do many things without any exercise either of judgment or wilL” AP, p. 67.
4 Animal principles “operate upon the will and intention, but do not suppose any exercise of judgment or 
reason.” AP, 121. “Appetite, affection, or passion, give an impulse to a certain action. In this impulse there is 
no judgment implied.” AP, p. 68.
5 “Rational principles . . . ,  in all their exertions, require, not only intention and will, but judgment or 
reason.” AP, p. 205.
6 As we shall see, it does not follow that agents are in no way morally accountable for those actions 
toward which they are inclined by animal or mechanical principles. For example, an agent may exert his will 
so as to resist their inclination.
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2 MORAL LIBERTY
We have seen that there are two principles of action, animal and rational, which incline 
an agent toward determinations of the will. We have also seen that only the rational 
principles incline the agent toward the exertion of the power of liberty over a particular 
determination of the will. But why should we think this? Can we not say that animal 
principles also incline an agent toward the exertion of the power of liberty? Reid takes 
this as a serious possibility, and thus distinguishes between what we may call mere 
liberty, and what he calls moral liberty:
A32 An agent has moral liberty over determination of the will D only if a rational
principle inclines her toward the exertion of her power of liberty to bring 
about D.
A33 An agent has mere liberty over determination of the will D only if it is an 
animal principle alone1 that inclines her toward the exertion of her power of 
liberty to bring about D.
Now although Reid thinks that mere liberty is a possibility,2 he argues that no actual 
being has i t  As we shall see, a determination of the will is morally evaluable only if a 
rational principle inclines the agent toward the exertion of her power of liberty to bring 
about that determination. Hence, no determination of the will brought about by mere 
liberty is morally evaluable. But then there is no difference, in respect of moral 
evaluability, between (i) an animal principle inclining an agent toward the exertion of her 
power of liberty to bring about a determination of the will, and (ii) an animal principle 
inclining an agent merely toward a determination of the will. The power of mere liberty 
is therefore a power without a purpose. But no power is given in vain. Hence, no actual 
being has mere liberty.3
In sum, having the power of liberty over the determinations of the will is not 
sufficient for moral liberty: the agent must be inclined toward the exercise of that 
power by a rational principle.
1 An agent may be inclined by both rational and animal principles in exerting her moral liberty (see § 4).
2 Weinstock argues that Reid is inconsistent in allowing this possibility: “Although Reid first tells us that 
power over one’s will implies judgment and reason, very shortly afterwards he tells us that it is at least 
conceivable that this power may be possessed by a being who has no reasoning abilities at all.” Jerome A. 
Weinstock, “Reid’s Definition of Freedom”, Philosophical Monographs 3 (1976): p. 97. But these claims must be 
correctly interpreted. Reid’s point is simply that, in the actual world, any agent with the power of liberty will 
also have judgment and reason just because there would be no purpose in giving such a power to a being 
who does not have judgment and reason. There is no inconsistency here. For a slightly different solution, see 
W. D. Hazelton, “On an Alleged Inconsistency in Reid’s Theory of Moral Liberty”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 16 (1978): pp. 453-55.
3 AP, p.268.
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3 M A NA G EM ENT OF THE A N IM A L  PRINC IPLES
Reid likens the mind to a “state”, or “commonwealth”, in which the “good of the whole” 
requires a division of powers into two classes: those that “ought to govern” and those 
that “ought to be subordinate”.1 In the former class, Reid places the rational principles; 
in the latter, the animal principles.2 This subordination does not entail that animal 
principles are such that they ought never to incline the agent. Actions that arise from the 
inclination of animal principles alone are not, in themselves, morally evaluable.3 It is 
only when any such inclination stands in opposition to a rational principle, that the 
agent ought to exert his power of liberty so as to resist the inclination of that animal 
principle. In such cases, the agent is morally accountable, not for being inclined by an 
animal principle, but rather for resisting or not resisting those animal principles that 
she believes she ought to resist.
In this section, I shall articulate the detail of Reid’s account regarding the 
management of the animal principles.
3.1 MORAL OBLIGATION
To say that an animal principle ought to be resisted, is to say that we have a moral 
obligation to so resist. But what precisely is a ‘moral obligation’ in Reid’s view? First, it 
is not, Reid argues, an attribute of either the action or the agent: but rather a relation 
between the two. For an agent cannot be under a moral obligation if there is no action 
which he is obligated to perform. Likewise, it makes little sense to say that an action 
ought to be performed, where no agent is under a moral obligation to do so. Thus:
A34 Moral obligation M exists if and only if there exists some agent S and some
action (f> such that S bears the relation M to 0.4
Now certain conditions must be satisfied if the relation of moral obligation is to 
hold. Where an agent S is culpably ignorant of p if and only if it is within S’s power and 
means to bring it about that she knows that p, but fails to do so:5
1 AP,pp. 187-88,233-34.
2 AP, pp. 72,75-6.
3 “our natural appetites have in themselves neither virtue nor vice” AP, p. 130.
4 AP, p. 234.
5 AP, p. 235; cf. An agent “may be very culpable for not using the means of having his judgment better 
informed.” AP, p. 256; “culpable ignorance does not excuse a fault” AP, p. 326; “The axiom. That invincible 
ignorance takes away all blame, is only a particular case of the general axiom, That there can be no moral 
obligation to what is impossible; the former is grounded upon the latter, and can have no other foundation.” 
AP, p. 326.
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A35 S is morally obliged to perform action 0only if (i) S has moral liberty over the
determination of her will to bring about <f>, and (ii) S is not culpably ignorant 
of her obligation to perform 0.1
3.2 RESISTING ANIMAL PRINCIPLES
As we have seen, Reid states that an action is free just in case some rational principle of 
action inclines the agent toward exerting her power of liberty over some determination 
of the will. We have also seen that the inclination of an animal principle is not thus 
mediated by the power of liberty. The question is, what would occur if an animal 
principle were opposed to a rational principle? Surely, to preserve the agent’s freedom 
to act according to the rational principle, the inclination of the animal principle cannot 
be deterministic: that is to say, the agent must be able to resist such inclinations.2 More 
precisely, let the relation of opposition be analysed as follows:
A35 Principles of action A and B are opposed for agent S if and only if (i) A 
inclines S toward a determination of the will to perform action <p at f, (ii) B 
inclines S toward a determination of the will to perform action yat t, and (iii) 
S cannot perform both <p and yat t . 3
Suppose, then, that some rational principle is opposed to an animal principle. In 
such a contest, which inclination would prevail? First, as we shall see, Reid would hold 
that the rational principle certainly ought to prevail: for rational principles incline the 
agent toward either what is good upon the whole or duty.4 That is, where these are 
defined as follows:
D26 Good upon the whole (or what is prudent) = df “That which, taken with all 
its discoverable connections and consequences, brings more good than ill.”5
1 Reid includes the following five necessary conditions for moral obligations, but they are all captured by 
(i), given our definition of moral liberty: (a) <(> is a voluntary action; (b)  ^is the action of S and not of some 
other agent; (c) S is an agent, not an inanimate thing; (d) S has understanding and will, and some degree of 
active power; (e) <t> is within the sphere of S’s “natural power”. Regarding condition (e), it is not clear to what 
kind of power Reid is referring. His use of the phrase elsewhere suggests that it denotes every power of which 
an agent is the subject: “Our natural power of discerning between right and wrong, needs the aid of 
instruction, education, exercise, and habit, as well as our other natural powers.” AP, p. 255.
2 AP,p. 267, pp. 272-73.
3 This analysis makes no reference to the strength of opposing principles; for two principles of action A 
and B may be opposed, even though the strength of A be neither equal to nor greater than B: for example, as 
we shall see, where A is the agent’s judgment that he ought not to yield to B.
4 “in innumerable cases in common life, our animal principles draw us one way, while a regard to what is 
good on the whole, draws us the contrary w ay.. . .  That in every conflict of this kind the rational principle 
ought to prevail, and the animal to be subordinate, is too evident to need, or to admit of proof.” AP, p. 211.
5 AP, p. 210.
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D27 Duty = df “what we ought to do, what is fair and honest, what is approvable, 
what every man professes to be the rule of his conduct, what all men praise, 
and what is in itself laudable, though no man should praise it.”1
Second, the rational principles ought to prevail only if (i) the agent can resist the 
inclinations of the animal principles; and (ii) the agent need not yield to the inclinations 
of the rational principles. In other words, the inclinations of both the rational and the 
animal principles must be such that they do not necessitate the determinations of the 
will.2 Note, Reid’s use of the term “motive” is equivalent to “principle of action”:
“Motives . . .  may be compared to advice, or exhortation, which leaves a man still at liberty.
For in vain is advice given when there is not a power either to do, or to forbear what it
recommends. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no
influence at all.”3
Reid’s account of this non-deterministic inclination is as follows: Animal and 
rational principles are not ‘things that exist’, but rather ‘things that are conceived’.4 But 
only things that exist can either act or be acted upon. Hence, these principles of action 
are not causes.5
This raises an important question: how is it that the inclination of a rational principle 
is able to prevail over an animal principle. Reid answer is this: if it were the case that, of 
two opposing principles A and B, A would prevail only if the impulsive force of A was
1 AP, p. 228. Reid argues that what is good upon the whole for an agent coincides with her duty if and 
only if she inhabits a theistic universe: “While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it is 
impossible, that any man should, in the issue, be a loser by doing his duty.” AP, p. 264. A contemporary 
version of this view is advanced by G. Mavrodes, “Religion and the Queemess of Morality”, in Rationality, 
Religious Belief & Moral Commitment (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986): pp. 213-26.
2 I disagree here with Rowe’s interpretation: “when an animal motive occurs in a human agent in 
circumstances where no contrary motives are of equal force, then, providing the motive and the circumstance 
are causally sufficient for the agent’s lacking sufficient active power to overcome the force of that animal 
motive, I see no reason why that motive should not be viewed as the event-cause of the ensuing volition.” W. 
Rowe, Thomas Reid, pp. 177-78. As we shall see, Reid argues that no animal principle is utterly irresistible: or, 
in Rowe’s terminology, no conjunction of animal motive and circumstance is causally sufficient for an agent’s 
lacking sufficient active power to overcome the force of that motive. Hence, no motive (in a human) c a m  be an 
event-cause of a volition.
3 AP.pp.292.
4 See Chapter 4, § 4. for a full account of this distinction.
5 “the influence of motives is of a very different nature from that of efficient causes. They are neither 
causes nor agents. They suppose an efficient cause, and can do nothing without it. We cannot, without 
absurdity, supp>ose a motive, either to act, or to be acted upon; it is equally incapable of action and of passion; 
because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived; it is what the schoolmen called an ens 
rationis. Motives, therefore, may influence to action, but they do not act.” AP, pp. 291-92. Rowe argues that this 
passage, “makes good sense provided Reid is restricting his discussion to rational motives.” W. Rowe, Thomas 
Reid, p. 177. However, as Rowe recognises, this passage occurs in a context in which Reid is referring to both 
animal and rational motives. The only text that might support Rowe’s view is where Reid admits that the 
term “motive” normally denotes the inclination of rational principles: “Let us next consider rationed motives, 
to which the name of motive is more commonly and more properly given”. AP, p. 298. However, Reid does 
not state that he himself will be or has been using the term “motive” in this specific manner.
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stronger than that of B, then the inclination of a rational principle would never prevail 
over the inclination of an animal principle. For the inclination of a rational principle has 
no impulsive force whatsoever. Its inclining power consists only in its “authority”, that 
is, in the agent’s judgment that she ought to resist the opposing animal principle.1 In 
short, the inclination of a rational principle will prevail over an animal principle if and 
only if the agent exerts her power of liberty over the determination of her will: that is, 
the agent must, in such cases, exercise “self-government”2
Now if two principles are opposed, an agent cannot yield to both. Hence to ‘resist’ 
the inclination of an animal principle is just to ‘yield’ to an opposing rational principle. 
Moreover, since the function of a rational principle is to incline an agent toward the 
exertion of her power of liberty over some determination of the will, it follows that to 
yield to the inclination of a rational principle is just to exert one’s power of liberty over 
some determination of the will. Thus:
A37 If, for agent S, a rational principle A is opposed to an animal principle B, then 
A will prevail if and only if S resists the inclination of B.
3.3 THE OBLIGATION TO RESIST ANIMAL PRINCIPLES
Reid holds that we are under a moral obligation to resist animal principles that are 
opposed to the rational principles.3 There are two important qualifications here. The 
first is this: Reid argues that we are not morally blameworthy for failing to resist an 
animal principle unless we have judged that we ought to resist it, that is, where moral 
blame and praise are properly ascribed according to the following principle:
Ajg S is morally praiseworthy in performing action 0 if and only if S judges that 
she ought to perform 0; and S is morally blameworthy in performing 0 if and 
only if S judges that <)> she ought not to perform <p.4
1 “it may happen, that, when appetite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, 
but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any impulsive force: . . .  In cases of this 
kind, the mein is convinced that he ought not to yield to appetite, yet there is not an equal or a greater impulse 
to oppose i t ” AP, p. 129.
2 “Every one knows, that when appetite draws one way, duty, decency, or even interest, may draw the 
contrary way; and that appetite may give a stronger impulse them any one of these, or even all of them 
conjoined. Yet it is certain, that, in every case of this kind, appetite ought to yield to any of these principles 
when it stands opposed to them. It is in such cases that self-government is necessary.” AP, p. 130.
3 “though our natural appetites have in themselves neither virtue nor vice, though the acting merely from 
appetite, when there is no principle of greater authority to oppose it, be a matter indifferent; yet there may be 
a great deal of virtue or of vice in the management of our appetites; and that the power of self-government is 
necessary for their regulation.” AP, pp. 130-31. cf. AP, p. 211, p. 76.
4 “If he does a materially good action, without any belief of its being good, but from some other principle, 
it is no good action in him. And if he does it with the belief of its being ill, it is ill in him.” AP, 235. This 
principle does not entail that Reid held moral praiseworthiness to be an entirely subjective matter. Reid is 
most certainly an ethical realist. (e.g. [duty] is what we ought to do , . . .  and what is in itself laudable, though
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Now rational principles, as we have seen, consist of judgments that we ought or 
ought not to perform certain actions, given their tendency to satisfy the ends of either 
prudence or duty. Hence, suppose that S fails to judge that she ought not to perform 
action <f>. Suppose also that some animal principle A inclines S toward willing to 
perform 0. Finally, suppose that, as it happens, <p is in fact inconsistent with prudence 
and duty, and so, such that S ought to resist it. In such a case, Reid would argue, S may 
well be blameworthy for failing to judge that she ought to resist A: that is, if she is 
culpably ignorant. But she is not blameworthy for failing to resist A. For A is not 
opposed to any rational principle in S. In other words, to say that we are not morally 
blameworthy for failing to resist an animal principle unless we have judged that we 
ought to resist it, is just to say that we are not morally blameworthy for failing to resist 
an animal principle unless it is opposed to a rational principle.
The second qualification is this: Reid claims that, normally, the impulsive force of an 
animal principle is difficult to resist;* 1 but if it were ever of such ‘violence’ that it was 
not within our power to resist, then, by A^, it would follow that we are not morally 
obliged to resist such a principle.2
However, there are two cases in which an agent may be held culpable even if an 
animal principle is irresistible. First, suppose that, for agent S, some animal principle A 
is opposed to a rational principle; and that, over a certain period, S continuously fails to 
resist A. As a consequence of this ‘indulgence’, the strength of A 's inclination increases 
to such an extent that it is no longer within S’s power to resist A. In such a case, Reid 
would argue, S is morally blameworthy for yielding to the inclination of A, even 
though it is not within S’s power to do otherwise. We will call such a principle culpably 
state-irresistible for S:3
The second case is this: Suppose again that, for agent S, some animal principle A is 
opposed to a rational principle, and that S knows that the inclination of A is irresistible; 
but suppose she also knows that A inclines her only in certain circumstances C; and 
that, for the most part, she is free with respect to whether or not she places herself in C.
no man should praise it.” AP, p. 228.) He is also a moral sense theorist: thus if it is self-evident to S that she 
ought to perform action 0, then it is more likely than not that she ought in fact to perform <p. See R. Stecker, 
“Thomas Reid on the Moral Sense” , Monist 70 (1988): pp. 453-64.
1 “Appetites, affections, passions, . .  . draw a man toward a certain object, without any farther view, by a 
kind of violence; a violence which indeed may be resisted if the man is master of himself, but cannot be 
resisted without a struggle.” AP, p. 73.
2 “If the passion be conceived to be irresistible, the action is imputed solely to it, and not at all to the man. 
If he had power to resist, and ought to have resisted, we blame him for not doing his duty”. AP, p. 74.
3 “I believe our natural appetites may be made more violent by excessive indulgence, and that, on the 
other hand, they may be weakened by starving. The first is often the effect of a pernicious luxury, the last 
may sometimes be the effect of want, sometimes of superstition. I apprehend that nature has given to our 
appetites that degree of strength which is most proper for us; and that whatever alters their natural tone, 
either in excess or in defect, does not mend the work of nature, but may mar and pervert i t ” AP, pp. 124-25.
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In such a case, Reid argues, S would be morally blameworthy for yielding to the 
inclination of A , even if A is irresistible. We may call this principle culpably circumstance- 
irresistible for S:1 Thus:
A39 If, for agent S, animal principle A is opposed to a rational principle, then S is 
morally obliged to resist A only if A is either resistible or culpably state- or 
circumstance-irresistible for S.
And, of course:
A40 If, for agent S, animal principle A is opposed to a rational principle, then S is
morally praiseworthy for resisting A , and S is morally blameworthy for failing 
to resist A only if S is morally obliged to resist A.
Now, having said all this, Reid would add the following rider: no animal principle is 
such that it is not within our power to resist it. It is not the case that there are two 
classes of animal principles divided into the resistible and the irresistible. Rather, as the 
following text indicates, the inclination of animal principles is “never” so violent as to 
be irresistable:2 3
“We allow that sudden and violent passion, into which a man is surprised, alleviates a bad
action; but if it was irresistible, it would not only alleviate, but totally exculpate, which it
never does, either in the judgment of the man himself, or of others.’*
There are two consequences of this: First, the failure to resist an animal principle 
when it is opposed to a rational principle is always morally blameworthy. For, by A^, 
an agent is morally praiseworthy in resisting an animal principle only if she is morally 
obliged to resist it. But no animal principle is either naturally or culpably irresistable. 
Hence, by A39, there is no animal principle opposed to a rational principle that an agent 
is not morally obliged to resist. Hence, failure to resist in this way is always morally 
blameworthy. In short:
1 “ [practical judgment] directs us, not only to resist the impulse of passion when it would lead us wrong, 
but to avoid the occasions of inflaming i t ” AP, p. 74.
2 Reid argues that we can evaluate the comparative strengths of two animal principles by the “animal 
test”, and of two rational principles by the “rational test”: “The strength of [animal motives] is perceived, not 
by our judgment, but by our feeling; and that is the strongest of contrary motives, to which he can yield with 
ease, or which it requires an effort of self-command to resist; and this we may call the animal test of the 
strength of motives.” AP, p. 298. “If there be any competition between rationed motives, it is evident, that the 
strongest, in the eye of reason, is that which it is most our duty and our real happiness to follow. Our duty 
and our real happiness are ends which are inseparable; and they are the ends which every man, endowed 
with reason, is conscious he ought to pursue in preference to all others. This we may call the rational test of 
the strength of motives. A motive which is the strongest, according to the animal test, may be, and very often 
is the weakest according to the rational.” AP, p. 299.
3 AP, p. 192. My emphasis.
3 PR IN C IPLES OF ACTION 49
A41 If, for agent S, animal principle A is opposed to a rational principle, then S is 
morally obliged to resist A.
And so:
A42 If, for agent S, animal principle A is opposed to a rational principle, then S is 
morally praiseworthy if she resists A, and morally blameworthy if she fails to 
resist A.
A second consequence is that there are degrees of praise and blameworthiness; and 
these are evaluated by reference to the strength of the inclination that an agent is 
required to resist.1 Now, just as we were able to distinguish between culpable and non- 
culpable irresistibility, so we may also distinguish between culpable and non-culpable 
degrees of irresistibility; and this distinction applies to both state- and circumstance- 
irresistibility, mutatis mutandis. Thus, if the inclination of an animal principle A upon S 
is excessively violent, that is, if A has a high degree of non-culpable irresistibility for S, 
then we should ascribe a proportionately lesser degree of blame to S if she fails to resist 
A. However, if A has a high degree of culpable irresistibility for S, then S must be 
blamed in proportion to the degree that she was responsible for bringing about that 
degree of irresistibility. For example, if S freely places herself in a circumstance in 
which A will have a high degree of irresistibility for her, then, to that extent, S is 
blameworthy for failing to resist A, even though A had a high degree of irresistibility. 
Again, if, over a period of time, S has continued to yield to A, with the result that A 
now has a high degree of irresistibility for her, then we should not ascribe a lesser 
degree of blame to S if she fails to resist A, that is, proportionate to degree of 
irresistibility A has for her.
Finally, the degree of praiseworthiness ascribable to an agent is also tied to the 
degree of irresistibility. If A has a high degree of non-culpable irresistibility, then we 
should ascribe a proportionately higher degree of praise to S if she manages to resist A.2 
And to the extent that S freely refrains from placing herself in a circumstance in which 
A will have a high degree of irresistibility for her, then, to that extent, S is praiseworthy 
for resisting A.3
1 “If he had power to resist [the passion], and ought to have resisted, we blame him for not doing his 
duty; but, in proportion to the violence of the passion, the fault is alleviated.” AP, p. 74.
2 “Passion or appetite may urge to what we know to be wrong. In every instance of this kind, the moral 
principle [Le. rational] ought to prevail, and the more difficult its conquest is, it is the more glorious.” AP, p. 
262; “The man who, in opposition to strong temptation, by a noble effort, maintains his integrity, is the 
happiest man on earth. The more severe his conflict has been, the greater is his triumph.” AP, p. 252.
3 “ C yrus, who refused to see the beautiful captive princess . .  . acted the part both of a wise and a good 
man; firm in the love of virtue, and, at the same time, conscious of the weakness of human nature, and 
unwilling to put it to too severe a trial. In this case, the youth of C yrus, the incomparable beauty of his captive, 
and every circumstance which tended to inflame his desire, exalts the merit of his conduct in resisting i t ” AP, 
p. 74
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Reid, unfortunately, does not tell us what kind of attribution we should make to 
those who manage to resist inclinations that are culpably state-irresistible. Presumably, 
we would tend to ascribe a high measure of praise to an agent who, at last, and with 
great difficulty, resists what he knows to be wrong, even if the degree of such difficulty 
is a consequence of his persistent failure to resist in the past. We might also tend to 
think that the appropriate degree of praise, in such a case, may be measured by the 
degree to which the principle is irresistible for that agent In sum:
A43 If, for agent S, animal principle A is opposed to a rational principle, then S is 
morally praiseworthy for resisting A and S is morally blameworthy for failing 
to resist A to the degree that A is either resistible or culpably state- or 
circumstance-irresistible for S.
3.4 EXPLAINING THE RESISTANCE OF ANIMAL PRINCIPLES
We have seen that, if, for agent S, a rational principle A is opposed to an animal 
principle B, then A will prevail if and only if S resists the inclination of B. In other 
words, it is ‘up to’ S as to whether or not she resists B. Moreover, S will be, to a certain 
degree, morally blameworthy if she fails to do so, that is, to the degree that B is either 
resistible or culpably state- or circumstance-irresistible. Suppose, then, that S resists B: 
that is, suppose S exerts her power of liberty, so as to bring about that determination of 
the will toward which she was inclined by A. The question is, why did she yield to A 
rather than B? We cannot appeal to the comparative strength of A's impulsive force, 
since, as we have seen, A, being a rational principle, has no impulsive force. Perhaps we 
could say that S had some reason or motive for resisting B. But this option would 
require a set of second-order principles of action, that serve to incline the agent toward 
being inclined by one first-order principle rather than another, which, of course, would 
generate an infinite regress of principles. 1 We cannot appeal to any prior exertion of 
power, since, as we have argued, the exertion of the power of liberty is a basic act. It 
seems, then, that all we have by way of an explanation is the brute fact that S exerted 
her power of liberty.
William Rowe suggests that one possible solution comes by way of an appeal to the 
agent’s character:
“In addition to the particular motives confronting the agent, there is the agent’s character: 
some more or less well-developed set of dispositions to act from a regard to duty and one’s 
good upon the whole or from one’s animal appetites, desires and affections. When the 
motives and the circumstances are roughly the same, it is to the characters of the agents that
i Rowe makes a similar point in his Thomas Reid, p. 183.
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we turn to explain why the motive of duty prevailed in the one and why the motive of 
immediate gratification prevailed in the other. As Reid remarks, ‘When there is a competition 
between these motives, the foolish will prefer present gratification; the wise the greater and 
more distant good.’ (612, emphasis mine) Of course the steady person of good character may 
act out of a character. But the influence that particular motives have in our free actions is 
shaped in part by the character of the person who is subject to those motives.”1
Rowe, then, is suggesting that, in Reid’s view, every agent has a ‘character’, which is 
made up of a set of dispositions to yield to either rational or animal principles under 
certain circumstances. Thus, we may explain why, in any instance, a rational principle 
prevails, by reference to the agent’s possession of a disposition to resist any animal 
principle that opposes that rational principle.
Now Rowe does not attempt to develop this solution; nor does he show, in any 
detail, how it might be available to Reid. However, Reid does suggest something that 
performs a very similar function to Rowe’s ‘‘set of dispositions”: that is, what Reid 
called “general fixed purposes”, which Reid, in effect, defines as follows:
D28 Particular fixed purpose = df  a determination of the agent’s will to perform 
some individual action at some future time and place, so as to bring about 
some particular end.
D29 General fixed purpose = df  a determination of the agent’s will to regulate 
her future actions by some general rule, such that if, at any future time or 
place in which certain circumstances occur, she will perform a certain action 
so as to bring about some general end.2
We can use this notion of general fixed purposes to explain why, for some 
individual action, a rational principle prevails over an animal principle: for we can now 
say that, the animal principle was resisted in this instance, just because the agent had a 
general fixed purpose to regulate her actions in such a way as to resist any such animal 
principle in any such circumstance.
There are two important questions that this ‘solution’ raises: First, we may have 
explained why an agent resists an animal principle in some particular instance by 
reference to a general fixed purpose. But this merely pushes the explanatory problem a 
step back: for we are now left with the need to explain why an agent might have one 
general fixed purpose rather than another. Second, Rowe suggests that a “set of
1 Rowe, Thomas Reid, p. 184.
2 “A fixed purpose or resolution with regard to our future conduct. . .  is truly and properly am act of will. 
. . .  By a particular purpose, I mean that which has for its object an individual action, limited to one time and 
place; by a general purpose, that of a course or train of action, intended for some general end, or regulated by 
some general rule.. . .  A general purpose may continue for life; and, after many particular actions have been 
done in consequence of it, may remain and regulate future actions.” AP, pp. 86-87.
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dispositions” constitutes the agent’s character; and it seems that Reid’s general fixed 
purposes correspond nicely to Rowe’s ‘dispositions’. The question is, do general fixed 
purposes, in Reid’s view, constitute an agent’s character?
We begin with the first question: Why might an agent have one general fixed 
purpose rather than another? First, Reid states that the rational principles of action “are 
the only principles [he is] able to conceive, which can reasonably induce a man to 
regulate all his actions according to a certain general rule [of conduct] or law.”1 Second, 
as we have just seen, Reid held that, to regulate future actions by some general rule, an 
agent must have a general fixed purpose to do so. Third, as and D29 state, a fixed 
purpose is just a determination of the will: the distinction between a particular and a 
general fixed purpose being merely a distinction between two kinds of determinations 
of the will to perform a future action. It follows that particular and general fixed 
purposes, being determinations of the will, must be the indirect object of some principle 
of action. Hence, Reid’s point is that (i) an agent is “induced” or inclined toward a 
general fixed purpose by some principle of action; and that (ii) only rational principles 
will suffice. More precisely:
Au S has a determination of the will D to regulate her future actions according to 
a general rule of conduct if and only if S yields to the inclination of some 
rational principle toward D .
Or, in Reid’s terminology:
A45 S has general fixed purpose D if and only if S yields to the inclination of some 
rationed principle toward D.
The problem we are faced with is now very clear indeed. Why is it that an agent 
yields to the inclination of some rational principle toward one general fixed purpose 
rather than another? We can perhaps best approach this first question by examining the 
second: is “character”, in Reid’s view, constituted by a set of general fixed purposes?
First, Reid clearly identifies the referents of what we ordinarily take to be character 
descriptors, such as ‘just’ and ‘benevolent’, with general fixed purposes. This is most 
evident in the following passage, in which Reid identifies the moral virtues, such as the 
virtues of justice and benevolence,2 with general fixed purposes:
“Suppose a man to have exercised his intellectual and moral faculties, so far as to have
1 AP, p. 227.
2 “The virtue of benevolence is a fixed purpose or resolution to do good when we have opportunity, from 
a conviction that it is right, and is our duty.” AP, p. 88.
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distinct notions of justice and injustice, and of the consequences of both, and, after due 
deliberation, to have formed a fixed purpose to adhere inflexibly to justice, and never to 
handle the wages of iniquity. *2 Is not this the man whom we should call a just man? We 
consider the moral virtues as inherent in the mind of a good man, even when there is no 
opportunity of exercising them.”1
In other words, the “just person”, is not one who merely happens to act justly when 
the occasion arises: for this action could be due to some unjust motive, 2 or it may 
merely be an aberration in an agent who is otherwise unjust. Rather the just person is 
one who has yielded to the inclination of a rational principle toward a determination of 
the will to regulate her future actions according to the rules of just conduct.
Second, Reid states that ‘fixed purposes have an effect in forming the character’ .3 But 
this description is ambiguous between the following two readings:
(i) Fixed general purposes play a role in bringing about the formation of a 
character, but do not in themselves constitute a character.
(ii) The kind of fixed general purposes an agent has, constitute, in part, the kind 
of character he has.
The textual evidence points toward the second reading. First, Reid states that we 
have three moral obligations with regard to our general fixed purposes:
Am (i) S is morally obligated to form a general fixed purpose P if and only if S 
judges that any action performed in accordance with P would be the best and 
most approvable action; (ii) if S forms P at t, then for any time after f, S is 
morally obligated at to act according to P; (iii) if S forms P at time t, then, if S 
has good evidence that any action performed in accordance with P would not 
be the best and most approvable action, then S is morally obligated to alter or 
retract P .4
Second, Reid argues that an agent’s character depends, in some way, upon the 
outcome of the conflict between opposing rational and animal principles:
1 AP, p. 87.
2 “a man who has no regard to justice, may pay his just debt, from no other motive, but that he may not 
be thrown into prison. In this action there is no virtue at all.” AP, p. 262.
3 “a young man proposes to follow the profession of law, of medicine, or of theology. This general 
purpose . . .  [has] a considerable effect in forming his character. 1 There are other fixed purposes which have 
a still greater effect in forming the character. I mean such as regard our moral conduct” AP, p. 87.
4 AP,pp. 91-92
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“The grand and the important competition of contrary motives is between the animal, on the 
one hand, and the rational on the other. This is the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, 
upon the event of which the character of men depends.”1
In other words, an agent’s character is constituted not only by the particular kind of 
general fixed purposes he has, but by whether or not his general fixed purposes satisfy 
the moral obligations that attach to such purposes. For example, take the obligation in 
A46, clause (iii): if, in the face of opposing animal principles, the agent intermittently 
fails to act according to her general fixed purposes, then her character is said to be 
“fickle”, “inconstant”, and “facile”. Whereas if an agent is “firm and steady in adhering 
to [her] resolutions” and resists even the strongest opposing animal principle, then, to 
that extent, her character is “uniform” and “consistent”.2 It is in this sense, then, that an 
agent’s character depends upon the outcome of the conflict between animal and 
rational principles.
Finally, Reid makes a distinction between an agent who intermittently fails to act 
according to his general fixed purposes, and one who has no such purposes 
whatsoever. Only the former is said to ‘have character’:
“A man who has no general fixed purposes, may be said . . .  to have no character at all. He 
will be honest or dishonest, benevolent or malicious, compassionate or cruel, as the tide of his 
passions and affections drives him. This, however, I believe, is the case of but a few in 
advanced life, and these, with regard to conduct, the weakest and most contemptible of the 
species.”3
It seems, then, that Reid regarded the agent’s character as being constituted by (i) 
her set of general fixed purposes, and (ii) whether or not, or to what degree she satisfies 
the obligations in A46. The question now, is whether Reid, as Rowe suggests, can 
legitimately appeal to “the characters of the agents. . .  to explain why the motive of duty 
prevailed in the one and why the motive of immediate gratification prevailed in the 
other”. Now, on the one hand, this is precisely the kind of appeal that Reid makes: our 
knowledge of an agent’s character, that is, of what the agent is, Reid argues, will enable 
us to predict or explain, with some probability, the actions he will perform in various 
circumstances:
1 AP, p. 299. Cf. “Thus it appears, that our passions, our dispositions, and our opinions, have great 
influence upon our animal principles, to strengthen or weaken, to excite or restrain them; and, by that means, 
have great influence upon human actions and characters.” AP, p. 199.
2 “Every man who maintains an uniform and consistent character, must sweat and toil, and often struggle 
with his present inclination.” AP, p. 204.
3 AP, p. 91; cf. AP, p. 203.
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“The science of politics borrows its principles from what we know by experience of the 
character and conduct of man. We consider not what he ought to be, but what he is, and 
thence conclude what part he will act in different situations and circumstances.” 1
On the other hand, we have, as yet, no explanation for why it is that an agent has 
one set of general fixed purposes rather than another. We have seen that we cannot 
merely appeal to the rational or animal principles by which the agent might have been 
inclined toward a general fixed purpose. For this leaves unexplained why it is that she 
yielded to a certain rational principle rather than some opposing animal principle. Nor 
can we appeal to a further set of general fixed purposes without generating an infinite 
regress. Reid’s answer to this puzzle, I suggest, is not to appeal to some further motive 
or inclination, but rather to the agent’s power of liberty. To show this, we must first 
clarify what it is that Reid is saying in the passage that Rowe quotes:
“For let us suppose, for a moment, that men have moral liberty, I would ask, what use may 
they be expected to make of this liberty? It may surely be expected, that, of the various actions 
within the sphere of their power, they will chuse what pleases them most for the present, or 
what appears to be most for their real, though distant good. When there is a competition 
between these motives, the foolish will prefer present gratification; the wise the greater and 
more distant good .”2
Now Rowe infers from this passage that (i) we may explain why it is that an agent 
chooses the greater and more distant good rather than immediate gratification by 
appealing to the fact that he is wise rather than foolish; and (ii) the terms ‘wise’ and 
‘foolish’ here refer to character traits. Given what we now know, this reading raises 
three questions:
(a) Is Reid, in this context, using the terms ‘wise’ and ‘foolish’ to denote general 
fixed purposes?
(b) In this context, why is it that the agent is wise rather than foolish?
(c) Why is it that the agent has one general fixed purpose rather than another?
I will show that these three questions are connected in such a way that, the answer to 
(a), will give us the answers to (b) and (c). First, recall that an agent is not passive in 
yielding to the inclination of a rational principle: rather the principle inclines him 
toward exerting his power of liberty over some determination of the will. Without the 
rational principles, no agent could form a determination of the will to perform an action 
that he has judged to be morally obligatory. But without the power of liberty, no
1
2
AP, p. 242. 
AP, p. 300.
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inclination of the rational principles would be of any consequence. The proper function 
of the power of liberty is therefore not merely to give the agent freedom, but to give her 
moral freedom:
“The effect of moral liberty is, That it is in the power of the agent to do well or ill. This power, 
like every other gift of GOD, may be abused. The right use of this gift of God is to do well and 
wisely, as far as his best judgment can direct him, and thereby merit esteem and approbation. 
The abuse of it is to act contraiy to what he knows or suspects to be his duty and his wisdom, 
and thereby justly merit disapprobation and blame.”1
In other words, if the agent does not exert his power of liberty to bring about a 
determination of the will toward which his rational principles incline him, then he 
thereby abuses the freedom that he has been given: for he fails to bring about what he 
knows to be his good upon the whole or his duty, even though it is within his power to 
do so. To the degree that he thus abuses his power of liberty, he is foolish, for he acts 
contrary to his best interest; and he is vicious, for he acts contrary to his duty. Likewise, 
to the degree that he makes proper use of his freedom, he is wise and good.
It is this sense in which Reid uses the terms ‘wise’ and ‘foolish’. In other words, Reid 
is not using the terms, in this context, to denote general fixed purposes. For it is not by 
virtue of the agent’s determinations of the will that she is called wise or foolish: rather, 
it is by virtue of the proper use or abuse of her power of liberty.2
It follows that if we asked Reid why it is that an agent is wise and good, rather than 
foolish and vicious, his answer would not refer either to some inclination or some 
determination of the will. Rather, he would say that an agent is wise and good just 
because she chooses to act in accordance with her best interest or her duty. More 
precisely, Reid holds that, if the agent finds herself inclined by competing motives (a 
rational principle and some opposing principle), then, if she exerts her power of liberty 
over a determination of the will to bring about an action that is in accord with the 
rational principle, she is, in that case, both wise and good.3
1 AP, p. 269.
2 “All wise and all foolish conduct, all virtue and vice, consist in the right use or in the abuse of that 
power which God hath given us. If man had no power, he could neither be wise nor foolish, virtuous nor 
vidous.”AP, p. 328. cf. “Rational beings, in proportion as they are wise and good, will act according to the best 
motives; and every rationell being, who does otherwise, abuses his liberty.” AP, p. 292; “liberty may be abused 
by the foolish and the vicious,. . .  its proper u se . . .  is to act wisely and virtuously” AP, p. 321.
3 “Contrary motives may very properly be compared to advocates pleading the opposite sides of a cause 
at the bar. It would be very weak reasoning to say, that such an advocate is the most powerful pleader, 
because sentence was given on his side. The sentence is in the power of the fudge, not of the advocate. It is equally 
weak reasoning, in proof of necessity, to say, such a motive prevailed, therefore it is the strongest; since the 
defenders of liberty maintain that the determination was made by the man, and not by the motive.’' AP, pp. 296-97. 
(My italics).
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Finally, if we asked Reid to explain why it is that the character of some agent S is 
just, he would, I suggest, reply with the following: When faced with competing motives 
as to what kind of general fixed purpose she should form with respect to the rules of 
justice, S exerted her liberty over that determination of the will which would regulate 
her future actions according to the rules of justice. There is, Reid would argue, no more 
we can or need to say. It does not follow that we therefore have no explanation for why 
an agent is, in any instance, motivated by duty rather than immediate gratification: we 
may still appeal to the general fixed purposes of the agent. But when it comes to 
explaining why it is that the agent has general fixed purposes that she has, we can point 
only to the agent’s exertion of moral liberty.
4 THE PROPER FUNCTIO N OF A NIM A L PRINC IPLES
One might suspect, from the foregoing, that animal principles were supplied for the 
sole purpose of putting us to trial and temptation. Reid tells a quite different story.
First, we are not morally obliged to resist every inclination of an animal principle. 
There are three possible relations an animal principle may bear to a rational principle. 
The first is opposition, which we have defined; the second and third may be called 
indifference and concurrence. If the inclination of some animal principle A has the same 
end as that of some rational principle B, then A may thus “aid” or give “additional 
force” to B.1 In such a case, we shall say that A concurs with B. If A neither opposes nor 
concurs with B, then we shall say that A is indifferent with respect to B.2 More precisely, 
where A is an animal principle and B is a rational principle:
A47 A concurs with B if and only if both A and B incline S toward a determination 
of the will to perform action (f> at the same time.
A^ A is indifferent with respect to B if and only if (i) A inclines S toward a 
determination of the will to perform action <p at t, and (ii) B does not incline S 
toward a determination of the will to perform action yat t, where S could not 
perform both <p and yat f.
Thus, in cases in which an animal principle concurs with, or is indifferent with respect 
to a rational principle, there is clearly no moral obligation to resist the animal principle. 
For in neither of these cases is an animal principle opposed to a rational principle.
1 “When there is no impropriety in [passion], much more when it is our duty, passion aids reason, and 
gives additional force to its dictates.” AP, p. 189.
2 “our natural appetites have in themselves neither virtue nor v ice ,. . .  the acting merely from appetite, 
when there is no principle of greater authority to oppose it, be a matter indifferent” AP, p. 130.
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It is not even clear that there is any moral obligation to yield to an animal principle 
that concurs with a rational principle. For it is surely possible that an agent should 
resist the inclination of an animal principle A, but yield to the inclination of a rational 
principle B, even though A concurs with B. For example, a judge might think that she 
should be influenced in her decisions only by a cool and considered regard to justice. 
Suppose, however, that she finds herself feeling a certain sympathy toward the plight 
of a defendant. Suppose also that her considered judgment is in his favour. She might, 
in such a case, seek to resist the inclination of the animal principle, so as to be satisfied 
that her decision is based solely on the operative rational principle. It is hard to see 
how, in such a case, she would be guilty of any impropriety. Hence, we are not morally 
obliged to yield to an animal principle even if it concurs with a rational principle.1
Second, Reid holds that the animal principles are “good and necessary parts of our 
constitution” .2 In their natural state, they provide a finely tuned inclination, of just the 
appropriate degree of strength, in favour of that action which is required for the agent’s 
preservation or well-being, whether or not the agent judges that such an action is so 
required. However, for various reasons, the strength of an animal principle may 
increase or decrease to the degree that it loses its “natural tone”, and, as such, inclines 
the agent toward willing an action that is inconsistent with prudence or duty. In this 
sense, no animal principle is indifferent with respect to what is in fact prudent or 
dutiful; for its sole function is to incline the agent toward willing an action that is 
prudent or dutiful. Hence, every animal principle will incline the agent either toward or 
against willing some prudent or dutiful action. To the degree that it fails in the former 
(and thus succeeds in the latter) it is defective: that is to say, it is not functioning as it 
was designed to function.3
However, if an animal principle A inclines an agent S against willing what is 
prudent or dutiful, S is not necessarily morally blameworthy if he fails to resist the 
inclination of A. For, as we have seen, an agent is blameworthy for failing to resist an 
animal principle only if it is opposed to some rational principle within that agent. Put 
another way, an animal principle can only be indifferent with respect to what we judge 
to be prudent or dutiful. And if we judge that we ought not to perform an action, and 
discover within ourselves an animal principle A that opposes that judgment, we
1 Cf. “In some cases, a regard to what is right may be the sole motive, without the concurrence or 
opposition of any other principle of action; as when a judge or an arbiter determines a plea between two 
indifferent persons, solely from a regard to justice.” AP, pp. 262-63.
2 AP, p.189.
3 “nature has given to our appetites that degree of strength which is most proper for us; and that 
whatever alters their natural tone, either in excess or in defect, does not mend the work of nature, but may 
mar and pervert it.” AP, p. 125; “it is best to preserve our natural appetites, in that tone and degree of strength 
which nature gives them” AP, p. 128.
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thereby have evidence that A is not functioning as it was designed to function, and 
therefore ought to be resisted:1
Third, Reid argues that the proper function of animal principles is to incline us 
toward willing acts that are conducive to our preservation and well-being. However, 
Reid also holds that nature gives no power in vain. Yet if the proper function of the 
rational principles is also to incline us toward willing acts that are conducive to our 
preservation and well-being, then surely one or the other is redundant. Reid’s response 
is to argue that there are at least two instances in which no superfluity exists: that is, (i) 
cases in which one kind of principle is absent or dysfunctional, and so the other must 
operate independently; (ii) cases in which one cannot perform its function successfully 
or optimally without the modification or concurrence of the other.
First, Reid argues that powers and principles of the mind may be distinguished into 
those that function at birth, and those which “come to maturity by slow degrees”. In the 
former category, Reid places the power of the will, and in the latter the rational 
principles. It follows that, in the early stages of her intellectual development, the agent 
could not be inclined toward any determination of the will by a rational principle: that 
is, by her practical judgment regarding what she ought and ought not to do.2 Hence, if 
the agent is to will acts that ensure her preservation and well-being, she must be 
supplied with principles of action that function independently of her ability to form 
and act on practical judgments. This, Reid argues, is one of the primary functions of the 
animal principles.3
Second, even in maturity, rational principles alone, Reid argues, are insufficient to 
incline the agent toward willing acts that ensure her preservation and well-being. There 
are several reasons for this. First, suppose an agent S forms a judgment that she is 
morally obligated to perform (or refrain from performing) action 0. This judgment may 
incline S toward a determination of the will to perform (or refrain from performing) 0, 
and she may even have no animal principle opposing 0. Yet, she may fail to yield to the 
authority of her judgment, simply because, as a mere rational principle, it has no
1 "there is no active principle which G o d  hath planted in our nature that is vicious in itself, or that ought 
to be eradicated, even if it were in our power. They are all useful and necessary in our present state. The 
perfection of human nature consists, not in extinguishing, but in restraining them within their proper bounds, 
and keeping them in due subordination to the governing principles”. AP, p. 264;“What is done according to 
the animal part of our nature . . .  is in itself neither virtuous nor vicious, but perfectly indifferent. Then only it 
becomes vicious, when it is done in opposition to some principle of superior importance and authority. And 
it may be virtuous, if done for some important or worthy end.” AP, pp. 125-26.
2 “Brutes, I think, cannot be influenced by [rational] motives. They have not the conception of ought and 
ought not. Children acquire these conceptions as their rational powers advance; and they are found in all of 
ripe age, who have the human faculties.” AP, p. 299.
3 “the wise Author of our being hath implanted in human nature many inferior principles of action, 
which, with little or no aid of reason or virtue, preserve the species, and produce the various exertions, and 
the various changes and revolutions which we observe upon the theatre of life.” AP, p. 141.
3 PRINCIPLES OF ACTION 60
impulsive force for her. In such a case, various concurrent animal principles, such as 
sympathy, fear or hope, may provide the impulsion required to bring the agent to so 
yield. 1
Finally, Reid argues that animal principles are necessary for the formation of sound 
judgments. An agent S can form a “true and stable judgment” regarding some object x 
only if S gives his attention to x. But S cannot so attend to x unless he has sufficient 
interest in r, and he will have sufficient interest only if he is so inclined by “a strong 
degree of curiosity, or some more important passion” .2 Hence, without yielding to the 
inclination of such animal principles, S can form no true and stable judgment of x. 
Moreover, excellence and advancement in the arts and sciences depend upon the 
activities of discovery and improvement; and these activities, in turn, are dependent 
not merely upon intellectual ability or sound judgment, but also upon certain animal 
principles. Unless the agent has, with regard to his subject, “a love and admiration of it 
bordering upon enthusiasm, or a passionate desire of the same . . .  he would not 
undergo the labour and fatigue of his faculties, which it requires” .3
5 M E CH AN IC AL  PRINCIPLES
In this section, I will set out, in detail, Reid’s account of the mechanical principles. Reid 
argues that there are only two kinds of mechanical principles: instincts and habits. We 
begin with Reid’s account of instincts.
5.1 INSTINCTS
First, recalling our earlier definitions of the mechanical principles and actions, we may 
give the following general definition of an instinct
D30 Instinct = dfa  principle of action which (i) inclines an agent toward the 
performance of an action in certain circumstances, without the exertion of the 
agent’s will or judgment, and which (ii) is present in the agent at birth.4
1 “Sympathy with the distressed may bring them a charitable relief, when a calm sense of duty would be
too weak to produce the effect___*1 There is no bad action which some passion may not prevent, nor is there
any external good action, of which some passion may not be the main spring”. AP, pp. 189-90.
2 AP,p. 190.
3 AP, p. 191. A further instance of the interdependence of the rational and animal principles lies, as we 
have seen, in the character-forming function of the rational principles: “the animal principles alone, without 
self-government, would never produce any regular and consistent train of conduct..” AP, p. 203.
4 “By instinct, I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without 
deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do” AP, p. 103.
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Second, Reid makes a distinction between instincts that occur only during infancy, 
and those that continue throughout adulthood. In the following exposition, I shall use 
the phrase “infant-instincts” to denote those instincts that occur only in infancy, and the 
term “instincts” for those that function in adulthood.
A49 S has the infant-instinct I to perform action 0 in circumstance C if and only if 
(i) S is inclined by I toward the performance of 0 in C, (ii) 0 is not an object of 
S’s will or judgment, (iii) performing 0in C is necessary for S’s preservation 
or health, (iv) S’s intellectual development is such that (a) S could not yet 
have discovered that performing 0 in C is necessary for her preservation or 
health,1 (b) S could not yet have learned or otherwise acquired the habit of 
performing 0 in C.2
Ago S has the instinct I to perform action 0 in circumstance C if and only if (i) S is 
inclined by I toward the performance of 0 in C, (ii) 0 is not an object of S’s will 
or judgment (iii) performing 0 in C is necessary for S’s preservation or health, 
(iv) S’s intellectual capacity is such that (a) S can discover that performing 0 in 
C is necessary for her preservation or health, (b) S cannot, at any time, learn or 
otherwise acquire the habit of performing 0 in C.
Three comments on the following analyses are in order: First, Reid argues that 
“There is no reason to think, that an infant new-born . . .  knows how [breathingl must 
be performed”.3 However, an agent may have procedural knowledge with respect to the 
performance of 0, without having propositional knowledge regarding the mechanisms or 
exertions of power involved in the performance of 0. In this sense, it would be false to 
say that ‘an infant performed 0 but did not know how to perform 0’. I take it that Reid 
would agree on this point. His intention is merely to claim that an infant does not have 
propositional knowledge regarding the mechanisms involved in the performance of an 
instinctive action.
Second, Reid suggests that an agent’s having no conception of an action is sufficient, 
but not necessary for its being an instinctive action.4 We can will to perform an action 
only if it is an object of our conception; hence the exertions of power involved in
1 “To return to instincts in mein; those are most remarkable which appear in infancy, when we are 
ignorant of every thing necessary to our preservation, and therefore must perish, if we had not an invisible 
Guide, who leads us blind-fold in the way we should take, if we had eyes to see it.” AP, p. 108; “In infancy we 
are ignorant of every thing; yet many things must be done by us for our preservation: These are done by 
instinct.” AP, p. 111.
2 “he breaths as soon as he is bom with perfect regularity, as if he had been taught, and got the habit by 
long practice.” AP, p. 103.
3 AP,p. 103.
4 “We have no reason to think, that, before [em infant] ever sucked, it has any conception of that complex 
operation, or how it is performed. It cannot, therefore, with propriety, be said, that it wills to suck.” AP, p. 61.
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breathing must, for an infant, be instinctive. But an action may be the object of 
conception without being the object of will. Even if an infant knew of the acts involved 
in breathing, it would not follow that she could will these acts.
Third, As0 (iv) (a) should not be taken to imply that most or even many agents 
discover the necessity of performing <p. Nor does it imply that an agent can, in every 
instance, obtain this knowledge before the performance of <p, since this would rule out 
the instinct to perform immediate actions, as described in § 5.2.
Finally, the qualification “learn or otherwise” in clause (iv) (b) is intended to rule out 
the acquistion of a habit apart from the operation of the instinct in question: it does not 
rule out the possibility of an agent performing (pin C upon the inclination of an instinct 
to a frequency sufficient for the formation of a habit, an example of which is imitative- 
habits. In other words, the need for clause (iv) (b) arises just because habits that arise 
merely by willing the performance of an action to a certain frequency could satisfy 
clauses (i) to (iv) (a). Gause (iv) (b) rules out such cases.
5 .2  INSTINCTIVE ACTIONS
Reid suggests that there are three kinds of instinctive actions, each of which has a 
particular function or end for which it was designed.
The first kind is designed to enable the agent to perform actions that she can will to 
perform, and which are required for her preservation, but which she cannot in fact 
perform without first performing an action that is of such complexity, that no human 
agent could make it an object of her will.1 The second is designed to enable the agent to 
perform actions with a frequency that is required for her preservation or health, but 
which, if she had to take the time and effort required to will such actions, then she 
would not be able to perform any other action. 2 And the third is designed to enable the 
agent to perform an action <p with a speed or immediacy that is required for her 
preservation or health, but which, if she were to take the time necessary both to 
determine that she must perform <p, and to will to perform <p, she would not be able to 
perform <p with the immediacy required. 3
5.3  HABITS
Reid distinguishes between three kinds of habit, the third of which is the mechanical 
principle in which we are interested. Henceforth, I shall use the term “habit” to refer 
only to that defined in D33.
1 AP,p. 108.
2 AP,p. 110.
AP.pp. 110-11.3
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D31 Habit (mere facility1) -  df a facility to perform some action 0 in circumstances 
C, without the exertion of will or judgment; and which (ii) is acquired by the 
frequent performance of 0 in C.2
D32 Habit (acquired appetite) = df an acquired animal principle of action which (i) 
consists of the agent’s desire for a certain object O, accompanied by an uneasy 
sensation; which (ii) inclines the agent toward the use of O without the 
exertion of judgment; and which (ii) is acquired by the frequent use of O (e.g. 
the use of tobacco).3
D33 Habit (principle of action) = df a principle of action which (i) inclines an agent 
toward the performance of some action 0 in certain circumstances C, without 
the exertion of the agent’s will or judgment, and which (ii) is acquired by the 
frequent performance of 0 in C.
Although all habits are acquired by the frequent performance of an action, Reid 
appears to distinguish between two kinds of habits, based on which principle of action 
inclines the agent toward this frequent performance. On the one hand, he claims, agents 
may be inclined toward a frequent performance of some action by ‘instinctive 
imitation’ (which I shall call ‘imitative-habits’); on the other hand, they may be inclined 
by any principle of action whatsoever (which I shall call ‘general-habits’). We may 
present Reid’s definition of ‘instinctive imitation’ as follows:
D34 Instinctive imitation = df the performance of an action 0 in circumstance C 
toward which an agent is inclined by her observation of the frequent 
performance of 0 in C by some person or group of persons, and which is not 
an object of will or judgment.4
Now if an agent were to be inclined by instinct toward imitating the performance of 
an action merely once or twice in his lifetime, then, of course, he would not acquire an 
imitative-habit of performing that action. However, if his instinctive imitation of an
1 It is a mere facility just because, unlike a mechanical principle, it does not also incline the agent toward 
the performance of 0 in C.
2 “Habit is commonly defined, A facility of doing a thing, acquired by haoing done it frequently. This definition 
is sufficient for habits of art” AP, p. 117; “ Some habits produce only a facility of doing a thing, without any 
inclination to do it. All arts are habits of this kind, but they cannot be called principles of action. “ AP, p. 128; 
“Every manufacturing art among men was invented by some man, improved by others, and brought to 
perfection by time and experience. Men learn to work in it by long practice, which produces a habit.” AP, p. 
105.
3 “There are other habits which produce a desire of a certain object, and an uneasy sensation, till it is 
obtained.” AP, p. 128; “we may create appetites which nature never gave. The frequent use of things which 
stimulate the nervous system, produces a languor when their effect is gone off, and a desire to repeat them. 
By this means a desire of a certain object is created, accompanied by an uneasy sensation.” AP, p. 128.
4 “human nature disposes us to the imitation of those among whom we live, when we neither desire nor 
will it.” AP, p. 112; cf. IP, p. 418.
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action is a frequent occurrence, then, eventually, he would acquire an imitative-habit. 
Henceforth, his performance of this action would, presumably, be inclined by the 
imitative-habit, rather than his previous instinct to imitate. Thus, we may capture 
Reid’s claims regarding imitative- and general-habits in the following analyses:
AS1 S  has the imitative-habit H  of performing action <p in circumstance C if and 
only if (i) H  inclines S  toward the performance of <p in C without the 
exertion of will or judgment, and (ii) S  was inclined by instinct toward 
imitating the performance of 0 in C to a frequency sufficient for the 
acquisition of H.1
AS2 S has the general-habit H  of performing action 0 in circumstance C if and 
only if (i) H  inclines S toward the performance of <f> in C without the 
exertion of will or judgment, and (ii) S  was inclined by some principle of 
action (other than the instinct to imitate) toward the performance of 0 in C 
to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of H.2
6 RESISTING M ECH A N IC AL PR INC IPLES
Since the action brought about by the inclination of instincts and habits is not brought 
about by the agent’s exertion of will, it must, in Reid’s view, be attributed to some other 
cause, namely God (or some intermediate agent) acting according to some law of nature 
to bring about a general end.3 However, Reid would reject the notion that the relation 
between an instinct or habit and the action to which it gives rise, is identical to the 
invariable relation expressed by the laws that apply to physical phenomena4
1 “How many auk ward habits, by frequenting improper company, are children apt to learn, in their 
address, motion, looks, gesture and pronunciation. They acquire such habits commonly from an undersigned and 
instinctive imitation, before they can judge of what is proper and becoming.” AP, p. 117; “It is owing to the 
force of habits, early accfuhed by imitation, that a man who has grown up to manhood in the lowest rank of life, 
if fortune raise him to a higher rank, very rarely acquires the air and manners of a gentleman.” AP, p. 118; see 
also AP, p. 119.
2 “what we have been accustomed to do, we acquire, not only a facility, but a proneness to do on like 
occasions” AP, p. 118.
3 “Philosophers who agree in the Existence of Instincts may yet differ with regard to their immediate 
Cause. Some with Dr Hartley may ascribe them to the Originell Frame of the Animal Body others with 
Malebranche may ascribe them to impulses given immediately by the Deity as there is occasion for them. 
And others may modestly acknowledge their ignorance of the Cause although they perceive such manifest 
marks of Contrivance and Design in the Effect as lead them to believe that it must, either mediately or 
immediately, proceed from a wise & intelligent Cause.” MS 3061 /9 ,11; in AC, p. 142.
4 “is it not self-evident, that the relation between a law of nature and the event which is produced 
according to it, is very different from the relation between a motive and die action to which it is a motive? . . .  
There is, indeed, a supposition upon which the two relations would be very similar. The supposition is, that, 
by a law of nature, the influence of motives upon actions is as invariable as is the effect of impulse upon 
matter; but to suppose this is to suppose fatality and not to prove it. It is a question of fact, whether the 
influence of motives be fixed by laws of nature, so that they shall always have the same effect in the same 
circumstances. Upon this, indeed, the question about liberty and necessity hangs.” Letter to Gregory, WH, p. 
66b.
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Reid does not, however, suggest that principles of action are not subject to any laws: 
rather, as the following text indicates, he advocates a distinction between the laws of 
physical phenomena, and the laws according to which the principles of action operate:
“motives may be subject to other laws of nature, no less invariable than the laws of motion, 
though not the same. Different parts of nature have different laws, it may be said; and to 
apply the laws of one part to another part, particularly to apply the laws of inert matter to the 
phenomena of mind, may lead into great fallacies.. . .  between the influence of motives upon 
a mind and the influence upon a body, there is but a very slight analogy, which fails in many 
instances.”1
The laws that Reid suggests might apply to the phenomena of mind appear to bear 
one essential caveat. The laws to which material phenomena are subject are rules, the 
application of which is brought about by the free action of God; the one qualification 
being that God may, in any instance, ‘suspend’ or ‘counteract’ a law of nature to bring 
about some end. Now the laws to which the phenomena of mind are subject are, in this 
respect, identical to the laws of material phenomena. However, they are unique, 
inasmuch as the agent herself, by an act of will, may ‘suspend’ some such law.2
We have seen how this kind of ‘suspension’ might take place in our discussion of 
the resistance of the animal and rational principles. But it might seem that the 
mechanical principles would fall under the class of material phenomena, since the 
actions inclined thereby are involuntary. However, Reid argues that, even here, there 
are several ways in which the agent may exercise the power of self-government.
First, the inclinations of an instinct or habit may operate without the exertion of will: 
but they may nevertheless be resisted by the exertion of will. Resistance on any single 
occasion may occur by virtue of a single exertion of the will.3 However, a single 
triumph is scarcely sufficient to eliminate an undesirable instinct or habit. But neither is 
a series of exertions of the will, in itself, sufficient: even a general fixed purpose to exert 
one’s will so as to resist the inclination of an instinct or habit is not sufficient, in itself, 
to eliminate that instinct or habit. It is only when, by her constant resistance, the agent 
finally acquires an ‘opposing-habit’, that the principle in question will be “undone”.
1 Letter to Gregory, WH, p. 66b-67a. See also,
2 Given that voluntary action, in Reid’s view, is merely the exertion of some power of the mind to bring 
about an effect, I take this ‘suspendable’ view of the laws of human nature, to be only plausible way of 
rendering consistent the following claims: (i) “Being, therefore, the work of Nature, [the human mind’s] 
powers and faculties, their extent and limits, their growth and decline, and their connection wit the state of 
the body, may, not improperly, be called phaenomena of Nature. And as far as these phaenomena can, by 
just induction, be reduced to geneal laws, such laws may properly be called laws of Nature” (p. 15); (ii) “the 
voluntary actions of men can in no case be called natural phanomena, or be considered as regulated by the 
physical laws of Nature.” (p. 16) MS 3061 /I  /4; in AC, p. 185.
3 “it requires a particular will and effort to forbear [a habit], but to do it, requires very often no will at all. 
We are carried by habit as by a stream in swimming, if we make no resistance.” AP, p. 118-19.
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More precisely, where:
A53 A is an opposing-habit with respect to some instinct or habit ß for agent S if 
and only if (i) A inclines S toward performing action <f> in circumstance C, (ii) B 
inclines S toward performing action y in C (iii) S cannot perform both <j> and y 
in C at the same time; 
and where:
A55 S may acquire an opposing-habit A with respect to some instinct or habit B if 
and only if S exerts her will to resist the inclination of ß to a frequency 
sufficient for the acquisition of A\
Reid would hold that
A^ S can eliminate some instinct or habit B if and only if S acquires an opposing- 
habit with respect to ß.1
Second, we have seen that the inclination of a general-habit bypasses the will and 
judgment. However, the formation of a general-habit requires a frequently repeated 
action, and the performance of such actions may well be the consequence of either 
rational or animal principles. In that case, the agent may be held directly accountable for 
the acquisition of a general-habit, and indirectly accountable for the performance of 
actions toward which the agent is inclined by that general-habit.2 This kind of habit, 
whereby a general fixed purpose produces a general-habit, Reid calls a “habit of the 
will”.3 4In this sense, an agent may be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for the kind 
of general-habits that she has acquired. More precisely:
A57 S will acquire a virtuous habit A if and only if (i) S has a determination of the 
will D to regulate her future actions according to the rules of duty or 
prudence (i.e. a general fixed purpose), and (ii) S adheres to D in her actions 
to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A*
1 “when the habit is formed, such a general resolution [to forbear it] is not of itself sufficient; for the habit 
will operate without intention; and particular attention is necessary, on every occasion, to resist its impulse, 
until it be undone by the habit of opposing it.” AP, pp. 117-18; “it is not easy to resist the impulse of instinct, 
even by a strong resolution not to yield to it.” AP, pp. 110-11.
2 “we may think [a man] highly blameable in acquiring [inveterate habits], yet, when they are confirmed 
to a certain degree, we consider him as no longer master of himself, and hardly redaimable without a 
miracle. “ AP, p. 321.
3 “A fixed resolution retains its influence upon the conduct even when the motives to it are not in v iew ,. .  
. [and] may be called a habit of the will. By such habits chiefly, men are governed . . .  in their practice.” AP, p. 
91; “There are therefore acts of the will which are not transient and momentary, which may continue long, 
and grow into a habit.” AP, p. 93
4 “There are good habits, in a moral sense, as well as bad; and it is certain, that the stated and regular 
performance of what we approve, not only makes it easy, but makes us uneasy in the omission of i t ” AP, p. 
118; “all virtuous habits, when we distinguish them from virtuous actions, consist in fixed purposes of acting 
according to the rules of virtue, as often as we have opportunity.” AP, p. 95.
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An agent may also acquire a vicious (or morally blameworthy) habit by the 
consistent failure to resist an animal principle when it is opposed by a rational 
principle. It is precisely this kind of failure that will produce a circumstance- or state- 
irresistible animal principle, which in turn will tend to incline an agent to perform 
actions to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of a vicious habit:1
A58 S will acquire a vicious habit A if and only if S fails to yield to the inclinations 
of some rational principle to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A.
One interesting consequence of the acquisition of virtuous or vicious habits, Reid 
argues, is the increase or decrease of an agent’s power of liberty:
“the power of self-government. . .  may be diminished, or perhaps lost, by bad habits; it may
be greatly increased by good habits.”2
Now we might, initially, take this to mean the following: first, the agent has the 
power of liberty only over those actions that are subject to his will; second, if the agent 
therefore acquires a habit that is opposed to some rational principle, then he has, to that 
extent, lost his power over the actions that he performs in accordance with this habit. 
But of course, the same must surely be true of virtuous habits: the agent will lose his 
liberty, in this sense, whenever an action is performed out of habit rather than from the 
exertion of his power of liberty.
The only sense we can make of Reid’s claim, it seems, is that the nature of an agent’s 
habits will determine the degree or extent to which she must exert her power of liberty 
in order to bring about a determination of the will to perform (or refrain from 
performing) those actions she thinks she ought to perform (or refrain from performing). 
Thus, suppose an agent forms a determination of the will to regulate her future actions 
in such a way that she resists some kind of opposing animal principle; and suppose that 
she adheres to this determination in her actions to a frequency sufficient for the 
acquisition of a general-habit. In such a case, she will, by definition, have thereby 
acquired the capacity and the inclination to resist that opposing animal principle on 
any occasion that it arises, without any exertion of her power of liberty. This, of course, 
will ‘free up’ the agent to exert her power of liberty in other domains. On the other
1 Even though a circumstance- or state-irresistible animal principle and a general-habit will both have 
very similar effects on the agent, they must be thought of as two distinct kinds of inclination, given that a 
habit is, by definition, a mechanical principle. There is, of course, one important difference: a circumstance- or 
state-irresistible animal principle inclines the agent toward voluntary actions; whereas a habit inclines the 
agent toward involuntary actions. Hence, the agent may be held directly morally accountable for the former, 
but only indirectly for the latter.
2 AP, pp. 321-22; cf. “Supposing it therefore to be true. That man is a free agent, it may be true, at the 
same time, that his liberty. . .  may be impaired or lost by vicious habits”. AP, pp. 270-71.
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hand, if the agent must consistently1 struggle against yielding to the inclinations of 
vicious habits, then her power of liberty will be to that extent restricted. It is in this 
sense, that the agent’s power of liberty increases in proportion to her acquisition of 
virtuous habits, and decreases in proportion to her acquisition of vicious habits.2
1 Of course, if the struggle is consistently successful, then she will eventually lose the habit.
2 “he who has accustomed himself to restrain his passions, enlarges by habit his power over them, and 
consequently over himself.” AP, p. 320.
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4
Judgment
INTRODUCTION
In the preceeding three chapters, we have examined, respectively, Reid’s notion of the 
mind and its operations, the nature of voluntary action and the principles that incline 
the agent to act. One final step remains before we can begin to consider Reid’s theory of 
knowledge directly: The operation of judgment, in Reid’s view, is that by which we 
may enter into an epistemic relation with the operations of our minds and the external 
world. To understand his account of the nature of this relation and the conditions 
under which it arises, we must first examine his account of the relata: namely, the 
operation of judgment and its objects.
1 PROPOSITIONS
Reid argues that we may gain some understanding of the various operations of mind, if 
we attend to the linguistic forms by which they are expressed.1 The operation of 
judgment, Reid states, “is expressed in speech by a proposition” .2 Hence, we begin with 
his account of propositions. First, Reid held that all propositions are sentences, but not 
all sentences are propositions. Questions, commands, petitions, promises, and 
suppositions each have a grammatical structure that enables them to express a unique 
kind of mental operation.3 The grammatical structure of a proposition is, of course, that 
of a declarative sentence:
Dj5 Proposition = df an “affirmative or negative [sentence], with a verb in what is 
called the indicative mood. ”4
Third, no proposition can express an operation of judgment unless it is also the 
expression of the operation of conception: for we must have some conception of that
1 “Language is the express image and picture of human thoughts; and, from the picture, we may often 
draw very certain conclusions with regard to die original.” IP, p. 573.
2 IP, p. 69. Cf. IP, p. 50Q “Judgment can only be expressed by a proposition, affirmative or negative, which 
is a compleat Sentence.” MS 8 /I I /5 ,2.
3 “there are many Sentences in Language which neither affirm nor deny, Such as a Question a Command, 
or Petition, or Promise a Supposition. These Operations of Mind are expressed in Language by Sentences, but 
not by propositions.” MS 2/III/12, 28. This view is evidently Aristotelian: “not all [sentences] can be called 
propositions. We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a 
sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity.” De lnterpretatione 17a. Trans. H.P. Cooke, H. Tredennick. Reid 
mentions Aristotle’s view in BA, p. 346. See B. Smith and K. Schuhmann, “Elements of Speech Act Theory in 
the Work of Thomas Reid”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1990): pp. 47-66.
4 IP, p.498.
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about which we judge.1 Fourth, being an expression of judgment is not essential to a 
proposition. A proposition may be used to express mere conception, that is, conception 
without belief, for example, where we knowingly utter contradictory propositions.2 
However, unless there are contextual indications to the contrary, the utterance of some 
proposition may be taken to both (i) indicate the occurrence of “a mental affirmation or 
negation” ,3 and (ii) describe what it is that the agent affirms or denies. Finally, the 
utterance of a proposition often includes linguistic or pragmatic signs indicating the 
degree of strength with which the agent affirms or denies, such as ‘probably’. In sum, 
Reid, I suggest, would consent to the following:
A59 For any proposition p, S judges that p  if and only if (i) S conceives of p  and (ii) 
S mentally affirms that p  with a certain degree of strength.
2 TRUTH-VALUE
To what does Reid ascribe truth-value? The textual evidence is unclear. On the one 
hand, Reid describes truth and falsehood as qualities that may be ascribed only to 
propositions.4 Again, he describes judgment as a determination of the mind regarding 
the truth or falsehood of a proposition.5 On the other hand, there are passages in which 
Reid ascribes truth-value to both (i) the operation of judgment and (ii) the propositions 
by which judgment is expressed, such as the following:
“Every judgment, and every proposition by which judgment is expressed, must be true or 
false; and the qualities of true and false, in their proper sense, can belong to nothing but to 
judgments, or to propositions which express judgment.”6
1 “there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge” IP, p. 499; “a 
proposition must be conceived before we can judge of it” IP, p. 509. This condition is true of every sentence 
that expresses an operation of mind: for “conception enters as an ingredient in every operation of the mind” 
IP, p. 358.
2 “it is impossible for a man to have two judgments at the same time, which he perceives to be 
contradictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty.” IP, 
p. 500.
3 IP, p. 501. “If it should be said that the Definition is to be understood of Mental Affirmation or Denial, 
not of that which is made by words, I believe it is so; but Mental Affirmation or Denial is onely a Periphrasis 
for Judgment and not more easy to be understood.” MS 8 /II/5 ,1
4 “Mr Locke very justly observes . . . That Truth and falshood belong not properly to Ideas but to 
propositions.” MS 4 /II/2 ,25 m.; cf. “every proposition is either true or false” IP, p. 533.
5 forming any judgment of [a proposition’s] truth or falsehood” IP, p. 19; “we may have no concern 
whether [a proposition] be true or false. In these cases we commonly form no judgment about it” IP, p. 395.
6 IP, p. 359; cf. “Truth and falsehood are qualities which belong to judgment only; or to propositions by 
which judgment is expressed. Every judgment, every opinion, and every proposition, is either true or false. 
But words which neither affirm nor deny any thing, can have neither of those qualities” IP, p. 69; “Every 
proposition is either true or false; so is every judgment.” IP, p. 533; “the Act of the Mind in supposing is 
neither true nor false being no judgment.” MS 6 /III/7 ,1-2.
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We may perhaps discover Reid’s view on this issue, by first determining what it is 
that he took to be the object of a judgment.1 There are several passages in which Reid 
states that ‘the object of judgment is a proposition’.2 However, he also appears to 
regard this is as a periphrasis for his more complete view, namely, that the object of 
judgment is that which is “expressible by a Proposition“ .3 But what is Reid referring to 
by this phrase? There appear to be several options.
First, Reid, as we have seen, states that judgments are ‘expressible by propositions’. 
Perhaps, then, Reid is refering to judgments. This interpretation is unlikely. For it 
would entail that Reid thought the object of judgment was judgment itself.
Second, Reid held that we cannot “pursue a train of thought or reasoning without 
the use of language”; again, language, he writes, “is an instrument of thought as well as 
of the communication of our thoughts.” 4 Could Reid therefore be referring to an 
‘inwardly spoken’ proposition that functions as the vehicle of thought, and which is 
therefore expressible by an ‘outwardly spoken’ proposition? Unfortunately, Reid also 
held that judgment is involved in every act of perception, memory, and consciousness;5 
and he would surely have denied that we formulate ‘inwardly spoken’ propositions for 
every perceptual judgment.
Third, Reid seems to allow that there is something that is distinct from and 
‘conveyed’ or ‘signified’ by a proposition, and which may be the object of our 
judgment. For he gives examples where (i) two token propositions of the same type are 
taken to signify different things: “certain articulate sounds convey to my mind the 
knowledge of the battle of Pharsalia, and others, the knowledge of the battle of 
Poltowa”; and where (ii) two token propositions of different types are taken to signify 
the same thing: “when a Frenchman and an Englishman receive the same information 
by different articulate sounds” .6 Again, Reid states that a proposition has a “meaning”, 
which we may understand .7 In short, the terms ‘knowledge’, ‘information’ and
1 “Belief must have an object For he that believes, must believe something; and that which he believes is 
called the object of his belief.” IP, p. 270.
2 “propositions . . .  are the object of belief’. IP, p. 580; cf. “Every proposition that may be the object of 
belief, has a contrary proposition that may be the object of a contrary belief.”. The belief of a proposition is an 
operation of mind” IP, p. 353; “assent we give to a proposition” IP, p. 671.
3 “The Object of a Belief must be a Proposition or expressible by a Proposition” MS 3 /I I /3 ,10.
4 IP, p. 666. Reid seems to have been aware of the difficulty in separating a thought from the sign of that 
thought; “Words are the signs of our thoughts; and the sign is so associated with the thing signified, that the 
last can hardly present itself to the imagination, without drawing the other along with it.” IP, p. 666.
5 “the senses, memory and consciousness, are considered as judging faculties.” IP, p. 502; “In the feeling of 
Pain there is a Mental Affirmation that I feel i t  It can only be expressed by a Proposition which must be true 
or false.” MS 8 /I I /5 ,3.
6 HM, p. 186; cf. Reid use of ‘proposition’ to refer to a mere token; “Aristeppus who happened to be 
formost came upon the diagram of a Mathematical Proposition drawn in the Sand” MS 2 /III/11 ,7
7 “I know nothing that can be meant by having the idea of a proposition, but either the understanding its 
meaning, or the judging of its truth.” IP, p. 403.
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‘meaning’, as used in these texts, seem to be good candidates for whatever is 
extensionally equivalent to the phrase ‘expressible by a proposition’. Our task, then, is 
to determine what precisely this ‘meaning’ is to which Reid refers.
3 THE ACT OF C O N CEPTIO N
We begin by examining that operation of mind by which Reid takes it that we 
understand or apprehend the meaning of a proposition, namely, the operation of 
“simple apprehension” or “bare conception” .1
First, what precisely is the referent of the term ‘conception’. Reid argues that, in our 
attempts to fix such a reference, philosophers have standardly failed to discern the 
process/product ambiguity in the term. For example, we would normally take:
(a) S is painting a centaur; 
to mean:
(a*) S is performing the activity of painting so as to bring about a pictorial 
representation of a centaur.
Unfortunately, philosophers have, by analogy, taken:
(b) S conceives of a centaur; 
to mean:
(b*) S is performing the activity of conceiving so as to bring about a mental 
representation of a centaur.
In doing so, Reid argues, they have made two mistakes. First, to say that we have a 
conception of a centaur in our minds is merely to say that we are conceiving a centaur: 
we are not producing a conception in the sense that, by painting, we are producing a 
picture. Conceiving, Reid argues, does not bring about any effect: it is merely the 
exertion of a power of the mind directed toward an object.2 The second mistake is to 
think that, just as the act of painting is directed toward a picture of a centaur, rather 
than the centaur itself, so also the act of conception is directed toward a mental 
representation of a centaur, and not the centaur itself.
1 “it is one thing to understand what is said, to conceive or apprehend its meaning, whether it be a word, 
a sentence, or a discourse; it is another thing to judge of it” IP, p. 358.
2 “Conceiving as well as projecting or resolving, are what the schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind, 
which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a transitive act, which produces an effect distinct 
from the operation, and this effect is the picture. Let this therefore be always remembered, that what is 
commonly called the image of a thing in the mind, is no more than the act or operation of the mind in 
conceiving i t ” IP, p. 364.
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Now these mistakes, Reid thinks, are generated, in part, by an adherence to the 
principle that the interaction between the mind and its objects is, in certain respects, 
analogous to the interaction between physical objects: that is, just as two bodies 
produce an immediate effect upon or change in each another if and only if they are 
spatio-temporally contiguous, so it is with the mind and its objects. Call this principle 
the Contiguity Maxim:
CM, x is an immediate object of S’s mind if and only if x is spatio-temporally 
contiguous to S’s mind.1
Thus, we might suppose that, since a centaur does not exist in any time or place, it 
cannot itself be an immediate object of our conception. Again we might think that, since 
the objects of our memory no longer exist, and the objects of our perception could not 
literally enter our minds, it follows that they cannot be immediate objects of mind. Now 
it is clear, Reid argues, that the hidden premise, in both cases, is CM,. Reid’s solution, 
then, is to reject the claim that the objects of mere conception, memory, and perception 
cannot be the immediate objects of thought, by rejecting CM,. Philosophers, however, 
have responded quite differently. They have instead postulated the existence of mental 
images or representations: that is, things that are (i) spatio-temporally contiguous to the 
mind; (ii) distinct from the objects of mere conception, memory, and perception; and 
(iii) somehow able to represent these objects to the mind.2
This solution is, of course, Reid’s interpretation of the Ideal System; and his attempt 
to refute it constitutes a major focus of his philosophical energy.3 We shall examine here 
two of his key objections. First, Reid takes it to be a general maxim that something is an 
object of thought if and only if it is an immediate object of thought. His argument is 
this: For any object of thought O:
(1) Either S thinks of O at time t or S does not think of O at t.
(2) If S thinks of O at f, then O is an immediate object of S’s thought at t.
(3) If S does not think of O at t, then O is not an object of S’s thought at t.
Therefore,
1 Cf. “the Mind being onely able to act where it is” MS 1 / I /3 ,12; “‘Neither the mind nor any other being 
can act but when & where it is.” MS 3107/1/3,65.
2 “Philosophers very unanimously maintain, that in conception there is a real image in the mind, which is 
the immediate object of conception, and distinct from the act of conceiving it.” IP, pp. 364-65.
3 It is well-known that Reid considered his objections to the Ideal System to be his chief contribution to 
philosophical thought: “It would be want of candour not to own that I think there is some merit in what you 
are pleased to call my Philosophy; but I think it lies chiefly in having called in question the common theory of 
Ideas, or Images of things in the mind being the only objects of thought;. . .  I think there is hardly anything that 
can be called mine in the philosophy of the mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this 
prejudice.” Letter to Dr. Gregory (20th Aug 1790), WH, p. 22a. See HM, Manuscripts § 22.
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(4) Either O is an immediate object of S's thought at t, or O is not an object of S’s 
thought at f.1 [by 1-3]
Now the Idealist holds that S cannot conceive a centaur unless the immediate object 
of S 's conception is a mental representation of a centaur. But if (4) is true, then S would 
not then be conceiving a centaur, but rather a representation of a centaur. That is:
(5) Either a centaur is an immediate object of S’s conception at t, or a centaur is 
not an object of S 's conception at t.
The Idealist might respond by arguing that, while it may seem to us that the object 
of our conception is a centaur, it is, in fact, a mental representation of a centaur. The 
problem here, Reid argues, is that the object of our conception, when we take ourselves 
to be conceiving a centaur, has the attributes of figure, colour, life, and motion. But no 
mental representation of a centaur has such attributes. More precisely, Reid’s second 
principle objection to the Ideal System is the following reductio:
(1) All mental representations are attributes of mind, [by definition]
(2) No attribute of mind is coloured, shaped or extended, [by definition]
Therefore,
(3) No mental representation is coloured, shaped or extended. [1,2]
(4) If mental representations are identical to the immediate objects of mind, then, 
for any attribute F, the immediate objects of mind have F if and only if mental 
representations have F. [by the indiscernibility of identicals]
(5) Mental representations are identical to the immediate objects of mind, [by 
hypothesis of the Ideal System]
Therefore,
(6) For any attribute F, the immediate objects of mind have F if and only if mental 
representations have F. [4,5]
(7) Some immediate objects of mind are coloured, shaped and extended.2
Therefore,
(8) Some mental representations are coloured, shaped and extended. [6,7]
Therefore,
(9) No mental representation is coloured, shaped and extended and some mental 
representations are coloured, shaped and extended. [3,8]
1 “whatever the object be, the man either thinks of it, or he does not. There is no medium between these. If 
he thinks of it, it is an immediate object of thought while he thinks of it. If he does not think of it, it is no 
object of thought at alL Every object of thought, therefore, is an immediate object of thought” IP, p. 536
2 The restriction is given in view of objects of mind such as time, existence, non-existence, and so on.
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And so, Reid condudes from this that, unless we are prepared to accept that we are 
utterly mistaken about what it is that we are conceiving, it seems we must be 
conceiving the centaur itself, rather than some mental representation of a centaur.1 But 
we need more detail here. What, precisely, does Reid take to be the objects of 
conception?
4 THREE TYPES OF C O N CEPTIO N
Reid presents three kinds of conceptions, distinguished by their objects: namely, the 
non-existent things, individuals and universals. We examine each in turn.
4.1 IMAGINATION
That kind of conception Reid calls imagination is given the following analysis:
Ago S imagines some object x if and only if (i) S conceives of x, (ii) x does not exist 
nor is it a copy of anything that exists, (iii) S does not believe that x exists, (iv) 
x may be conceived by some person other than S.2
It follows immediately that, if there is such an operation as imagination, then CM, is 
false. For if S can imagine that p, then something can be the immediate object of thought 
even though it is not spatio-temporally contiguous to the mind.
4.2 CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUALS
The second kind of conception is that which we have of things that exist.3 Now Reid 
daims that his description of the relation between this kind of conception and its object 
is analogous, in certain respects, to that relation which holds between a picture and that 
of which it purports to be a representation. But, given Reid’s rejection of mental 
representations, it is not at all dear how this analogy is to be made out. For example, 
Reid suggests that our conceptions are true just in case they “agree with” the individual 
thing that is the object of that conception.
1 “This one object which I conceive, is not the image of an animal, it is an animal. I know what it is to 
conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an animal; and I can distinguish the one of these 
from the other without any danger of mistake. The thing I conceive is a body of a certain figure and colour, 
having life and spontaneous motion. The Philosopher says that the idea is an image of the animal, but that it 
has neither body, nor colour, nor life, nor spontaneous motion. This I am not able to comprehend.” IP, p. 391.
2 “There are conceptions which may be called fancy pictures. They are commonly called creatures of
fancy, or of imagination. They are not the copies of any original that exists, but are originals themselves-----
They were conceived by their creators, and may be conceived by others, but they never existed. We do not 
ascribe the qualities of true or false to them, because they are not accompanied with any belief, nor do they 
imply any affirmation or negation.” IP, p. 365.
3 Reid, as we have seen, is emphatic in holding that only judgments are (in some sense) truth-valuable. 
Yet, in his description of this kind of conception, he states that these conceptions “are called true when they 
agree with the thing conceived”. (IP, p. 366) I take it that Reid intends us to understand this kind of 
conception as that which accompanies belief.
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“our conceptions are called true when they agree with the thing conceived. Thus, my 
conception of the city of London is true when I conceive it to be what it really is” .1
But if conceptions are just operations of the mind, in what possible sense could they be 
said to “agree” or “disagree” with the city of London? This claim appears to run 
headlong into Reid’s own objection to the Ideal System. Again, how should we 
understand Reid’s claim that a conception of an individual thing is true just in case “I 
conceive it to be what it really is”? Suppose that I conceive the city of London to be the 
capital of England. Are we to say that my conception will be true just in case London is 
indeed the capital of England? If so, it is very difficult to see how my conception of 
London could be false. For the object of my conception is not some mental 
representation of London, nor is it some proposition describing London. It is, Reid 
would say, London itself. But then a conception is true, on Reid’s account, just in case its 
object is “what it really is”. But it could hardly be anything else! In short, Reid’s account 
must either suffer the very same objections he advanced against mental 
representations, or it cannot account for falsehood.
We may gain considerable ground here by taking Reid to be an adverbial theorist 
with respect to the operations of mind. Sensation is the simplest operation to analyse in 
this respect. The grammatical predicate of any proposition describing an act of 
sensation does not pick out an object of that act. Its function is merely to characterise 
the kind or mode of sensory act thereby attributed to the subject. In other words, the 
predicate is being used to modify the verb, and so, from a semantic perspective, 
functions as an adverb.2 Now, a feeling or sensation is merely “a certain manner in 
which [the subject! is affected” .3 4Thus, to say that “I feel pain”, is not to say that the 
object of sensation is “pain”, but rather that the manner in which I am affected is that of 
being pained.4.
Now the grammatical predicates in propositions describing any of the other 
operations of mind are distinct from those describing sensations, in that they have a 
dual function. They not only function, semantically, as an adverb; they also pick out the 
object of that operation. Thus, take the following proposition:
(a) S conceives a centaur,
1 IP, p.366.
2 Cf. R.Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957): p. 115ff.
3 IP, p. 176; cf. an “affection or feeling of the mind” HM, p. 24.
4 Although “the form of the expression, 1 feel pain, might lead one to think that there is here an act of the 
mind denoted by the Verb feel & an object denoted by the word pain yet in reality there is no distinction 
between the one and the other.” MS 4 /I I /2 ,30-31. Cf. HM, p. 163.
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On this adverbialist view, the term ‘centaur’ picks out both (i) a particular manner or 
mode of conceiving; and (ii) the object of that conception. We may thus re-express (a) as 
follows:
(a*) S conceives-centaurly a centaur; or, S  conceives a centaur in a centaurly 
manner.
Now (a*) would appear to capture all that Reid wants to say about the operation of 
conception. First, it does not entail or require that the operation of conceiving produces 
anything beyond itself. Second, it does not entail or require that the object of conception 
is a mental representation: the object is, as (a*) states, the centaur itself.
Again, taking Reid as an adverbial theorist allows us to be more precise about his 
analysis of the act of judgment or believing. Thus:
A61 S believes that x  is F if and only if (i) S conceives of x  in an Fx-ly way; and (ii) 
this act of conceiving is accompanied by a mental affirmation that is 
expressible by the proposition: ‘x is F’.1
Now this analysis should by no means be taken to imply that Reid understood belief 
and conception as merely distinct secondary attributes of the same operation. The act of 
affirming is a distinct k ind  of operation to the act of conceiving, even though both are 
modes of thinking about the same object. To reinforce this point, we may look briefly at 
Reid’s reductio of Hume’s account of the difference between belief and conception.
Reid takes Hume to have argued that to have a firm belief is to have a strong and 
lively idea; merely to conceive, that is, to conceive without believing or disbelieving, is 
to have a weak and faint idea. Thus:
S firmly believes that p  = df S ’s  idea of p  is strong and lively.
D37 S merely conceives of p  = df  S ’s idea of p  is weak and faint.
However, suppose S firmly believes that not-p. What should we say? Either S’s idea 
of p  is weak and faint, or it is strong and lively. If it is weak and faint, then, contrary to 
D^, S  can firmly believe something and her idea of it be weak and faint; and, given D37,
1 The analysis given here is, in effect, quite similar to Keith Lehrer’s, that is, where the act of “attributing” 
is equivalent to the act of “affirming”: “S believes that o is F if and only if some object of conception x and 
some attribute of being A are such that S conceives of x under the mode of conception <f, S conceives of being 
A under the mode of conception F* and S attributes being A under the mode of conception F* to x under the 
mode of conception O*. The terms that replace o and F refer to an object of conception and an attribute 
respectively, but they also refer to a mode of conceiving the object and a mode of conceiving the attribute 
respectively.” Keith Lehrer, “Metamind: Belief, Consciousness, and Intentionality”, in Belief ('Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986): p. 43.
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we could not distinguish between S’s believing that not-p, and S’s merely conceiving 
that p. Suppose, then, that S’s idea of p is strong and lively. Given D^, we could not 
distinguish between S’s believing that p and S’s believing that not-p. Both of these 
results are absurd. Hence, believing and conceiving are not merely secondary attributes 
of the same kind of operation.1
Given the analysis in A61, we may perhaps understand Reid’s analysis of the truth- 
conditions for a belief as follows: Suppose that S believes that London is the capital of 
France. On the Idealist account, S’s belief would be false just because S has formed a 
mental representation of London as being the capital of France, and this representation 
does not correspond to or agree with what London “really is”. On Reid’s account, 
however, S’s belief is false just because (i) S has conceived of London in a London-is- 
the-capital-of-France way; and (ii) this act of conceiving is accompanied by a mental 
affirmation or assent expressible by the proposition: ‘London is the capital of France’. 
This, again, appears to capture all that Reid would want to say about truth and 
falsehood: First, it does not entail or require a mental representation as the immediate 
object of thought; the object of the conception and belief is ‘London’s being the capital 
of France’ itself (remembering that the immediate objects of thought, for Reid, need not 
exist). Second, the source of the falsehood is not that the operation of conception has 
produced a mental image of London that mis-represents London itself. Rather S’s belief 
is false just because her manner or mode of conception fails to agree with London itself.
There is a serious problem with this adverbial approach. Reid’s attempt to eliminate 
mental representations was intended, in part, to provide a solution to the scepticism 
which he took it to entail. More precisely, the Contiguity Maxim, CM,, states that the 
mind can interact with an object only if they are spatio-temporally contiguous. 
However, there is a corollary to CM,:
CM2 If S’s mind is at a spatio-temporal distance D from object x, then x can be an 
object of S’s mind only if there is some mediating object y, such that (i) y is 
spatio-temporally contiguous with x, (ii) y traverses D, and (iii) y becomes 
spatio-temporally contiguous with S’s mind.2
Now both the Peripatetics and the modem Idealists, Reid argues, accept CM, and CM2. 
The Peripatetics postulated that the requisite mediating object, which they called 
“intelligible species”, was constantly emitted by the original object in all directions and
1 HM , p. 28.
2 It “is evident, that if a medium is at all necessary, it must lay hold on both the mind & object & pass all 
the way between them without any chasm or interruption, otherwise it remains as impossible for the mind & 
object to affect each other, as if there was no medium at all.” MS 3107/1 / 3 ,69
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so was able to traverse the distance between the object and the mind and “make an 
impression on the passive intellect”.1 The mind, being spatio- tempo rally contiguous 
with the impressions, was thereby able to make them its object.2 The Idealists, however, 
rejected the notion of intelligible species; yet they did not replace it with some other 
object that might play the mediating role described in CM2.3 But then it follows that the 
Idealists do not have the explanatory resources to explain how it is that anything that is 
not spatio-temporally contiguous with the mind can be an object of the mind: in other 
words, the System of Ideas fails to explain how it is that the objects of perception, mere 
conception and memory can be objects of the mind. It also follows straightforwardly 
that the System of Ideas coupled with the Contiguity Maxim leads directly to absolute 
scepticism as regards the external world.4 There are two arguments here. The first 
assumes that CM2 is true:
(1) For any object of S’s perception x, x is such that (i) it is at a spatial distance D 
from S’s mind, and (ii) there is no mediating object y, such that (a) y is 
spatially contiguous with x, (b) y traverses D, and (c) y becomes spatio- 
temporally contiguous with S’s mind.
(2) No objects of perception are objects of S ’s thought, [by 1, CMJ
(3) If x is not an object of S’s thought, then x is not an object of S’s knowledge.
(4) No objects of perception are objects of S ’s knowledge. [2,3]5
1 MS 3107/1/3,68
2 “the active Intellect which may be supposed at no great Distance observes them.” MS 1 / I / 3 ,13.
3 Cf. “The intelligible forms of the Peripatetics and ideas imprinted on minds are parts of this same 
hypothesis, which rest on the same foundation and are joined to themselves by a binding com pact With 
what right, therefore, and with what injury Descartes and his modem followers have dismissed and rejected 
one part of this hypothesis and retained the other, let themselves observe.” Orations, III., p. 967.
4 Michaud argues that Reid’s argument in the Inquiry to the effect that the theory of ideas leads to 
scepticism, is “not safe from” the following criticism: “Berkeley did not think he was a sceptic: on the 
contrary, he wanted to prevent the sceptical consequences of Locke’s representative theory of perception. As 
to Hume, his scepticism is at least protean and multifarious, and the outcomes of his analyses of the causal 
relation and of our belief in the uniformity of nature are decisive. His scepticism concerning reason is at least 
as important as his scepticism concerning the senses.” Y. Michaud, “Reid’s Attack on the Theory of Ideas”, in 
M. Dalgamo and E  Matthews, eds. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
PSS 42,1989): p. 15. This criticism displays an astonishing lack of acquaintance with Reid’s work. First, Reid 
was not ignorant of Berkeley’s attempt to avoid scepticism, and indeed provided an explanation of what he 
took to be Berkeley’s inconsistency in this respect, both in the Inquiry (Chap. 1, § 5.) and well before the 
Inquiry was published. Second, Reid presented forceful objections against Hume’s scepticism with respect to 
the nature of causation, the uniformity of nature (see Chapter 2 of this thesis), and reason (IP, Essay VII., 
Chap. 1).
5 “with these intelligible forms rejected, the doctrine of ideas plunge everything into the abyss of 
scepticism. For according to this hypothesis the ideas present in the mind are not merely the immediate but 
the only object of the intellect. For, when the chain that links ideas and things has been broken, «ill objects 
that have passed away, all external objects, vanish just like the dreams of a sick man. The ideas of the instant 
moment are everything; about other things of whatever kind nothing will be known nor will knowledge nor 
even probable opinion be left in the human mind.” Orations, III, p. 973.
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The second argument proceeds from Reid’s contention that the only objects of 
thought are immediate objects, coupled with the implication of CM^ that no objects of 
perception are immediate objects of thought. Given (3) above, it follows, once again, 
that no objects of perception are objects of knowledge.1
Now Reid seems to have thought that, by replacing the Idealist’s representationalist 
account with adverbialism, these sceptical arguments would be effectively blocked. The 
problem is, why should we think that an adverbialist account is any less likely to 
engender scepticism? On the adverbialist account, whether or not the immediate objects 
of perception exist and are as they are perceived to be, is surely a matter of whether we 
are conceiving them in the right manner. But on what grounds can we assume this is 
so? Why should we take it that our ‘manner of conceiving’ objects is reliable?2
Reid’s response, I suggest, would be this: first, he would readily admit that the 
adverbialist theory will not avoid scepticism unless it is accompanied by his externalist 
theory of knowledge; second, he would argue that, even if his theory of knowledge 
were true, the Idealist account of the phenomena in question would still entail 
scepticism; whereas the adverbialist account does not. The details of this response, 
however, must be delayed. For we have yet to examine Reid’s important third kind of 
conception, that is, our conceptions of universals.
4.3 UNIVERSALS
Reid defines individual substances, attributes and relations as things that exist in time 
and place. Universals, on the other hand, do not exist in time or place and “belong or 
may belong to many individuals”.3 There is one clarification that it will be helpful to 
make before we set out formal analyses of these statements. Reid distinguishes between 
the relation that individual attributes bear to individual substances, and the relation 
that universals bear to individuals. Thus, rather than say that universals ‘belong to’ or 
are ‘attributes o f individual substances, attributes and relations, we shall say that 
individual substances, attributes and relations are instantiations or instances of 
universals. For example, we shall not say that the universal man is an attribute of John: 
but rather that John is an ‘instance’ of the universal man.
1 “What cannot be the object of thought, or the object of the mind in thinking, cannot be the object of 
knowledge or of opinion.”; “all knowledge, and all judgment and opinion, must be about things which are or 
may be immediate objects of our thought.” IP, p. 548;“There can be no knowledge, no judgment, or opinion 
about things which are not immediate objects of thought.” IP, p. 552.
2 Audi, for one, makes a similar objection: “Using the adverbial theory of sensory experience, one might 
also formulate an adverbial phenomenalism, which constructs physical objects out of sensory experience alone 
and says that to see a tree (for instance) is to experience ‘treely’ in a certain vivid and stable way. On this 
view, perception does not require even sense-data, only perceivers and their properties.” Robert Audi, Belief, 
Justification and Knowledge (Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988): p. 25.
3 IP, p.366.
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Thus we can set Reid’s analyses in the following way:
A62 x is an individual (substance, attribute or relation) if and only if x exists in
some time or place.
Aö X is a universal if and only if it is possible that there should be two or more 
individuals xu . . .  such that x  ^ . . .  Xj, are instances of X.
Reid ascribes to universals the same characteristics as Plato’s forms or ‘ideas’, with one 
exception: universals, in Reid’s view, do not exist.1 Thus, Reid held the following:
A« X is a universal = df (i) X may be distinctly conceived by any intelligent being 
even if there is no instance of X; (ii) X is the exemplar or model, according to 
which God created every instance of X; (iii) X is entire in every instance of X 
without being multiplied or divided; (iv) X is eternal, immutable,2 and 
uncreated; (v) X is the object of God’s conception.
Now one implication of this defininition is that any universal that is not (also) 
conceived by human agents, is nothing but the object of God’s conceptual activity. For 
to say that universals are “eternal”, as Reid does, is just to say that they have been 
conceived from eternity; and the only candidate for this role is ‘the Divine intellect’. 
However, Reid makes it quite clear that this account should not be taken to imply that 
universals exist in the mind of God as models or exemplars which resemble their 
created instances. Reid, being a divine exemplarist,3 agrees with the following principle:
A65 S produces a work of art or design x at t, only if S conceived of x at a time
prior to f.4
1 “The nature of . . .  every thing which the andents called an universal, answers to the description of a 
Platonic idea, if in that description you leave out the attribute of existence.” IP, p. 387. In his manuscripts, 
Reid antidpates the objection that Plato did not consider universals to exist: “Many have thought that the 
Ideas of the Pythagoreans and of Plato meant nothing more than the Conception which the Deity must have 
had of all his works before he made them; as every work of Design must be conceived before it is executed. 
And indeed there are many passages in those Philosophers, in which the word Idea is used so as to lead us to 
this Sense. But there are other passages, which as plainly require something more to be meant by it. If their 
Ideas meant nothing but the Conceptions of the Deity, they would never have made Ideas & Matter to be two 
first Prindples of things distinct from the Deity, whom they made a third. I do not find this Language in the 
later Platonists.” MS 8 /II/13 ,10/12
2 Reid’s MS version included the attribute of omnipresence: “It is omnipresent; because allways ready to 
present itself to the contemplation of every being capable of contemplating it “ MS 8 /II/1 3 ,13/19. Reid may 
have noticed that his charactersation is identical to clause (i).
3 For a contemporary critique of divine exemplarism, see J. F. Ross, “God, Creator of Kinds and 
Possibilities: Requiescant unwersalia ante res, in Rationality, Religious Belief, & Moral Commitment, edited by R. 
Audi and W. J. Wainwright (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986): pp. 315-34. A reply to Ross is 
given in L. Zagzebski’s “Individual Essence and Creation”, in Divine & Human Action: Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Theism, ed. T.V. Morris, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988): pp. 119-44.
4 “this is a maxim universally admitted, that every work of art must first be conceived in the mind of the 
operator.” IP, p.363.
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On the Idealist account, to have a conception of x is to have an existing mental 
representation of x : and this will be true even for the divine intellect But then, by A^, 
God could have produced his creation only if there existed some prior mental 
representation of the creation, that is, a set of exemplars, in God’s mind. But if this is so, 
then how is the origin of this set of exemplars to be explained. If it was created by God, 
then Aö conjoined with the Ideal System would require the postulation of a second- 
order set of exemplars, and so on ad infinitumr1
On Reid’s adverbialist account, however, no such regress arises. God’s conception of 
what it is that he creates is identical to the operation of ‘imagination’: that is, when God 
conceived of what he was to create, the object of his conception did not exist, even as a 
mere mental representation.
4.4 POSSIBLE WORLDS
This account of universals has some useful spin-offs in terms of understanding Reid’s 
view of modality, non-existent objects, and, more germane to our task, the nature of 
meaning.2 We begin with the following passage:
“It is possible, you say, that God might have made an universe of sensible and rational 
creatures, into which neither natural nor moral evil should ever enter. It may be so, for what I 
know: But how do you know that it is possible? That you can conceive it, I grant; but this is 
no proof. I cannot admit, as an argument, or even as a pressing difficulty, what is grounded 
on the supposition that such a thing is possible, when there is no good evidence that it is 
possible, and, for any thing we know, it may in the nature of things be impossible.” 3
Reid suggests here that we can conceive of God’s having created a world W* that is 
very different from the actual world W, that is, where W* is such that at least the 
following two propositions are true:
1 “In every work of design, the work must be conceived before it is executed, that is, before it exists. If a 
model, consisting of ideas, must exist in the mind, as the object of this conception, that model is a work of 
design no less than the other, of which it is the model; and therefore, as a work of design, it must have been 
conceived before it existed. In every work of design, therefore, the conception must go before the existence. 
This argument we applied before to the Platonic system of eternal and immutable ideas, and it may be 
applied with equal force to all the systems of ideas." IP, p. 393.
2 My exposition here, I acknowledge, is problematic in two respects: first, although I claim no more than 
is consistent with Reid’s own statements, the exposition is anachronistic inasmuch as it makes use of the 
notion of ‘possible-worlds’ as drawn from contemporary metaphysics (albeit inherited from Leibniz); second, 
since this is not the place for it, I do not attempt to defend or clarify (my formulation of) this notion in a 
manner that would otherwise be required.
3 IP, p. 405. See AP, p. 355 ff.
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P All humans in W* have the power of moral liberty.1
Q No natural or moral evil exists in W*.
Reid also suggests that W* may or may not be a possible world: and by this, he seems 
to mean that P and Q, perhaps together with certain necessary truths, are inconsistent; 
which is just to say that the state of affairs they describe are not compossible. We have 
here, of course, the germs of a free will defense.2 What we are especially interested in, 
however, is Reid’s talk of possible and impossible “universes”.
First, let us call the actual world ‘ W’. Now Reid has stated that, prior to the creation 
of W, God must have conceived of W. More precisely, God must have conceived the set 
of universals, of which the individual substances, attributes and relations in W are 
instances. Second, this set of universals would have been describable by a set of 
propositions depicting various relations between the universals. Call this set of 
propositions ‘0 ’. Third, since the individuals in W are instantiations of the relations 
described in <P, we can also say that <P is a consistent set of propositions: there could 
have been no instantiation otherwise. In sum, W was, prior to creation, a mere possible 
world: that is, a world that is (i) non-existent, (ii) the object of God’s imagination, and 
(iii) describable by a set of consistent propositions.
Now on the basis of the passage above, I suggest that Reid would also accept, in 
principle, that W is not the only mere possible world: there are other ways in which the 
world might have been. But precision is crucial here. Reid rejected the maxim that p is 
possible if and only if p is conceivable.3 For we can easily conceive of (in the sense of 
‘understand’) impossible propositions. Hence, we cannot define ‘possibility’ in terms of 
‘being conceived by God’. For God also conceives of impossible propositions. Indeed, 
Reid would argue that, for any necessary truth God conceives, God must also conceive 
of its contradictory.4 And since God conceives of every necessary truth, he must 
conceive of every impossible proposition.5
1 As we have seen, Reid holds that no rational creature is without moral liberty.
2 For a contemporary version of a possible worlds approach to the free will defense, see A. Plantinga: The 
Nature of Necessity (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1974).
3 “our power of conceiving a proposition is no criterion of its possibility or impossibility” IP, p. 297. For a 
good discussion of Reid’s views on this maxim, see M. Hooker, “A Mistake Concerning Conception” 
Philosophical Monographs 3 (1976): pp. 86-94.
4 “Every proposition, that is necessarily true, stands opposed to a contradictory proposition that it is 
im possible; and he that conceives one, conceives both: Thus a man who believes that two and three 
necessarily make five, must believe it to be impossible that two and three should not make five.” IP, p. 403.
5 Put another way, whilst it may be true that if p is possible, God conceives of p, we cannot say that if God 
conceives of p then p is possible.
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This is not to say that God, in Reid’s view, has nothing to do with modality. First, 
Reid’s distinction between universals and individuals may be understood in terms of 
the distinction between what God has imagined from eternity and what God actualises, 
or chooses to bring into existence as an instance of what he has imagined.1 Second, 
Reid, as we have seen, ties in the impossibility of a proposition’s being false, with the 
determinant of its truth-value being independent of any exertion of active power. 
Likewise, he holds that a proposition is possibly false just in case its truth-value is 
dependent upon the exertion of active power. We can then say that, for Reid, p is a 
necessary truth if and only if its truth-value is independent of whether or not any mere 
possible world is actualised by God. Whereas p is a contingent truth if and only if its 
truth-value is dependent on which mere possible world it is that God actualises. This, I 
take it, nicely explains the sense in which Reid defines necessary and contingent truths 
in terms of the exertion of will.
4.5 CONCEPTION OF UNIVERSALS
We come now to Reid’s explanation of how it is that we form our conceptions of 
universals, or ‘general conceptions’. 2 Reid argues that our first conceptions of an 
individual are probably obtained prior to the exertion of judgment. At this stage, our 
conceptions are “gross and indistinct” .3 The formation of general conceptions, then, 
requires the performance of some darificatory operation, namely, that of “analysis and 
composition” .4 This operation is equivalent, in Reid, to what he calls “abstraction” 5 or 
“distinguishing”: that is, where some individual x has the attributes F and G:
A^ S distinguishes F and G if and only if S forms the judgments: (i) F and G are 
non-identical (analysis), and (ii) F and G are attributes of x (composition).
1 Adams criticises Leibniz ’s attempt to define the actual world in terms of being that possible world which 
God freely chooses. Robert M. Adams, “Theories of Actuality”, in The Possible and the Actual, edited by 
Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979): p. 192. Unfortunately, Reid’s view, on 
this point at least, does seem very similar to that of Leibniz. However, it may be possible to understand 
Reid’s view of actualization as being similar to that advanced by A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 169.
2 It should be noted that Reid does not daim to have explained how it is that we conceive universals: but 
he does at least claim to know what must be involved, namely, the operations of distinguishing and 
generalising. “As to the manner how we conceive universals, I confess my ignorance.. . .  I think we may be 
certain that universals are not conceived by means of images of them in our minds, because there can be no 
image of an universal.” IP, p. 482.
3 “There are therefore notions of the objects of sense which are gross and indistinct; and there «ire others 
that are distinct and scientific.” IP, p. 514; the first notions we have of sensible objects are . . .  neither simple, 
nor are they accurate and distinct They are gross and indistinct, and like the chaos, a rudis mdigestaque moles." 
IP, p. 511.
4 “the notion which we have from the senses alone, even of the simplest objects of sense, is indistinct and 
incapable of being either described or reasoned upon, until it is analysed into its simple elements, and 
considered as compounded of those elements.” IP, p. 513; cf. HM, p. 27.
5 IP, p.445.
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Distinguishing alone will only give us an abstract conception. The formation of a 
general conception requires, in addition, the operation of “generalising”,1 that is:
A67 S generalises an individual attribute F if and only if S judges that F is an 
instance of the universal F-ness.
Thus:
Asg S forms a simple general conception of F if and only if S can form the 
judgments: (i) F and G are non-identical; (ii) F and G are attributes of x; and 
(iii) F is an instance of the universal F-ness.2
Universals, then, in Reid’s view, are not “an object of any external sense”.3 We do not 
see whiteness; we form a general conception of it. However, we do have perceptual 
access to that of which we have an abstract conception, namely, individual attributes: 
for example, we can perceive the whiteness of a sheet.4
Now Reid, as an adverbialist, holds that general words perform a dual function: they 
express both (i) a general conception, that is, the act of conceiving a universal, and (ii) 
the universal conceived:
“Universals are always expressed by general words; and all the words of language, excepting 
proper names, are general words; they are the signs of general conceptions, or of some 
circumstance relating to them.“5
My reading of this passage requires some comment. Reid seems to be saying that 
universals are nothing but general conceptions. That is, if (1) “Universals are always
1 In his manuscripts, Reid gives an example of distinguishing which appears to indicate that he 
considered generalising (i.e. “capable of being applied to other notes”) to be one aspect of the operation of 
distinguishing: “Thus when a Musician distinguishes in a single Note of Musick, the Tone, the Time, the fork 
or Piano the tender or the bold; he must neccessarly judge these things to be different attributes belonging to 
that note, & at the same time capable of being applied to other notes. “ MS 2 /III/8 , 3. In the IP, however, 
distinguishing (or ‘abstraction’) and generalising are clearly regarded as distinct operations: “we cannot 
generalise without some degree of abstraction; but I apprehend we may abstract without generalising: For 
what hinders me from attending to the whiteness of the paper before me, without applying that colour to any 
other object The whiteness of this individual object is an abstract conception, but not a general one, while 
applied to one individual only.” IP, p. 446.
2 This argument is based on the following text “It is impossible to distinguish the different attributes 
belonging to the same subject, without judging that they are really different and distinguishable, and that 
they have that relation to the subject which Logicians express, by saying that they may be predicated of it. We 
cannot generalise, without judging that the same attribute does or may belong to many individuals. It has 
been shewn, that our simplest general notions are formed by these two operations of distinguishing and 
generalising; judgment therefore is exercised in forming the simplest general notions.” IP, p. 507.
3 IP, p.482.
4 “the whiteness of this sheet is one thing, whiteness is another, the conceptions signified by these two 
forms of speech are as different as the expressions: The first signifies an individual quality really existing, and 
is not a general conception, though it be an abstract one: The second signifies a general conception, which 
implies no existence, but may be predicated of every thing that is white, and in the same sense." P , p. 448.
5 P , p.368.
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expressed by general words”, and (2) “[general words] are the signs of general 
conceptions”, then, since ‘x is the sign of y’ is equivalent to ‘y is expressed by x \  it 
follows that, (3) universals are general conceptions. But this cannot be right. For a 
general conception is a real individual, that is, an individual act of conceiving; hence, 
universals cannot be identical to general conceptions:1
“if there were really such images in the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, 
because every thing that really exists is an individual. Universals are neither acts of the mind, 
nor images in the mind.”2
I take it, therefore, that Reid intends to say that a general word functions as the sign 
of both a universal and the act of conceiving a universal.
5 REFERENTIAL THEORY OF M E A N IN G
We return now to our original task, namely, determining Reid’s account of ‘meaning’. 
Reid tells us that the “meaning of the word is the thing conceived”,3 and again, that 
general conceptions “are conceptions of the meaning of general words”.4 There are 
several important implications we can draw from these statements.
First, Reid appears to hold to a referential theory of meaning, that is, according to 
which the meaning of a word is to be identified with its extension. Now one of the 
attractive features of a referential theory is that it captures what we might want to say 
about one important function of language: namely, that it enables others to pick out 
that object to which we refer, or to be able to discern what the world would have to be 
like for some proposition we utter to be true.5 Reid, it seems, would agree with this 
view. For example, in the following passage he suggests that one aim, in speaking of 
individual things, is to fix their reference: that is, when we use a proper name, an 
ostensive definition or whatever, one central aim is to ensure that those to whom we 
are attempting to communicate are able to determine what it is to which we are 
referring:
1 The need for darity on this matter is not always recognised by Reid’s commentators. For example: “Reid 
distinguishes between the whiteness of this sheet of paper, an individuell quality that really exists in the 
world, but is the quality of one individual only, and whiteness, a general conception or universal which does 
not exist at all, but is a quality of all white individuals..” Keith Lehrer, “Reid on Evidence and Conception”, in 
M. Dalgamo and E Matthews, eds. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
PSS42,1989): p. 135.
2 IP, p. 480.
3 IP, p.367.
4 IP, p.369.
5 Michael J. Loux, “Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics”, in The Possible and the Actual, edited by 
Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979): p. 35
4 JUDGM ENT 87
“An individual is expressed in language either by a proper name, or by a general word joined 
to such circumstances as distinguish that individual from all others; if it is unknown, it may, 
when an object of sense and within reach, be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the 
reach of the senses, it may be ascertained by a description, which, though very imperfect, may 
be true and sufficient to distinguish it from every other individual. Hence it is, that, in 
speaking of individuals, we are very little in danger of mistaking the object, or taking one 
individual for another.” 1
Now one well-known problem with referential theories is fixing the reference of 
coextensive general words. Suppose we take it that general words function just like 
proper names, except that the meanings of general terms are to be identified with that 
set of individual substances, attributes and relations which they satisfy. Thus, for 
example, the meaning of ‘white’ will be the set of white individuals. The problem with 
this approach, is that coextensive predicates and propositions with the same truth- 
value would then be synonymous:2 for example, both the predicate terms ‘white’ and 
‘the colour of the walls’, would, under this account, mean the same thing; as would the 
two sentences ‘This sheet is white’ and ‘This sheet matches the colour of the walls’, that 
is, where they have the same truth-value.
One contemporary solution to the problem of coextensionality is to use the notion of 
possible worlds: that is, as Loux puts it, “the referential force of an expression extends 
beyond objects in the actual world to objects in other possible worlds. ” 3 This kind of 
solution will work for us very well indeed. For Reid’s view is that the meanings of 
general words are universals. Hence, we can say that, for Reid, the meaning of the 
general terms ‘white’ and ‘the colour of the walls’ are the corresponding universals (or 
sets of universals). Now these universals may or may not be actualised; and if they are, 
the world may or may not be such that their instances coincide; and if they do, we 
would not say that these terms are synonymous, because their meanings are to be 
identified with two quite different universals (or sets of universals).
We might, however, want to make the following objection: when we say ‘this sheet 
is white’, we are not referring to whiteness in general, but some individual whiteness. 
Reid would reply thus: to say that ‘this sheet is white’ is to say that ‘whiteness is 
instantiated in the sheet’, or ‘the colour of the sheet is an instance of whiteness’. In 
these propositions, we are referring both to the instance (the individual attribute of 
whiteness), and that of which it is an instance (the universal whiteness). The reason 
why this must be so, is that we cannot affirm that the sheet is white unless we have 
formed a general conception of that attribute we are predicating of the sheet; but the
1 IP, p.272.
2 Loux, “Introduction”, p. 34.
3 Loux, “Introduction”, p. 35.
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process involved in forming a general conception involves the operations of 
distinguishing and generalising; and the process of generalising produces a conception 
of a universal. Hence, we cannot affirm that the sheet is white unless we have a 
conception of the universal whiteness.
How, in Reid’s view, is the reference of a general word to be fixed? Here Reid’s view 
is that ‘use is the arbiter of meaning’. More precisely:
A$9 The correct meaning of a general word ‘F’ uttered in circumstance C is that 
universal (or set of universals) to which those members of a particular 
language-community who best understand the language would refer 
whenever they utter ‘F’ in C.
This analysis carries with it several implications: first, whenever a member of a 
language-community uses a general word, the universal (or set of universals) to which 
she thereby refers may or may not be identical to that of any other member of that 
community. This would, in part, account for mis-communication. Second, the members 
of a language-community, even those who are thought to understand best the 
language, may or may not have an adequate or distinct conception of the universals (or 
set of universals) to which they refer whenever they utter ‘F’ in C. This would account 
for ambiguity, vagueness, and the like.1 Third, the phrase “those who best understand 
the language” ,2 may perhaps be best understood as an idealisation that attempts to 
capture the conclusions of an exhaustive induction based upon evidence of how words 
are actually used by most people: that is, the kind of induction we use, according to 
Reid, in learning the meaning of general words. 3
6 VOLUNTARY INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS
One crucial feature of the operation of judgment we have not yet examined is its 
relation to the will. Reid, as we have seen, argues that all the intellectual powers are 
active: first, ordinary language analysis reveals that expressions referring to the mental, 
are, mostly, action-verbs; any such universal linguistic phenomenon, Reid held, 
constitutes prima facie evidence of a corresponding reality; hence, we have good reason 
to accept that the mind is active.4
1 “ it is impossible that a man should distinctly express what he has not distinctly conceived.” IP, p. 371.
2 “The meaning of the word . . .  is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the 
language.” IP, p. 367.
3 “The meaning of most general words is not learned like that of mathematical terms, by an accurate 
definition, but by the experience we happen to have, by hearing them used in conversation. From such 
experience we collect their meaning by a kind of induction” IP, p.369.
4 “It seems therefore to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of 
thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs.” IP, p. 14.
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Second, the cause of this universal ascription of activity to the mind, is, Reid argues, 
a product of the perception that the intellectual powers are, to some degree, under the 
direction of the will.1 It is crucial, however, that we pin down the precise ‘degree of 
activity’ Reid has in mind. First, he distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary 
intellectual operations:
A70 An intellectual power P is voluntary if and only if the exertion of P is brought 
about and continued by the agent’s will; and involuntary if and only if the 
exertion of P is not brought about by the agent’s will.2
Second, he argues that all involuntary intellectual operations are subject to the will, 
inasmuch as they may be either resisted or directed by the exertion of the voluntary 
operations. More precisely, there are three voluntary intellectual operations: attention, 
deliberation, and fixed purpose or resolution, which we have already examined. The 
former two operations may be defined as follows:
D38 Attention = a voluntary exertion of power, by which the mind, for a long 
or short time, and with greater or less intensity, focuses upon some external or 
internal object of thought, in order to acquire or retain a distinct notion of its 
attributes and relations.3
D39 Deliberation = df a voluntary exertion of power, by which the mind, for a 
long or short time, and with greater or less care or seriousness, seeks out and 
evaluates arguments that might justify a judgment as to whether or not to 
perform or refrain from performing some present or future action.4
Being voluntary, these operations are morally evaluable in the same sense that the 
active powers we considered in Chapter 2 are morally evaluable.5 In other words, the 
agent may be inclined toward exerting her power of liberty to bring about an exertion 
of the power of attention by either animal or rational principles. Hence:
1 “because the understanding is always more or less directed by the will, mankind have ascribed some 
degree of activity to the mind in its intellectual operations, as well as in those which belong to the will, and 
have expressed them by active verbs, such as seeing, hearing, judging, reasoning, and the like.” IP, pp. 67-68.
2 For example, “Attention is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; and 
it may be continued as long as we will; but consciousness is involuntary and of no continuance, changing 
with every thought.” IP, p. 60.
3 AP, pp. 78-82.
4 AP.pp. 82-86.
5 “That a great part of wisdom and virtue consists in giving a proper direction to our attention; and that 
however reasonable this appears to the judgment of every man, yet, in some cases, it requires an effort of self- 
command no less than the most heroic virtues.” AP, p. 82.
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A71 S is morally praiseworthy for attending to some object of thought O, for 
duration d with degree of intensity i, if and only if S judges that O is deserving 
of attention for d with i, in view of prudence or duty.
Again, an agent may be inclined by some animal principle toward attending to some 
object of thought for a duration and intensity that is inconsistent with what she has 
judged to be deserving; and she may find this inclination, to a certain degree, 
irresistible for reasons we have examined. Thus, our earlier analysis of moral praise- 
and blameworthiness applies here.
With respect to deliberation, Reid again suggests that we may be inclined by animal 
principles that oppose our rational principles. Thus, suppose the agent is inclined by an 
animal principle A toward exerting his power to bring about some action 0, and A is 
opposed to some rational principle. Then, in his deliberation about whether or not to 
perform <f>, S may yield to the inclination of A by failing to adhere to one or more of the 
Rules of Deliberation: for example, seeking just those arguments that would justify his 
judgment that it is permissible or obligatory to perform <p. On the other hand, he may 
resist A by exerting his power of liberty so to bring it about that he obeys the Rules of 
Deliberation1: that is, where the Rules of Deliberation are as follows:
A72 (i) if it is perfectly clear to S that she ought to perform action <f>, then S ought
not to deliberate about whether or not to perform <f>\ (ii) if (a) it is not perfectly 
clear to S that she ought to perform <p, (b) <p is of sufficient importance, and (c) 
there is sufficient time for deliberation, then S ought to deliberate with that 
degree of care and seriousness that is proportionate to the importance of 0;
(iii) S ought to form a judgment as to whether or not she ought to perform <f> 
only if she has (a) done what is within her power to identify the arguments for 
and against,2 3(b) given equal consideration to each, and (c) allowed each 
argument the weight she thinks it ought to have in determining her judgment;
(iv) if S is deliberating about whether or not she ought to perform 0 at t , then 
she ought to form a judgment, one way or the other, prior to t?
1 “And when he has reason to suspect that his affection may bias his judgment, he may either honestly 
use the best means in his power to form an impartial judgment, or he may yield to his bias, and only seek 
arguments to justify what inclination leads him to do. In all these points, he determines, he wills, the right or 
the wrong.” AP, p. 83.
2 “What we call a fault of ignorance, is always owing to the want of due deliberation. When we do not 
take due pains to be rightly informed, there is a fault, not indeed in acting according to the light we have, but 
in not using the proper means to get light. For if we judge wrong, after using the proper means of 
information, there is no fault in acting according to that wrong judgment; the error is invincible” AP, p. 84.
3 AP, p. 83.
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It follows from this account that every other intellectual operation, including 
judgment, is involuntary. As we shall see, Reid argues that, upon its seeming to us that 
we have evidence for p , it is not within our power to refrain from forming or sustaining 
a belief that p. On the other hand, Reid does argue that the operation of judgment is, if 
only indirectly, subject to each of the three voluntary intellectual operations described 
above. To reach this conclusion, however, we need to examine in some detail Reid’s 
psychology of belief-formation. In particular, we need to look at the class of beliefs of 
utmost importance in Reid’s epistemology, namely, those he identifies as ‘self-evident 
beliefs’ or ‘first principles’.
7 FIRST PRINCIPLES
First principles are expressed by both general and particular propositions. For instance, 
Reid takes the following general proposition to express a first principle:
CP3 “those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and 
are what we perceive them to be” 1
But he would also hold that, for any instance in which we have a distinct perception of 
some object O by our senses, the proposition:
(a) O really exists, and is what I perceive it to be
likewise expresses a first principle.2 Now this distinction between the general and 
particular forms of expressing the first principles is crucial, if we are to gain a proper 
grasp of Reid’s epistemology.3 In this section, I shall argue that the general propositions 
Reid presents as first principles are not intended to denote the objects of those beliefs 
that Reid classifies as ‘self-evident’. Rather they serve two functions: first, they refer to 
innate principles or laws of the intellectual constitution according to which self-evident 
believings are governed or regulated; second, they pick out the various kinds of 
propositions, of which the objects of our self-evident beliefs are instances.
1 IP, p.587.
2 “The truths immediately testified by the external senses are the first principles from which we reason, 
with regard to the material world, and from which all our knowledge of it is deduced.” AP, p. 238-39; cf. 
“N ow, every judgment of this kind we form, is only a particular application of the general principle, that 
intelligence, wisdom, and other mental qualities in the cause, may be inferred from their marks or signs in the 
effect.” IP, p. 622
3 For example, it enables us to avoid the charge that Reid seems to have considered general and particular 
principles alike to be self-evident. See William P. Alston, “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles”, History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): p. 440.
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7.1 FIRST PRINCIPLES AS GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
Reid sets out his list of putative first principles in general propositions for two reasons. 
First, to enumerate all the particular propositions that are self-evident for us, such as (a) 
above, would “be impossible & if possible would be meer trifling”. Second, for any 
proper science, the class of its epistemologically foundational propositions must be 
“easily marked and easily referred to when any conclusion drawn from it is disputed”;1 
and this condition is unlikely to be satisfied by an enumeration of all the particular self- 
evident propositions. In other words, the propositions listed must refer to the various 
kinds of propositions we take to be self-evident:2 3
“Some perhaps may be apt to imagine that the self-evident truths we have occasion to use in 
reasoning are so many that it would be in vain to Attempt to enumerate them, & that it would 
be too troublesome even to mark them when we have occasion for them. But . . .  innumerable 
particular propositions may be contained under one general One. N ow if the general 
Proposition is laid down as a first Principle, it would be trifling to enumerate the particular 
propositions it contains. Now if we confine ourselves to those first principles that are really 
usefull and make them as general as the Nature of the thing will admit I see no reason to 
apprehend that in any branch of Science their Number will be any just objection to their Being 
particularly Pointed out. That First principle in Natural Philosophy that Effects which are 
similar in their Nature ought to be ascribed to the same or to similar Causes, comprehends in 
its womb thousands nay Millions of particular Propositions which must be admitted if the 
general Proposition is admitted. To enumerate all the particular selfevident Propositions 
which this general one contains would indeed be impossible & if possible would be meer 
trifling. But the general Proposition is easily marked and easily referred to when any 
conclusion drawn from it is disputed.’9
In short, the general propositions that Reid identifies as first principles are not taken 
to be self-evident themselves; rather they are intended merely to express various kinds 
of propositions, the instances of which we take to be self-evident. Now in making this 
distinction, Reid identifies an objection to most forms of scepticism: that is, sceptics 
tend to direct their doubt against only the general propositions; and for good reason, 
Reid argues. For this is the only psychologically possible form of scepticism available to 
them: that is, we are so constituted that we cannot help but form a belief in the 
particular instances of these general propositions:
1 MS 2/111/8,17
2 cf. “I come now to that which I conceive to be the most Important branch of this Subject, To attempt 
some Enumeration of those Principles of Common Sense which I conceive to be the chief Foundations of 
Science. In this Enumeration we must confine ourselves to the most general Principles, that we may not run 
out into too great a Number, but we ought to make them as comprehensive as possible, that no species of 
Selfevident truth be wholly ommitted.” MS 2/III/10 ,1.
3 MS 2 /III/8 ,17.
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“It is another property of this and of many first principles, that they force assent in particular 
instances, more powerfully than when they are turned into a general proposition.. .  . Many 
have in general maintained that the senses are fallacious, yet there never was found a man so 
sceptical as not to trust his senses in particular instances when his safety required it; and it 
may be observed of those who have professed scepticism, that their scepticism lies in 
generals, while in particulars they are no less dogmatical than others.“1
Put another way, the only reason why it seems possible to hold that our external 
senses are fallacious, is that we are so constituted that the general proposition against 
which this scepticism is directed, namely, that our external senses are trustworthy, is 
not self-evident for us. If we feel inclined to believe this proposition at all, it is, or ought 
to be, by virtue of having constructed an inductive argument the premises of which 
contain a list of particular occasions in which we have taken it to be self-evident that 
our external senses are trustworthy. And even here our belief in the general proposition 
should be held with a degree of strength that is proportionate to the inductive evidence, 
and so, can be no more than highly probable.
Reid’s point, then, is this: if some general proposition P  expresses a certain kind of 
belief, and all (or most) of the instances of P have been self-evident for S, then it would 
be irrational or unjustified for S to hold that P is false, or even that P  is more likely than 
not to be false. The only proper object of scepticism, as regards the first principles, is the 
question of whether or not a putative first principle is genuine: that is, whether the 
kinds of beliefs that would constitute instances of a first principle are self-evident.
Reid addresses this question by suggesting a list of “marks” by which we may 
determine whether a general proposition expresses a genuine first principle.2 Where P  
is a general proposition expressing a putative first principle:
M, There is some proposition q, such that q entails the denial of either P  or some 
instance of P and q is absurd3
M2 It would be inconsistent to reject any instance of P  merely on account of its 
being self-evident, if it is accepted that another proposition q is self-evident, 
and there is no relevant difference between q and any instance of P .4
1 IP, p.594.
2 “there are ways of reasoning, with regard to first principles, by which those that are truly such may be 
distinguished from vulgar errors or prejudices.” IP, p. 575.
3 “opinions which contradict first principles are distinguished from other errors by this; that they are not 
only false, but absurd” IP, p. 567.
4 “Thus the faculties of consciousness, of memory, of external sense, and of reason, are all equally the gifts 
of Nature. No good reason can be assigned for receiving the testimony of one of them, which is not of equal 
force with regard to the others. The greatest Sceptics admit the testimony of consciousness, and allow, that 
what it testifies is to be held as a first principle. If therefore they reject the immediate testimony of sense, or 
of memory, they are guilty of an inconsistency.” IP, p. 569.
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M3 There is some proposition qy such that q is entailed by the denial of either P or 
some instance of P, and q is absurd.1
M4 There is strong evidence that most instances of P have seemed to most people 
to be self-evident;2 and if each of these instances of P were false, there would 
no good explanation for why so many false propositions had seemed to most 
people to be self-evident.3
M5 Beliefs in the instances of P arise in a person too early to be explained as the 
effect of education or unsound reasoning.4
M* Beliefs in the instances of P are necessary for a person’s preservation and 
well-being, and she has no reason for believing those instances.5
It should be noted that the satisfaction of these marks is not taken by Reid to provide 
evidence for the truth of a first principle. For, as we shall see, this would contradict 
Reid’s rejection of any form of epistemic circularity.6 For example, we could only know 
that M4 is true if we have used our faculty of perception. Hence, suppose that (i) the 
putative first principle we are investigating, call it P, states that our faculty of perception 
is reliable; and that (ii) P satisfies M4. We cannot infer from (ii) alone that P. For we 
cannot know (ii) unless we know P. All that follows, is that, if P also satisfies the 
remaining ‘marks’, then it expresses a genuine first principle.
7.2 REGULATORY FIRST PRINCIPLES
This account of first principles cannot be the whole story. For Reid also describes them 
as “a part of that furniture which nature hath given to the human understanding”, they 
are “a part of our constitution”.7 Again, he states that “when I got such first principles ..
1 “In this kind of proof, . . .  we suppose the contradictory proposition to be true. We trace the 
consequences of that supposition in a train of reasoning; and if we find any of its necessary consequences to 
be manifestly absurd, we conclude the supposition from which it followed to be false; and therefore its 
contradictory to be true.” IP, p. 570.
2 Reid suggests that this evidence might be collected from (i) the structure of language (“what is common 
in the structure of languages, indicates an uniformity of opinion in those things upon which that structure is 
grounded” IP, pp. 573-74), (ii) our own observation of human conduct, and (iii) the record of history (“the 
whole tenor of human conduct, as far as our acquaintance reaches, and from the history of all ages and 
nations of which we have any records” IP, p. 573).
3 “to suppose a general deviation from truth among mankind in things self-evident, of which no cause 
can be assigned, is highly unreasonable.” IP, p. 573.
4 “Thus the belief we have, that the persons about us are living and intelligent beings, is a belief for which 
perhaps we can give some reason, when we are able to reason; but we had this belief before we could reason, 
and before we could learn it by instruction. It seems therefore to be an immediate effect of our constitution.” 
IP, p. 574.
5 “when an opinion is so necessary in the conduct of life, that without the belief of it, a man must be led 
into a thousand absurdities in practice, such an opinion, when we can give no other reason for it, may safely 
be taken for a first principle” IP, pp. 574-75.
6 See Chapter 6. See Alston, “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles”, pp. 443-44, and pp. 450-51, n. 41.
7 HM,p.210.
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. I know not; for I had them before I can remember: but I am sure they are parts of my 
constitution, and that I cannot throw them off’.1 If first principles are to be understood 
merely as general propositions, how could they possibly be “a part of our constitution”?
I suggest the following.
First, take the way our behaviour is guided by nonpropositional procedural 
knowledge: a person performing an action under certain circumstances can generally 
be said to know how to do so, even if, either prior to or during the action, she does not 
think, declare or believe any description of how to perform that action under those 
circumstances. But we would also say that there is nevertheless some such description 
or rule which she had either acquired and subsequently internalized, or which is a part 
of her constitution and already internalized. Thus, we might say the following:
A73 S has a constitutional rule R indicating how to perform some action <p in 
circumstances C if and only if (i) S has not at any stage learned or otherwise 
acquired R (ii) R is internalized in S in such a way that, without the exertion of 
her will, it regulates her ^-ing in C, whether or not S thinks, declares or 
believes, before or during her action, that her <Hng in C should be regulated 
according to R.2
Now, believing, as we have seen, is also an action of sorts. Let us then try to apply this 
analysis to the act of believing:
A74 S has a constitutional rule R indicating how to believe in circumstances C if 
and only if (i) S has not at any stage learned or otherwise acquired R (ii) R is 
internalized in S in such a way that, without the exertion of his will, it 
regulates the formation and sustenance of his believing, with a certain degree 
of strength, in C, whether or not S thinks, declares or believes, before or 
during the formation of his belief, that his believing in C should be regulated 
according to R.
My suggestion, then, with regard to Reid’s talk of first principles as being a “part of our 
constitution” is this: a person believes some particular instance of a first principle in 
some circumstance, just in case she has a constitutional rule of how to believe in 
circumstances of that kind: noting, of course, that these rules will be expressed in the 
imperative, rather than the indicative form which Reid gives his general propositions.
Of course, we need a great deal more textual support before attributing something 
like this to Reid. But this, I think we have: First, Reid often writes of our self-evident
1
2
HM, p. 68.
Cf. John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (London: Hutchinson, 1986): p. 129f.
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beliefs as being the ‘immediate effect’, the ‘natural issue’, or the ‘necessary result’ of 
our ‘constitution’.1 We can plausibly take ‘constitution’ here to refer to the agent’s 
original faculties of mind. Then, with A74 in mind, we can take it that these faculties are 
designed so as to operate in accordance with the first principles, understood as 
constitutional rules of how to believe in certain kinds of circumstances; that is, where 
the beliefs are read as the “effect” or “issue” of the the mind’s operating in accordance 
with the constitutional rules. By way of an example, take the following first principle:
CP3 “those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and 
are what we perceive them to be” 2
On this interpretation, Reid’s claim would be that CP3 regulates our beliefs in the sense 
that the relevant faculties of mind would operate according to the following 
constitutional rule:
(a) Upon x's being distinctly perceived by the senses, believe, with a certain 
degree of strength, that x really exists and that x is what it is perceived to be.
Second, Reid held that we find ourselves automatically forming beliefs in 
accordance with first principles, whether or not we think, declare or believe them:
“We may here take notice of a property of the principle under consideration [i.e. That our 
faculties are trustworthy], that seems to be common to it with many other first principles, and 
which can hardly be found in any principle that is built solely upon reasoning; and that is, 
that in most men it produces its effect without ever being attended to, or made an object of 
thought. No man ever thinks of this principle, unless when he considers the grounds of 
scepticism; yet it invariably governs his opinions.”3
Third, Reid draws an analogy between instinctive actions and our self-evident 
beliefs (an analogy we will later explore in more detail).
“the power of judging in self-evident propositions, which are clearly understood, may be 
compared to the power of swallowing our food. It is purely natural, and therefore common to 
the learned, and the unlearned; to the trained, and the untrained: It requires ripeness of 
understanding, and freedom from prejudice, but nothing else.’4
1 Such beliefs are “the voice of Nature” IP, p. 613; they “came from the mint of Nature . . .  [bearing] her 
image and superscription” HM, p. 163; they are “the inspiration of the Almighty” HM, p. 210, “the immediate 
effect of our constitution, which is the work of the Almighty.” IP, p. 275; “the natural issue of those faculties 
which God hath given” IP, p. 572; “the natural effect of our constitution” IP, p. 591; “immediately inspired by 
our constitution” HM , p. 35.; they “necessarily result from the constitution of our faculties.” IP, p. 613.
2 IP, p.587.
3 IP, p.594.
4 IP, p. 556
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Again, Reid states that, for purposes of our preservation, there are principles of our 
constitution, analogous to our instincts, that somehow regulate our self-evident beliefs, 
in particular, during the early stages of our intellectual development:
“We come into the world without the exercise of reason; we are merely animal before we are 
rational creatures; and it is necessary for our preservation, that we should believe many 
things before we can reason. How then is our belief to be regulated before we have reason to 
regulate it? has Nature left it to be regulated by chance? By no means. It is regulated by 
certain principles, which are parts of our constitution; whether they ought to be called animal 
principles, or instinctive principles, or what name we give to them, is of small moment.” 1
Fourth, Reid suggests that, although disbelieving the instances of a first principle is 
possible, just as it is possible to resist the inclination of mechanical principles, doing so 
is abnormal or unnatural: it is to believe against the doxastic constraints set by our 
natural constitution:
“We are bom under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers; and a real 
belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for a considerable time by the greatest 
Sceptic, because it is doing violence to our constitution. It is like a man’s walking upon his 
hands, a feat which some men upon occasion can exhibit; but no man ever made a long 
journey in this manner. Cease to admire his dexterity, and he will, like other men betake 
himself to his legs.”2
Again, Reid considered that such disbelief would be so abnormal as to warrant 
ascribing a kind of madness:
“A remarkable deviation from [original and natural judgments], arising from a disorder in the 
constitution, is what we call lunacy, as when a man believes that he is made of glass. When a 
man suffers himself to be reasoned out of the principles of common sense, by metaphysical 
arguments, we may call this metaphysical lunacy, which differs from the other species of the 
distemper in this, that it is not continued, but intermittent: it is apt to seize the patient in 
solitary and speculative moments”3
Finally, Reid, as we have seen, held that our faculties operate according to laws of 
nature; and it would seem, from the following text, that he identified these laws with 
what we have called constitutional rules:
1
2
3
IP, pp. 284-85. 
IP, p. 593.
HM, p. 210.
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“It is a Law of our Nature that the Operations of our Minds are attended with Consciousness, 
so that every man who thinks, knows by his Consciousness that he does think; and this 
Consciousness gives him infallible assurance of the Fact. The Laws of Nature are General 
Rules by which God Governs the World, & by which he acts either immediately by his own 
Power, or by second Causes appointed by him .” 1
In sum, then, Reid appears to hold that first principles are the laws of our intellectual 
constitution: they are the rules according to which our self-evident beliefs are 
produced. And, while these beliefs may be self-evident to us, the first principles 
themselves, when turned into general propositions, are not: they must be discovered in 
the same way that we discover the laws of nature, namely, by observation and 
experiment.
Two points of clarification are required. First, it might be thought that this account 
conflicts with Reid’s view that (i) some general principles, when converted to general 
propositions, are necessary truths, and that (ii) no laws of nature are necessary truths. 
However, as we have seen, the general propositions in which Reid presents the first 
principles must be understood as serving two functions: first, they serve as expressions 
of certain kinds of self-evident beliefs; second, they express, in an indicative form, the 
constitutional rules according to which these beliefs are formed. For example, Reid 
presents the following first principle as a necessary truth:
NP M2 “whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it”.
Now Reid’s intention, I suggest, is that we read this in two ways: first for some agent 
S, if S distinctly conceives some particular event E, then the following proposition 
would be self-evident for S:
(a) E must have a cause which produced it.
Second, there is some constitutional rule according to which S forms the belief in (a), 
that is, where this rule would be expressed by Reid as the following first principle:
(b) If S distinctly conceives E, then S will immediately form a belief, with a 
certain degree of strength, that E must have a cause which produced it.
Reid would claim that (a), but not (b), is a necessary truth. Reid’s holding that some 
first principles are necessary truths does not therefore imply that the first principle by 
which the corresponding self-evident beliefs are produced, is likewise a necessary 
truth.
1 MS4/II/1,48.
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The second point of clarification is this: Reid would appear to hold that propositions 
such as (b) would suffice as a scientific explanation for the phenomenon of believing in a 
certain first principle. However, as we know, he would not consider them to be causal 
explanations. For this, he would, I suggest, provide the following kind of statement:
(c) S believes, with a certain degree of strength, that some event E must have a 
cause which produced it if and only if God’s judgment regarding what is best 
upon the whole inclines him toward the exertion of his power of liberty so as 
to bring about a determination of will to act according to the rule: if, at any 
future time or place, S distinctly conceives some event E, then bring it about 
that S immediately believes, with a certain degree of strength, that E must 
have a cause which produced it.
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Epistemology
INTRO DUCTIO N
We should now have sufficient background to determine, with some accuracy, the 
nature of Reid’s epistemology. We begin with Reid’s notion of evidence. I shall argue 
that Reid’s characterization of evidence is both psychological and epistemological. That 
is to say, evidence performs two functions: it is both (i) that which inclines the agent 
toward the formation of a judgment or belief to a certain degree of strength, and (ii) 
that which may render the belief epistemologically justified.1
1 EVIDENCE
First, Reid states that ‘evidence’ is the ground of judgment or belief.2 The term ‘ground’ 
is relational: that is, evidence e is said to be a ‘ground’ of a belief b just in case b stands 
in the relation of ‘being grounded upon’ to e. Second, Reid states that it is “not in a 
man’s power to believe any thing longer than he thinks he has evidence”;3 that, “when 
we see evidence, it is impossible not to judge”;4 and again, “It is not in our power to 
judge as we will. The judgment is carried along necessarily by the evidence, real or 
seeming, which appears to us at the time”;5 finally, evidence, he states, “is more easily 
felt than described. Those who never reflected upon its nature, feel its influence in 
governing their belief”.6
There are several points we can extract from these descriptions. First, evidence must 
be accessible to consciousness; a person’s belief cannot be grounded upon something 
unless she is aware of it. Second, the relation of ‘being grounded upon’ is very similar 
to that which holds between a mechanical principle and an action: that is, just as 
mechanical principles incline or “influence” the agent to perform an action without the 
exertion of her will, so also, evidence inclines the agent to form a belief without any
1 Cf. “Is a ground anything that gives rise to a belief; or must it give the belief some support, render it 
justified or rational in some degree? I think the answer must be: both.” William Alston, “Reid on Perception 
and Conception”, in M. Dalgamo and E. Matthews, eds. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid (Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, PSS42,1989): p. 41
2 “We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of belief.” IP, p. 271; “Evidence is the ground of 
judgment” IP, p. 502.
3 IP, p. 271.
4 IP, p. 502.
5 IP, p. 555.
6 IP, p, 271; cf. “it operates upon our belief whether we reflect upon its nature or not.” 8 / II/16,3
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exertion of will. Now Reid clearly states that it is “impossible” for the agent to refrain 
from believing, upon seeing the evidence. 1 However, the inclination of some particular 
evidence is, I will argue, resistible if the agent exerts some voluntary intellectual 
operation, or if the agent’s faculties are not functioning properly.
Third, the agent must not only be aware of the existence of evidence; it must appear 
to her to be evidence. A distinction is sometimes made between ‘acceptance’ and 
‘belief’. To accept something, it is said, is to believe it for the dual epistemic aim of 
believing what is true and of not believing what is false; whereas one might believe 
something merely because it is, say, prudent or convenient to do so. Keith Lehrer gives 
an example of the latter kind of belief:
“We may believe that a loved one is safe because of the pleasure of so believing, though there 
is no evidence to justify accepting this out of regard for truth, indeed, even where there is 
evidence against it.”2
Some might argue that this distinction confuses kinds of believing with kinds of 
justification: we can be hedonistically justified in believing that a loved one is safe, but 
not epistemically justified. For the purposes of obtaining pleasure, we would be 
believing the right thing; for epistemic purposes, we would not.3 Reid would argue 
along similar lines, namely, that the distinction confuses kinds of believing with the 
kinds of ends for which believing might be the necessary means:
“A man may discourse or plead, or write, for other ends than to find the truth.. . .  When it is 
not truth, but some other end he pursues, judgment would be an impediment, unless for 
discovering the means of attaining his end; and therefore it is laid aside, or employed solely 
for that purpose. ”4
In other words, whatever nonepistemic ends a person might achieve by believing 
that p, the function of believing is such that, if she believes at all, she must believe that p 
is true. This, Reid would say, is due to the psychological conditions for belief-formation 
and sustenance. It is not within a person’s power to form and sustain a belief when it 
does not seem to him that there is evidence for its being true. Believing, for Reid, is 
always believing-true.5
1 “Judgments be not immediately in our Power” MS 6/III/6, 1; “A parent or a master might command 
them to believe; but in vain; for belief is not in our power” AP, p. 115.
2 Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1990): p. 11.
3 Cf. William Alston, “The Deontologies] Conception of Justification”, in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1989): p. 116.
4 IP, pp. 395-96. cf. “The love of truth is natural to man, and strong in every well-disposed mind. But it 
may be overborn by party-zeal, by vanity, by the desire of victory, or even by laziness..” IP, p. 654.
5 “to believe a proposition means the same thing as to judge it to be true.” IP, p. 513. Cf. “One has 
evidence that one’s belief that P is really true when one has evidence that F \  William Lycan, Judgment and
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For example, suppose it seems to S at t that e is evidence for p and so S forms the 
belief that p at f, but then at t + „ it seems to S that e is false or improbable, and that she 
has no other evidence for p. In such a case, it is not within S’s power to continue to hold 
or sustain the belief that p  at t + v  Again, if, at any time, it seems to S that e is evidence 
for p, then it is not in her power to refrain from holding the belief that p. In short
A75 S forms or sustains a belief that p  at t if and only if it seems to S that there is 
evidence for p at f.* 1
Finally, Reid states that evidence is “fitted by Nature to produce belief in the human 
mind”, either “in the highest degree, which we call certainty”, or “in various degrees 
according to circumstances”.2 Now, the degree of belief produced is determined by the 
‘degree’ that the evidence seems to the agent to have: as Reid puts it: “Every degree of 
evidence perceived by the mind, produces a proportioned degree of assent or belief.”3 
For example, suppose an agent S attends to propositions p  and not-p. On Reid’s 
account, if it seems to S either that (i) there is no evidence for either p or not-p, or that 
(ii) p and not-p have equal degrees of evidence, then it is not within her power to judge 
either way: her judgment must remain in “perfect suspense”. On the other hand, if it 
seems to S that one or the other proposition has the slightest degree of evidence in its 
favour, then this “inclines the judgment in proportion”.4 Thus, we may add the 
following to our analysis:
A76 S forms or sustains a certain degree of belief that p at t if and only if it seems 
to S that there is a certain degree of evidence for p at f, and this degree of 
evidence is proportionate to her degree of belief.
‘2 EPISTEM IC JUSTIFICATION
Reid distinguishes between (i) mere evidence or a mere ground of belief, as being that 
which gives rise to a belief, and (ii) “good evidence” or a “just ground” of belief, as 
being that which produces judgments that are “just and true”;5 which functions as “the 
voucher for all truth”;6 or which “ought to govern our belief as reasonable creatures”.7
Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): p. 137.
1 This general formulation applies regardless of the precise nature of ‘evidence’, for instance, whether it 
be propositional, experiential, or whatever.
2 IP, p.272.
3 IP, p. 691.
4 IP, p.691.
5 IP, p.517.
6 IP, p.593.
7 IP, p.273.
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In short, if a belief is grounded upon ‘good evidence’, then it is formed in such a way 
that it is more likely to be true than not. Put another way, a belief that is grounded 
upon good evidence obtains a positive evaluation from an epistemic point of view: for 
it has fulfilled the epistemic aim of believing that p if and only if there is good evidence 
for p . 1 For this reason, such a belief is said to be “just and true”, or, as I shall say, 
‘epistemologically justified’ .2
Reid, it must be said, uses the term “justify” to refer to the epistemic status obtained 
by virtue of something the agent does, such as showing that a belief is justified by 
producing an argument. For example:
“When I believe the truth of a mathematical Axiom, or of a proposition that necessarily 
follows from it; I see that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise. There is nothing I can 
desiderate to justify this belief. I see that the thing is so and why it is so.” 3
The term as I use it in the following exposition, however, will refer only to the state 
or condition of being justified, and may thus be applied to any belief that is grounded 
upon good evidence, whether the evidence of reasoning or the evidence of a first 
principle, as in the quotation above.4
There are, in Reid’s view, two basic kinds of evidence, probable and demonstrative. 
Reid distinguishes between the term ‘probable’ as it is used in common language, and 
as it is used by philosophers. In the former case, it refers merely to a certain degree of 
belief. Thus, if, in ordinary language, S states that ‘p is probable’, the implication is that, 
while S might believe p, he does so with a certain degree of doubt or uncertainty. But 
‘probable evidence’, in the philosophical sense, is a species of evidence opposed to 
another species of evidence, namely, that which we earlier called ‘E-demonstration’. 
That is to say, the function of ‘probable evidence’ is to provide a range of degrees of 
epistemic justification, “from the very least, to the greatest which we call certainty”. It 
differs from ‘demonstrative evidence’ inasmuch as it can never afford that kind of
1 “It is every mans concern & every mans wish to believe onely what he has just ground to believe & not 
to believe, where he has no just ground for belief.” MS, 8/II/16; “To believe without evidence is a weakness 
which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid.” IP, p. 271.
2 Cf. William P. Alston, “Concepts of Epistemic Justification”, in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1989): p. 83.
3 MS 8/II/10, 3 (My italics), cf. “Dr Hartley is brought at last to justify this deviation in theory, and to 
bring arguments in defence of a method diametrically opposite to it.” IP, p. 88; “The child ,. . .  acts agreeably 
to the constitution and intention of Nature, even when he does and believes what reason would not justify." 
IP, p. 297; “Though this belief cannot be justified upon his system, it ought to be accounted for as a 
phaenomenon of human nature.” IP, pp. 351-52; “This instinctive induction is not justified by the rules of logic” 
IP, p. 457; “Some objects strike us at once, and appear beautiful at first sight, without any reflection, without 
our being able to say why we call them beautiful, or being able to specify any perfection which justifies our 
judgment." IP, p. 743. (My italics)
4 This distinction is made by Alston, for example, in his “Concepts of Epistemic Justification”, pp. 82-83.
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justification which Reid calls ‘absolute certainty’: for this kind of justification attaches 
only to necessary truths, and the beliefs grounded upon probable evidence must 
always be contingent. However, probable evidence may still afford a very high degree 
of justification. Indeed, Reid seems to suggest that the highest degree of probable 
evidence ought to produce a degree of belief that is equal to that afforded by E- 
demonstration:
“That there is such a city as Rome, I am as certain as of any proposition in Euclid; but the
evidence is not demonstrative, but of that kind which Philosophers call probable.’1
Reid, it must be said, is often ambiguous as to whether he is referring to degrees of 
belief or degrees of evidence, his use of the term “certainty” being a prime example. 
There is perhaps a good explanation for this. Reid holds that, for the most part, we can 
only measure a degree of evidence, that is, the degree of justification afforded by 
evidence, by the degree of belief it produces in us:
“I think, in most cases, we measure the degrees of evidence by the effect they have upon a
sound understanding, when comprehended clearly and without prejudice.” 2 3
More precisely:
A77 S’s belief that p has a greater degree of justification than her belief that q if and 
only if S believes that p  to a stronger degree than she believes that q?
Now Reid claims that a belief held with a sufficiently high degree of strength, 
namely, that of ‘certainty’ constitutes ‘knowledge’:
“In knowledge, we judge without doubting; in opinion, with some mixture of doubt.’4
“there can be no knowledge without judgment, though there may be judgment without that
certainty which we commonly call knowledge.”5
1 IP, p. 691.
2 IP, p. 691; cf. “such is the constitution of the human mind, that evidence discerned by us, forces a 
corresponding degree of assent And a man who perfectly understood a just syllogism, without believing that 
the conclusion follows from the premises, would be a greater monster than a man bom without hands or 
feet.” IP, p. 593.
3 Cf. Plan tin ga’s principle: “Belief B has more warrant than B* for S iff S believes B more firmly than B \” 
Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 9.
4 IP,p.533
5 IP, p. 504. cf. “judgment extends to every kind of evidence, probable or certain, and to every degree of 
assent or dissent. It extends to all knowledge as well as to all opinion; with this difference only, that in 
knowledge it is more firm and steady, like a house founded upon a rock. In opinion it stands upon a weaker 
foundation, and is more liable to be shaken and overturned.” IP, p. 534.
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As we have seen, the degree of justification afforded by evidence is measured by the 
degree of belief thereby produced. But then it follows that mere belief or opinion may 
be distinguished from knowledge, according to Reid, by virtue of the fact that the latter 
has a sufficiently higher degree of justification, namely, that degree which corresponds 
to the degree of belief we call ‘certainty’.1
3 EXTERNALISM
In the forgoing section, we have used the term ‘justification’ as a way of conveying 
Reid’s notion of epistemic appraisal. Unfortunately, this term carries its own 
conceptual baggage. For example, the term has been said to imply or suggest 
“epistemic deontologism”, that is, the view that there are epistemic duties, obligations, 
requirements, and so forth; and that this view, in turn, suggests or motivates 
intemalism.2 Hence, our use of this term must be carefully qualified. First, let us define 
intemalism and extemalism as follows. Where a justifying factor is whatever brings it 
about that a belief is justified:
D40 Intemalism = dj S’s belief is justified only if all of the justifying factors for 
that belief are (or could be) cognitively accessible to S; she must be (or be 
capable of being) aware of them.
D41 Extemalism = df S’s belief is justified even if some or all of the justifying 
factors for that belief are not (or could not be) cognitively accessible to S; he 
need not be (or be capable of being) aware of them.3
Our question, then, is whether Reid is an internalist or an externalist. Reid certainly 
makes claims that would place him in the former category. For example, as we have 
seen, he states that a person must be aware of the evidence for her belief, and that it 
must seem to her to be evidence. Again, he suggests that we have some voluntary 
control, if only indirectly, over our beliefs:
“In every case the assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence; for to believe firmly, what
has but a small degree of probability, is a manifest abuse of our understanding.” 4
1 Cf. “warrant is a normative, possibly complex quantity that comes in degrees, enough of which is what 
distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.” A. Plan tin ga. Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1993): p. 4.
2 Plan tin ga. Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 1 Iff.
3 Cf. Laurence Bonjour, “Extemalism/Intemalism”, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa: A Companion to Epistemology 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992): p. 132.
4 IP,p.48.
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It is important to note that Reid is only saying here that our degree of belief ought to 
be proportioned to the degree of probability that evidence actually has. This does not 
imply that it is within our power to believe more firmly than is proportionate to that 
degree of probability which the evidence seems to us to have. Such a phenomenon 
would not be the result of an “abuse of our understanding”, but rather due to some 
cognitive malfunction:
“such is the constitution of the human mind, that evidence discerned by us, forces a 
corresponding degree of assent. And a man who perfectly understood a just syllogism, 
without believing that the conclusion follows from the premises, would be a greater monster 
than a man bom without hands or feet.”1
Hence, we have no obligation to proportion the strength of our belief to what seems 
to ms to be a certain degree of evidence. However, it is possible, in Reid’s view, to exert 
our voluntary intellectual powers so as to bring it about that we fail to gain an accurate 
perception of the degree of probability that some evidence actually has. As a 
consequence, we may be mistaken in thinking that some evidence has a high degree of 
probability, and thus form a belief with a stronger degree of strength than is warranted. 
Nevertheless, even with this qualification, Reid would still appear to be an internalist: a 
belief held to a certain degree is justified to a corresponding degree only if it appears to 
the agent that the evidence has the degree of probability it has in fact.
However, this is by no means the whole story. Our analysis in A77 omitted the three 
conditions Reid placed at the end of his statement, namely, that the agent must (i) have 
a “sound understanding”, (ii) form a distinct conception of what she believes, and (iii) 
do so “without prejudice”. These three conditions are repeated in the context of Reid’s 
discussion of what it is for a first principle to be ‘self-evident’:
“Self-evident propositions are those which appear evident to every man of sound 
understanding who apprehends the meaning of them distinctly, and attends to them without 
prejudice.”2
This is no coincidence. Indeed, I shall argue that these three conditions constitute 
Reid’s analysis of knowledge. Now conditions (ii) and (iii), taken separately, might 
appear to constitute internalist elements in Reid’s account. However, our exposition of 
condition (i) will quickly dispose of this perception. First, as we shall see, condition (i) 
is an entirely external justifying factor. We shall also see that if (i) failed to be satisfied, 
then, even if conditions (ii) and (iii) were satisfied, this would amount to nothing from
1
2
IP,p. 593. 
IP, p. 161.
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an epistemic point of view. In other words, the agent may form a distinct conception 
without prejudice, and yet, if his understanding is unsound in some relevant respect, 
then the belief thereby produced will, to that extent, fail to be justified. Again, even if, 
for some belief that S forms, all three conditions were satisfied, and yet, being only a 
small child, S was unaware of this, it would not follow that her belief was thereby 
unjustified. A child, in Reid’s view, may form a sufficiently distinct conception without 
prejudice, and yet be unaware that she had done so, or that doing so was required for 
the justification of her belief. Finally, conditions (ii) and (iii) may be absorbed into (i), 
given Reid’s naturalized account of obligations. That is, if the agent’s understanding is 
sound, then she will form her belief in the way that she ought to; and this, in part, will 
involve forming a distinct conception of the proposition believed without prejudice.
On the other hand, Reid’s extemalism does not entail that we can ignore conditions 
(ii) and (iii). Reid argued that it is within our power to “abuse our understanding’’, that 
is, to render it ‘unsound’. And it is precisely conditions (ii) and (iii) over which we have 
such power.1 Part of the epistemologist’s task, then, is to enable us to understand better 
this power that we have, and the processes by which we might better direct its 
exertions so as to ensure that (ii) and (iii) are fulfilled.2
4 SO UND U N D ER STA N D IN G
Earlier, we argued that one condition required for the formation of a belief in first 
principles, would be the proper functioning of the relevant faculties. However, we did 
not connect this condition with Reid ’s epistemology. There is, however, considerable 
evidence that Reid took this to be a necessary condition for knowledge.3
First, Reid argues, as we have seen, that our intellectual powers were designed to 
achieve several purposes: the preservation and well-being of our species, the ability to 
form correct judgments regarding what is good upon the whole, or what is our duty, 
and so on. When we achieve these ends, it may therefore be said that our faculties are 
functioning properly: that is, they are functioning the way they were designed to 
function by the Author of our nature. However, one can easily imagine an Humean
1 Nicholas Wolterstorff presents a similar externalist interpretation of Reid’s epistemology in “Hume and 
Reid” Monist 70 (1988): pp. 398-417. However, given the prominent role that Reid gives to the voluntary 
intellectual powers in satisfying the conditions for epistemic justification, along with Reid’s lengthy 
consideration of ‘prejudices to avoid’ (IP, Essay VI, Ch.8), I must disagree with Wolterstorff’s view that “Reid 
offers no rules for the direction of the mind, lays down no intellectual obligations - other than the bland 
injunction to avoid drawing conclusions hastily”, p. 410.
2 My exposition here, it must be said, is quite similar to the basic outline of Alvin Plantinga’s recent 
account of epistemic warrant in Warrant and Proper Function. However, I have endeavoured to ensure that 
these conditions are stated in a manner that is faithful to Reid.
3 PI an tin ga presents a similar interpretation of Reid’s use of the term “sound understanding” in Warrant 
and Proper Function, pp. 164-65.
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world in which these ends are achieved with mostly false beliefs.1 Hence, the mere fact 
that our faculties are functioning properly is not sufficient for knowledge. It must also 
be the case that our intellectual powers were designed for the purpose of producing 
true beliefs. In other words, by the condition of “sound understanding”, Reid means, in 
part, that the powers by which the belief is produced must be functioning in such a way 
as to bring about at least one particular end for which they were designed, namely, the 
production of true beliefs:
“OUR intellectual powers are wisely fitted by the Author of our nature for the discovery of 
truth, as far as suits our present state. Error is not their natural issue, any more than disease is 
of the natural structure of the body.”2
“We must judge of the Intention of our faculties /  from their sound and natural State . . .  our 
Senses are given us by nature not to deceive but to give us true information of things within 
their Reach”3
The phrases “as far as suits our present state” and “things within their Reach” give 
us the second condition. As we saw earlier, Reid argues that our faculties were 
designed to operate in quite specific environments. Thus, even if our faculties are 
functioning as they were designed to function, there may be occasions when there is a 
mismatch between the environment and the faculties, such that the beliefs therein 
produced are mostly false.
Now Reid argues that, as it happens, our faculties are presently in that environment 
for which they were designed; and that any errors produced by a properly functioning 
power of the mind, such as perception, may be explained by reference to the fallacious 
application of certain voluntary powers of the mind.4 There is, however, one feature 
that may be described as ‘environmental’, of which Reid admits the possibility of a 
mismatch. First, Reid allows that the mind may continue to function following the 
death of the body:
“Tho Death puts an End to the power of the Mind over that System of Matter we call the Body 
& it can no more produce either Vital or Voluntary Motions in it {or have Sensations by 
Impressions made upon it} it no wise follows that the other Powers of the Mind should 
thereby cease”5
1 E.g, where “the whole universe about me, bodies and spirits, sun, moon, stars, and earth, friends and 
relations, all things without exception, which I imagined to have a permanent existence, whether I thought of 
them or not, vanish at once” HM, p. 3 ; cf. Plantinga’s “Is Naturalism Irrational?” in Warrant and Proper 
Function, Chapter 12.
2 IP, p. 652; cf. “The understanding, in its natural and best state, pays its homage to truth only.” IP, p. 652; 
“the senses . . .  are formed by the wise and beneficent Author of Nature, to give us true information of things 
necessary to our preservation and happiness.” IP, p. 288.
3 MS 8/11/22,2-3
4 See IP, Chap 22, “Of the Fallacy of the Senses”.
5 MS 4 / n / 4 , 1. “We grant that the Soul is presently so connected with the body as to be greatly affected
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In the present earthly environment, however, the intellectual powers depend upon 
certain internal and external physical organs: the internal organs being “nerves and the 
brain”, and the external, being various body parts, such as the eye. Thus, while there 
may be no dysfunction in some intellectual power, a disorder in the physical organ to 
which it is regularly conjoined, will tend to produce false beliefs:* 1
“our Senses ought not to be accounted fallacious because we are sometimes deceived by them 
when the Organs are disordered and in some unnatural State. We must judge of the Intention 
of our faculties /  from their sound and natural State and not from any disorder of them which 
is accidental. And thus we actually Judge in other cases. Thus every man judges that a Mans 
feet & legs are fitted by nature for (h)is walking upon them; Nor is it any Objection to this that 
some Men are lame & unable to walk upon their legs. In like Manner our Senses are given us 
by nature not to deceive but to give us true information of things within their Reach, and it is 
no objection to this that when there is any disorder that is accidental & preternatural in our 
organs of perception we may from that cause be led to judge wrong.”2
The third condition is this: even if our faculties are functioning properly in an 
appropriate cognitive environment, it may yet be that our beliefs turn out to be mostly 
false. For the design itself, and the actions of the designer in bringing about the relevant 
effects, may be defective. In short, the Author of our nature may be unreliable.3
Reid’s response to this problem is to argue that, within the framework of a theistic 
metaphysics, there are no beliefs that might entail or render it more probable than not 
that this condition fails to be satisfied:
“we have no reason to think that God has given fallacious powers to any of his creatures: This 
would be to think dishonourably of our Maker, and would lay a foundation for universal 
scepticism” .4
by the good or bad state of i t  But it follows not from this that it may not continue to exist when that 
connexion is totally broke. We may with better reason conclude on the contrary, that as the operations of the 
Mind are limited and confined by its connexion with the body, those operations will be more free it  
unconfined when that connexion is dissolved.” MS 4/11/19,2.
1 Ben-Zeev argues to the effect that any direct realist account of perception, such as Reid’s, requires, for 
the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs, the satisfaction of the first two externalist conditions we have 
mentioned above: “it would make no (religious, evolutionary, pragmatic, etc.) sense to assume that the 
perceptual system is false when it is properly functioning”. A. Ben-Zeev,“Reid’s direct approach to 
perception”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 17 (1986): p. 110.
2 MS 8 /II/22 ,2-3; cf. “The imagination, the memory, the judging and reasoning powers, are all liable to be 
hurt, or even destroyed, by disorders of the body, as well as our powers of perception; but we do not on this 
account call them fallacious.” IP, p. 291; We must acknowledge it to be the lot of human nature, that all the 
human faculties are liable, by accidental causes, to be hurt and unfitted for their natural functions, either 
wholly or in part But as this imperfection is common to them all, it gives no just ground for accounting any 
of them fallacious.” IP, p. 301.
3 Cf. Plan tin ga, “the design governing the production of the belief in question [must] be a good one; still 
more exactly . . .  the module of the design plan governing its production must be such that it is objectively 
highly probable that a belief produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to that module 
(in a congenial environment) will be true or versimiltudinous.” Warrant and Proper Function, p. 17.
4 IP, p. 291. cf. “it seems to be a very unfavourable account of the workmanship of the Supreme Being, to 
think that he has given us one faculty to deceive us, to wit, our senses, and another faculty, to wit, our reason.
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This response should not be taken to mean that theism plays a Cartesian role in 
Reid’s epistemology .* 1 For this, Reid argues, would be tantamount to epistemic 
circularity:2 that is, where one may commit epistemic circularity in one of two ways:
(a) in attempting to show that one faculty is reliable, one assumes in the process, 
that that faculty is reliable; or
(b) in attempting to show that every faculty is reliable, one assumes that at least 
one faculty is reliable.
Reid does not therefore pretend to show that our faculties are reliable by inference 
from the existence of a benevolent Creator; for this would assume that at least one 
faculty is reliable: whether the faculty of reasoning, or, as Reid holds, some faculty that 
gives rise to a self-evident belief.3
Of course, this problem will be true for any position. For example, we might decide 
that, in view of our inability to provide any good reason for trusting our faculties, 
scepticism is the only rational option. But we cannot arrive at this position without 
exerting at least one of our faculties. Again, we might take an agnostic view, 
withholding any belief until such time as there is sufficient evidence to justify a belief in 
the reliability of our faculties. However, as Reid states, such agnosticism would, of 
necessity, be a permanent predicament. For how could we ever be persuaded out of our 
agnosticism, when it entails that we refuse to believe that our faculties are reliable until 
we exert our faculty of reasoning so as to conclude that they are reliable?
“If a Sceptic should build his scepticism upon this foundation, that all our reasoning and 
judging powers are fallacious in their nature, or should resolve at least to with-hold assent 
until it be proved that they are not; it would be impossible by argument to beat him out of 
this strong hold, and he must even be left to enjoy his scepticism.4
to detect the fallacy.” IP, p. 290; “if we should take for granted all that [philosophers] have said on this subject, 
the natural condusion from it might seem to be, that the senses are given to us by some malignant Daemon on 
purpose to delude us, rather than that they are formed by the wise and beneficent Author of Nature, to give 
us true information of things necessary to our preservation and happiness.” IP, p. 288.
1 As Daniels seems to think: “Reid’s only defense against the sceptical outcome of his own nativism - 
namely, that our constitutions might lead us to systematically false beliefs - is his belief that God would not 
deceive us (p. 117)... Reid justifies natively given ‘common sense’ beliefs through a dogmatic appeal to God 
as a nondeceiver” (pp. 119-20) Norman Daniels, Thomas Reid's Inquiry (New York, N.Y.: B. Franklin, 1974).
2 This term derives from William P. Alston, “Epistemic Circularity”, in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1989): Essay 12. See also, Alston, “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Prindples”, 
pp. 444-45.
3 “every argument offered to prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties, takes for granted the thing in 
question, and is therefore that kind of sophism which Logicians call petitio principii."IP, p. 710; “Every kind of 
reasoning for the veracity of our faculties, amounts to no more them taking their own testimony for their 
veracity; and this we must do implicitly, until God give us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old.” IP, 
p. 593. This last phrase is puzzling, given that any new faculties would fall under the same problem.
4 IP, p.592.
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Finally, except in cases of ‘metaphysical lunacy’ and cognitive dysfunction, it is not 
within our power to refrain from believing that the deliverances of our faculties are, for 
the most part, reliable. Indeed, we give expression to this belief whenever we act:1
“Although some writers on this subject have disputed the authority of the senses, of memory, 
and of every human faculty; yet we find, that such persons, in the conduct of life, in pursuing 
their ends, or in avoiding dangers, pay the same regard to the authority of their senses, and 
other faculties, as the rest of mankind. By this they give us just ground to doubt of their 
candour in their professions of scepticism.”2
Reid’s position, then, is this: all of us cannot help but place some degree of trust in 
the reliability of our cognitive faculties:
“The judgments grounded upon the evidence of sense, of memory, and of consciousness, put 
all men upon a level. The Philosopher, with regard to these, has no prerogative above the 
illiterate, or even above the savage. H Their reliance upon the testimony of these faculties is as 
firm and as well grounded as his.”3
Given this state of affairs, the primary task for epistemologists is to provide a 
metaphysics that is superior to any other by virtue of its capacity to preserve better the 
rationality of the trust we cannot help but place in our faculties. Reid’s contribution, in 
this respect, is to argue that, within the context of a theistic metaphysics, there is no 
good reason to believe that scepticism is a live possibility. For a theistic metaphysics 
consists of a set of beliefs, no member of which either affirms or leads to the denial of 
the reliability of our faculties, a feature that could not be claimed of a system such as 
that advanced by David Hume.4
In short, Reid’s view is that, within a theistic universe, it is more probable than not 
that a person with a ‘sound understanding’ will form mostly true beliefs. More 
precisely, where F = the faculty (or set of faculties) by which S’s belief that p is 
produced at t:
A78 S is justified in believing that p at t, only if (i) F is designed to produce true 
beliefs; (ii) F is functioning properly at f, (iii) F is functioning in an 
environment for which it was designed to function at f, and (iv) if (i)-(iii) are 
true, then it is more probable than not that p is true.
1 “The Sceptic may perhaps persuade himself in general, that he has no ground to believe his senses or his 
memory: But, in particular cases that are interesting, his disbelief vanishes, and he finds himself under a 
necessity of believing both.” IP, p. 505.
2 IP, p. 45.
3 IP, pp. 504-5.
4 Cf. “there are no propositions [the theist] already accepts just by way of being a theist, which together 
with forms of reasoning . . . lead to the rejection of the belief that our cognitive faculties have the 
apprehension of truth as their purpose and for the most part fulfil that purpose.” Plantinga, Warrant and 
Proper function, p. 237.
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5 DISTINCT CONCEPTION
Reid’s second necessary condition for the epistemic justification of a belief is that it be 
“the inseparable companion of a clear and steady apprehension”.1 To be more precise, 
where the adverb ‘distinctly’, modifies the manner in which the object is conceived:
A79 S ’s belief that p is justified only if S distinctly conceives of p.
In this section, I shall determine those conditions under which acts of conception are 
taken by Reid to be thus modified.
First, there are, in Reid, two kinds of distinct conceptions, both of which we have 
already encountered:
(i) direct conceptions
(ii) general conceptions
Corresponding to these, are conceptions that fail to be distinct:
(iii) mere relative conceptions (“obscure”)
(iv) the “first notions” we obtain by our external senses and consciousness (“gross 
and indistinct”)2 3
In the following two subsections, I will examine the interpretative problems raised 
by (iii) and (iv).
5.1 MERE RELATIVE CONCEPTIONS
Reid, as we have seen, allows that we can know that about which we have only a mere 
relative conception: that is, we may obtain knowledge of our own minds, of causes in 
nature, design and purpose in a cause, and of space. Indeed, he takes our belief in such 
things to be self-evident for they are each instances of first principles. But if this is so, 
how are we to understand the following claim:
“Self-evident propositions are those which appear evident to every man of sound 
understanding who apprehends the meaning of them distinctly, and attends to them without 
prejudice.’*
1 “indistinct conceptions of things are, for the most part, the cause not only of obscurity in writing and 
speaking, but of error in judging.. . .  a sound judgment seems to be the inseparable companion of a dear and 
steady apprehension” IP, p. 372.
2 "the first notions we have of sensible objects are . . .  neither simple, nor are they accurate and distinct 
They are gross and indistinct, and like the chaos, a rudis indigestaque moles.” IP, p. 511.
3 IP, p. 161.
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For instance, Reid, as we have seen, would take the following proposition to be self- 
evident for a person:
P This operation of which I am conscious must have a subject to which it 
belongs as an attribute.
Now Reid seems to suggest that we can distinctly conceive of a proposition only if 
we can form a distinct conception of its terms. 1 2But he also states that we can form only 
a mere relative conception of any substance. It follows that we cannot distinctly 
conceive of P, in which case A79is inconsistent with Reid’s view that P is self-evident.
Reid’s response to this objection would be to distinguish between (a) a conception of 
a substance as that which may stand in a certain relation to its attributes, namely, 
‘being a subject of’; and (b) a conception of its other essential attributes. With respect to 
(a), our conception is sufficiently distinct to distinguish this relation from other 
relations, such as ‘being the cause of’. With respect to (b) no such conception exists. It is 
for this reason that Reid states that our conception of a substance is “obscure”: we have 
no conception of the essence of any substance, except that it may stand in a relation to 
certain attributes. But if our conception of one of the essential relations of substance is 
sufficiently distinct to enable us to distinguish it from other relations, it must be 
possible to form a general conception of that relation. But general conceptions are 
distinct conceptions; hence, in Reid’s view, if we have a mere relative conception of a 
substance then we are justified in believing that (i) it exists and that (ii) it is the subject 
of certain attributes. I take this interpretation to be supported by the following texts:
“though the relation between a Substance and its qualities be in some respects obscure, it is
easily distinguished from all other relations’*
“however imperfect or obscure our notion of Substance may be, we must admit their
existence, and that qualities cannot subsist without them”3
5.2 FIRST NOTIONS
We begin our analysis of the interpretative problem here by examining the operation of 
consciousness. We will then approach the same problem as it arises in relation to the 
operation of sensation.
1 “In every other proposition, the predicate at least must be a generell notion; a predicable and an 
universal being one and the same. Besides this, every proposition either affirms or denies. And no man can 
have a distinct conception of a proposition, who does not understand distinctly the meaning of affirming or 
denying: But these are very general conceptions” IP, p. 509.
2 MS3061 /I  /4 ,2; in AC, p. 174.
3 MS3061 /I  /4, 5; in AC, p. 176.
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Reid distinguishes between the operations of consciousness and reflection in the 
following manner. First, the objects of consciousness are present operations of mind, 
and there are no present operations of mind of which we are not conscious.1 Hence:
Ago S is conscious of x at t if and only if x is an operation of mind occurring in S at t.
Second, the objects of reflection are also present operations of mind: however, 
reflection includes within its range those operations that have occurred in the recent 
past, and so are “fresh” in our memory. Moreover, unlike consciousness, not all 
operations of mind are the object of reflection.2 3Hence:
Agl S reflects on x at t if and only if (i) x is an operation of mind occurring at t, or an 
object of S's short-term memory at t ; (ii) S directs her attention toward x at t?
Third, consciousness and reflection differ further in respect of the kinds of 
conception we obtain by their exertions. If S is merely conscious of some operation O, 
then she will obtain only an indistinct conception of O.
“(Consciousness) is insufficient of itself to give us clear and distinct notions of the operations
of which we are conscious, and of their mutual relations, and minute distinctions.”4
Reflection, on the other hand, is that operation by which we may obtain a distinct 
conception of the objects presented to us by consciousness.
“it is by reflection upon the operation of our own minds that we can form any distinct and
accurate notions of them, and not by consciousness without reflection”5
1 “Consciousness is . . .  that immediate knowledge which we have of . . .  all the present operations of our 
minds.” IP, p. 17.
2 “All men are conscious of the operations of their own minds, at all times, while they are awake; but 
there are few who reflect upon them, or make them objects of thought.” IP, p. 60.
3 Bourdillon argues that Reid makes a three-fold distinction between consciousness, attention and 
reflection: “consciousness is the receptacle in which all mental operations . . .  reside; attention, a relatively 
mundane act, brings these operations to the surface; and reflection, a far more sophisticated act, gives us dear 
and distinct notions of these operations.” Phillip Bourdillon, “Thomas Reid’s Account of Sensation as a 
Natural Prindple of Belief”, Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): p. 25. However, as we have seen, Reid gives a very 
dear definition of ‘attention’ in the Active Powers, according to which reflection just is attention directed 
toward the operations of mind. The following text makes this especially dear: “when we make [the various 
operations of our minds] the objects of our attention, either while they are present, or when they are recent 
and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called reflection." IP, p. 40.
4 IP, p.581.
5 IP, p. 517. This text, in particular, resolves the apparent interpretative difficulty that arises from those 
passages in the Inquiry where Reid speaks of ‘perceiving sensations’, for example: “ A sensation, which can 
have no existence but when it is perceived” HM, p. 40. The term ‘perceived’ here, I suggest, is merely 
functioning in the same sense that ‘reflection’ functions in the passage above. That is, Reid’s talk of 
“reflection upon the objects of sense” is extensionally equivalent to the act of perception. Likewise, his talk of 
sensations being “perceived” in the Inquiry is extensionally equivalent to the act of reflecting upon sensations. 
This interpretation is shared by Phillip D. Cummins, “Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid’s Theory of 
Perception” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1990): p. 760. See also D. M. Armstrong, who argues,
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The interpretative problem, then, is this: Reid takes it to be a first principle that 
consciousness is that faculty by which we obtain an immediate knowledge of our 
operations of mind, namely, Q Y * 1 But, as we have seen, Reid argues that a person’s 
belief can obtain that degree of justification sufficient for knowledge only if she has a 
distinct conception of the object of her belief. Hence, Reid appears to state both that 
consciousness does and that it does not provide us with a distinct conception of the 
operations of mind.
There are two ways we can render Reid’s account consistent. First, we can take 
Reid’s statements regarding the knowledge we obtain by consciousness to be a 
periphrasis for the more precise claim that knowledge of the operations of mind is 
obtained only by the operation of consciousness conjoined with that of reflection.2 
However, this would require us to take Reid as holding that we might be conscious of 
an operation, and yet fail to know that it exists; but there is no textual evidence in the 
entire Reid corpus that would support this view, and, as we have seen, a great deal 
against it.
The second option is this: whilst consciousness alone may give us immediate 
knowledge, it cannot give us the more detailed kind of knowledge obtainable by 
reflection. This interpretation is strongly supported by the following texts:
“The difference between consciousness and reflection, is like to the difference between a 
superficial view of an object which presents itself to the eye, while we are engaged about 
something else, and that attentive examination which we give to an object when we are 
wholly employed in surveying it. ” 3
as Reid does, that we do not, strictly speaking, perceive sensations; rather we have or feel them. Contrary to 
Berkeley, “The ‘esse’ of sensations is not ‘perdpi’ but ‘sentri’.” Armstrong, Perception and The Physical World, 
p. 5.
1 Consciousness is “that immediate knowledge which we have of . . .  all the present operations of our 
minds “ IP, p. 17; it is “the only evidence which we have or can have of their existence.. . .  Every man finds 
himself under a necessity of believing what consciousness testifies, and every thing that hath this testimony is 
to be taken as a first prindple.” IP, p. 39; “The existence therefore of those passions and operations of our 
m inds, of which we are consdous, is a first prindple, which Nature requires us to believe upon her 
authority.” IP, p. 421; “We know our own thoughts, and the operations of our minds, by a power which we 
call consdousness” IP, p. 578; “by consdousness we know certainly the existence of our present thoughts and 
passions;” IP, p. 39; “every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to 
give implidt belief to [consdousness], and to laugh at, or pity the man who doubts its testimony.” HM, p. 15; 
“As to the existence of our thoughts, we have the evidence of consdousness; a kind of evidence that never 
was called in question. “ IP, p. 91.
2 This appears to be Bourdillon’s solution, with the qualification that he distinguishes (mistakenly) 
between attention and reflection (see footnote 2 on p. 114 above): “On those occasions when Reid says, for 
example, that we find it impossible to doubt the existence of those things of which we are consdous . . .  he is 
generally alluding either to pain or to other mental operations of which we are not merely consdous, but to 
which we also pay attention.” Bourdillon, “Reid’s Account of Sensation”, p. 26.
3 IP, p. 60, cf. “we cannot be unconsdous of the . . .  sensation of the mind . . .  If we can only acquire the 
habit of attending to our sensations, we may know them perfectly.” HM, p. 170.
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“The operations of our minds are known . . .  by consciousness, the authority of which is as 
certain and as irresistible as that of sense. In order, however, to our having a distinct notion of 
any of the operations of our own minds, it is . . . farther necessary that we attend to them 
while they are exerted, and reflect upon them with care, while they are recent and fresh in our 
memory.”1
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with Reid’s developmental view of the 
voluntary intellectual powers. Attentiveness or reflection, like the operations of 
deliberation and fixed purposes, is rarely present in childhood:
“reflection does not appear in children. Of all the powers of the mind, it seems to be of the 
latest growth, whereas consciousness is coeval with the earliest” .2
Again, the degree of attention required for the most accurate and scientific study of 
the mind’s operations is, Reid argues, practiced by only a minority:
“attentive reflection upon those operations, making them objects of thought, surveying them 
attentively, and examining them on all sides, is so far from being common to all men, that it is 
the lot of very few” .3
Now to preserve Reid’s view that consciousness may yet give us knowledge, these 
texts must be read with great care. Reid is not, I suggest, referring here to reflection 
taken as a kind of operation, but rather as a certain degree to which that operation is 
exerted, namely, that degree which is only found, if at all, in the later stages of a 
person’s intellectual development. Reflection as an operation, however, may be present 
even to a very weak degree. Indeed, I suggest that Reid’s view entails that it must be 
present from the moment we obtain any knowledge of the operation of our minds. As 
we have seen, Reid holds that (1) it is not within our power to form a belief that has a 
degree of justification sufficient for knowledge unless we can distinctly conceive of the 
object of our belief; and that (2) consciousness alone cannot give us any such 
conception. But then, if, as he states, (3) consciousness “is common to all men at all 
times”, and (4) we have an immediate knowledge of any operation of which we are 
conscious, then Reid must, on pain of inconsistency, also hold that (5) our ability to 
form distinct conceptions of the objects of consciousness by way of some act of 
reflection, with however weak a degree, must be coeval with the first exertions of that 
power. In other words, consciousness and reflection do not operate successively. We are 
not presented with indistinct conceptions, upon which the operation of reflection then
1
2 
3
IP, p. 105. 
IP, p. 516. 
IP, p. 581.
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performs its task of analysis. The operations of consciousness and reflection must be 
taken to operate at the same time, such that every conception we form by way of 
consciousness is also a conception we form by way of reflection, even though the two 
operations perform distinct functions.1
We can perhaps gain more clarity on this point by examining the interpretative 
problem as it arises for the external senses. First, Reid states that our senses alone give 
us a “gross and indistinct” conception of their objects:
“There are therefore notions of the objects of sense which are gross and indistinct; and there 
are others that are distinct and scientific. The former may be got from the senses alone; but 
the latter cannot be obtained without some degree of judgment.”2 3
Second, Reid draws a parallel between the kind of conception presented by 
consciousness, and that presented by the external senses:
“Consciousness, being a kind of internal sense, can no more give us distinct and accurate 
notions of the operations of our minds, than the external senses can give of external objects.’*
The second parallel Reid draws is between the operation of reflection and the 
operations required for distinctly conceiving the objects of the external senses:
Reflection upon the operations of our minds, is the same kind of operation with that by which 
we form distinct notions of external objects.. . .  so it is by reflection upon the objects of sense, 
and not by the senses without reflection, that we can form distinct notions of them .’4
Now there would appear to be an interpretative puzzle here of the first importance. 
On the one hand, Reid appears to think of the conceptions we obtain by our senses as 
being that which “which Nature immediately presents to us”; that is, they are prior to 
and distinct from those conceptions that arise by way of the operations of 
distinguishing and generalising.5 Yet Reid also makes the following counterfactual
1 This interpretation, of course, implies that we form beliefs about all our sensations, and so, as Pappas 
suggests, leaves open the possibility of an inference from sensation-beliefs to beliefs about die external world. 
However, as we shall see, Reid holds that sensations themselves, and not any belief about sensations, «ire the 
(non-inferential) occasion of perceptual beliefs. Again, Reid held that the evidence for a belief is not merely a 
necessary condition for its justification, but that which gives rise to it. Hence he must reject the view that our 
perceptual beliefs are justified only if infered from sensation-beliefs. But all this may still be true, even if 
consciousness gives rise to sensation-beliefs. In other words, my interpretation is not inconsistent with Reid’s 
account of the formation and justification of perceptual beliefs. See Pappas, “Sensation and Perception in 
Reid”, p. 160.
2 IP, p. 514.
3 IP, p. 516.
4 IP, p. 516.
5 “our most simple conceptions are not those which Nature immediately presents to us. When we come to 
years of understanding, we have the power of analysing the objects of Nature, of distinguishing their several 
attributes and relations, of conceiving them one by one, and of giving a name to each, whose meaning
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claim: If we were so constituted as to be incapable of distinguishing the attributes and 
relations of an object, then our consciousness and our senses would give us only “one 
complex and confused notion of all these mingled together” .* 1 The implication of this 
second claim is that, for certain kinds of attributes and relations, it is not the case that 
there are two temporally distinguishable phases or stages in the process of forming a 
distinct conception: we are not presented with a confused, complex indistinct 
conception, upon which we then set to work analysing the elements thereby presented.2
Perhaps Reid might have helped us here by suggesting, as he does in another 
context, that this two stage view is mistakenly analogous to the process of painting. 
That is, where we might think that:
(a) S produces a clear and distinct picture of some object x by first quickly 
sketching a blurred and indistinct representation of x, followed by a closer 
study and analysis of x so as to produce a more refined and distinct 
representation;
by analogy, we might also think that:
(b) S forms a clear and distinct conception of some object x by first immediately 
forming an “gross and indistinct” conception of x, followed by the acts of 
distinguishing and generalising, so as to produce a distinct conception of x.
But of course the analogy is seriously mistaken. The act of conception does not 
produce anything: there is no mental representation that we might set out to refine or
extends only to that single attribute or relation: And thus our most simple conceptions are not those of any 
objects in nature, but of some single attribute or relation of such objects. Thus Nature presents to our 
senses, bodies that are extended in three dimensions, and solid. By analysing the notion we have of body 
from our senses, we form to ourselves the conceptions of extension, solidity, space, a point, a line, a surface; 
all which are more simple conceptions than that of a body. But they are the elements, as it were, of which our 
conception of a body is made up, and into which it may be analysed.” IP, p. 375.
1 “You perceive, for instance, an object white, round, and a foot in diameter I grant that you perceive all 
these attributes of the object by sense; but if you had not been able to distinguish the colour from the figure, 
and both from the magnitude, your senses would only have given you one complex and confused notion of 
all these mingled together.” IP, p. 5 ll;“Nature presents no object to the senses, or to consciousness, that is not 
complex. Thus, by our senses we perceive bodies of various kinds; but every body is a complex object; it has 
length, breadth, and thickness; it has figure, and colour, and various other sensible qualities, which are 
blended together in the same subject; and 1 apprehend, that brute animals, who have the same senses that we 
have, cannot separate the different qualities belonging to the same subject, and have only a complex and 
confused notion of the whole: Such also would be our notions of the objects of sense, if we had not superior 
powers of understanding, by which we can analyse the complex object, abstract every particular attribute 
from the rest, and form a distinct conception of it. T So that it is not by the senses immediately, but rather by 
the powers of analysing and abstraction, that we get the most simple, and the most distinct notions even of 
the objects of sense.” IP, p. 398.
2 If I understand Alston correctly, he takes Reid to hold this ’two-stage’ view. See Alston, “Reid on 
Perception and Conception”, pp. 43-45; for example,“it is clear that [Reid] takes conception to be present 
where no general conceptions are being deployed”, (p. 43.)
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develop. Rather there are two ways of conceiving the objects of our senses: (i) that by 
which we are made directly aware of an object or by which it is immediately presented 
to us, and (ii) that by which we distinguish and generalise. However, these different 
ways of conceiving do not occur in parallel or sequentially, but rather, at the same time. 
In other words, we may distinguish between two kinds of immediacy:1
D42 x has presentational immediacy for S = df the manner in which S conceives 
of x is such that she is made directly aware of x.
D43 x has conceptual immediacy for S = df the manner in which S conceives of x 
is such that she forms a distinct conception of some attribute or relation of x at 
the same time that she is directly aware of x.
Naturally, we will need a great deal more textual evidence to support and clarify this 
interpretation of Reid as advocating the notion of conceptual immediacy. To this end, I 
shall, in the following sub-sections, look at two key issues: Reid’s direct realism, and 
the role of sensations in perception.
5.3 DIRECT REALISM
First, we have seen that the only objects of thought, in Reid’s view, are immediate. But 
we have yet to clarify what it is that Reid would take to be an immediate object of 
perception. One of the best sources, in this regard, is Reid’s objection to Hume’s 
diminishing table argument.2
Reid begins his analysis with a distinction between real and apparent magnitude. 
Each is distinguished by two properties: the means by which it is measured, and the 
sense modality by which it is known:
D44 Real magnitude = df that which is measured by known measures of length, 
surface or capacity; and known only by the sense of touch.
D4S Apparent magnitude = df that which is measured by the angle which an 
object subtends at the eye;3 and known only by sight.
Take the following scenario, for example: suppose (i) the angle which an object x 
subtends at a spectator’s eye changes, for example, the distance between x and the 
spectator increases; but (ii) the length, surface or capacity of x does not change. In this
1 D*3 is similar to a formulation found in Alston, “Reid on Perception and Conception”, p. 36.
2 For a strikingly similar argument, see D. M. Armstrong, Perception and The Physical World (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961): pp. 12-13.
3 “Supposing two right lines drawn from the eye to the extremities of the object making 2m «ingle, of 
which the object is the subtense, the apparent magnitude is measured by this tingle.” IP, p. 210.
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case, the real magnitude of x will remain unchanged, while the apparent magnitude 
will change relative to the distance of the spectator.1 Reid then presents Hume’s 
argument as the following syllogism:
(1) “The table which we see, seems to diminish as we remove farther from it”
(2) “the real table which exists independent of us suffers no alteration”
Therefore,
(3) “It w as. . .  nothing but its image which was presented to the mind.”2 [1,2]
We can generalise this to yield the following:
(1*) All immediate objects of perception are such that their magnitude diminishes 
as we move farther away from them.
(2*) No external object is such that its magnitude diminishes as we move farther 
away from it.
Therefore,
(3*) No external object is an immediate object of perception, [by 1*, 2*]
If the distinction between apparent and real magnitude is correct, then the argument 
is simply invalid; for it commits the fallacy of equivocation.3 That is to say, the 
syllogism has two middle terms: premise (1*) is true only of apparent magnitude, 
premise (2*) only of real magnitude.
Moreover, the phenomenon Hume describes, once disambiguated, proves precisely 
the opposite of his conclusion:
(4) All the immediate objects of perception are such that their apparent 
magnitude diminishes as we move away from them.
(5) All objects that are such that their apparent magnitude diminishes as we 
move farther away from them are external objects.
Therefore,
(6) All immediate objects of perception are external objects, [by 4 ,5]4
The argument is made even stronger, Reid suggests, by including the following 
information in the premises: we can predict, “ by the rules of geometry and
1 “The same individual object, remaining in the same place, and unchanged, must necessarily vary in its 
apparent magnitude, according as the point from which it is seen is more or less distant; and that its apparent 
length or breadth will be nearly in a reciprocal proportion to the distance of the spectator.” IP, p. 210.
2 IP, p.209.
3 “according to the rules of logic, the conclusion is not justly drawn from the premises.” IP, p. 211.
4 “Let us suppose, for a moment, that it is the real table we see: Must not this real table seem to diminish 
as we remove farther from it? It is demonstrable that it must How then can this apparent diminution be an 
argument that it is not the real table?” IP, p. 211.
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perspective”, the exact apparent magnitude of an object for any distance at which the 
object is placed from the eye. But this prediction is based on the supposition that “the 
objects we see are external, and not in the mind itself.” Moreover, these predictions 
have proved accurate in “innumerable trials”, and have solved “an infinite number of 
phenomena of nature”, and not one prediction has been falsified. On the other hand, if 
the System of Ideas were true, then no account could be given of the phenomenon of 
apparent magnitude: we should have no explanation why an object of sight has one 
apparent magnitude and not another. But if one account explains a prodigious number 
of phenomena and has never been discontinued in its predictions, whilst another gives 
no explanation for the same range of phenomena and can make no predictions, it seems 
abundantly dear, from a scientific point of view, which of the two we should accep t1 
In short, Reid would deny that the object of perception is some mental 
representation or image of an external object. More importantly, Reid would deny that 
any operation of mind, such as sensation, might be the object or some aspect of the 
object of perception.2 Reid was therefore a direct realist, as defined by the following:
A82 x is an object of S’s perception at a time t if and only if (i) S perceives x at f, 
and (ii) there is no object y such that (a) y and x are non-identical or y is a 
constitutive part of x, and (b) S perceives x at t only if S perceives y at f.3
5.4 IMMERWAHR'S INTERPRETATION
John Immerwahr has argued that Reid was an indirect realist in writing the Inquiry, that 
is, Reid thought that “external objects are only known indirectly by means of sensations 
which act as natural signs of the external world”.4 By the time Reid published the 
Intellectual Powers, however, he had become a direct realist: that is, by 1785 Reid 
thought that “sensation is seen as something which happens parallel to the process of 
perception, rather than part of a sequence which produced perception.”5
1 IP, pp. 212-13.
2 For a similar view, see A. E  Pitson, “Sensation, Perception and Reid’s Realism”, in M. Dalgamo and E  
Matthews, eds. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid (Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, PSS 42,1989): p. 42.
3 George Pappas constructs a similar definition for what he calls ‘direct perception’: “A person S directly 
perceives an object O at a time t = (1) S perceives O at t; and, (2) it is false that S would perceive O at t only if 
S were to perceive R at t, where R * O, and where R is not a part of O nor is O of R, and where R is not a 
constituent or group of constituents of O, nor is O of R.” “Sensation and Perception in Reid”, Nous 23 (1989): 
pp. 156-57.
4 John Immerwahr, “The Development of Reid’s Realism”, Monist 61 (1978): p. 248.
5 Immerwahr, “The Development of Reid’s Realism”, p. 249. Immerwahr defines direct and indirect 
realism as follows: “By direct realism I mean the theory that we are directly aware of external objects and that 
we know them without requiring an awareness of mental entities which act as cognitive links informing us of 
an external world. Indirect realism holds that we are directly aware only of certain mental entities (call them 
sensa) from which the mind makes some kind of inference or other mental transition to the existence of an 
external world.” p. 247.
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Immerwahr then depicts the difference using the following chart:1
(suggestion)
INDIRECT REALISM: —> External Object -> Physical Impression —»Sensation 
(Inquiry)
-» Conception
& Belief
Sensation
DIRECT REALISM: -  
CIntellectual Powers)
—»External Object Physical Impression
Conception
& Belief
This view is defective on both historical and philosophical grounds. First, Reid’s 
manuscripts clearly show that the Intellectual Powers was based upon lecture notes 
delivered throughout his career, from as early as 1764. The publication date of 1785 is 
therefore meaningless.2 Second, Immerwahr argues that, although Reid rejected the 
view that ‘sensations’ could be natural signs of external objects in his Orations (1759), 
by the time of the Inquiry, he had “reversed his view”.3 However, most of the material 
we find in the Inquiry was delivered to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society in a series of 
papers dating from 1758-1763. Reid’s ‘suggestion’ and ‘natural sign’ terminology is 
thus found throughout the same period that Reid is supposed, by Immerwahr, to have 
been a direct realist.4
Third, as Reid states in his Abstract of the Inquiry, the relation of ‘suggestion’ or that 
of ‘sign’ to thing ‘signified’ is not intended to carry any theoretical weight, beyond that 
of indicating that the relata are constantly conjoined:
“for aught we know, Nature might have given us both the conception and belief of external 
things, without connecting them invariably with certain Sensations. For no man can give a 
shadow of reason why the later should always precede the former. U This Connexion which 
Nature hath established betwixt our Sensations and the conception and belief of external 
Objects, I express two ways: Either by saying that the Sensations suggest the objects by a 
natural principle of the Mind; or by saying that the Sensations are natural Signs of the 
Objects. These Expressions signify one and the same thing, and I do not pretend by them to 
account for this Connexion, but onely to affirm it as a fact that by the constitution of our 
nature there is such a Connexion.”5
1 Immerwahr, “The Development of Reid’s Realism”, p. 249.
2 Immerwahr, it must be said, acknowledges the composite nature of the Intellectual Powers. But he seems 
not to take seriously the implications of this, stating as he does that: “By 1785, . . . the theory [of innate 
language] has been rejected and direct realism is Reid’s final position.” p. 252.
3 Immerwahr, “The Development of Reid’s Realism”, p. 251.
4 See Manuscripts § 2. in HM.
5 MS 2/111/1,6.
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Fourth, Immerwahr admits that Reid explicitly uses the natural sign terminology 
more frequently than not in the Intellectual P o w ersand then explains this anomaly by 
suggesting that “Reid himself was not completely clear about the difference between 
these two positions”.1 2 I take it that if an interpretation of Reid entails that he was 
unwittingly inconsistent with regard to a doctrine that played a central role in his 
philosophical thought, then so much the worse for that interpretation.
Finally, Reid argues in the Intellectual Powers that there is a sense in which a sign 
may function as that by which what it signifies is known. However, he firmly rejects 
any sense in which a sign is taken to function as an indirect or mediate object of 
thought. That is, a sign x can signify something y  for some agent S only if both x and y 
are immediate objects of S’s thought. Most importantly, this, Reid claims, will be true 
even if the sign in question is a natural sign-3
This is precisely the criticism Reid makes as early as 14th March 1759: in a paper he 
delivered to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, he rejects any view according to which 
the only immediate objects of thought are ideas or sensations:
“One object of thought may introduce another by the laws of our constitution, but when the 
second object is actually thought of, it is as immediate an object as the first was. The sound of 
a coach may lead me to think of a coach, & to believe that one is passing by; here the sound is 
the immediate & only object of sense, but the passing of a coach is as immediate an object of 
thought & belief.” 4
In short, Immerwahr would have Reid rejecting indirect realism around 1759, 
adopting it in 1764, only to reject it once again in 1785 using the same arguments he 
advanced in 1759. Given that (i) these dates are meaningless as regards the 
development of Reid’s thought; (ii) there is scarcely a more central doctrine in Reid’s 
philosophical thought, and (iii) Reid gives us no notice at any stage that he had 
changed his mind, I take it that Immerwahr’s interpretation is most implausible.
1 Eg., “sensations belonging to secondary qualities are . . .  signs of the object perceived” IP, p. 239.
2 Immerwahr, “The Development of Reid’s Realism”, p. 253.
3 “There is a sense in which a thing may be said to be perceived by a medium. Thus any kind of sign may 
be said to be the medium by which I perceive or understand the thing signified. The sign, by custom, or 
compact, or perhaps by nature, introduces the thought of the thing signified. But here the thing signified, 
when it is introduced to the thought, is an object of thought no less immediate than the sign was before: And 
there are here two objects of thought, one succeeding another, which we have shown is not the case with 
respect to an idea, and the object it represents.” IP, p. 152.
4 MS 3107/1 /3 ,63. Cf. Orations, III.: “I certainly do not deny that of the things which are observed by the 
mind, there are different connections, similarities, and bonds and that the intellect is carried by a certain 
natural impulse from some one object of reflection to others akin to or connected with it. Thus from the keen- 
sighted Galileo the mind easily passes to the satellites of Jupiter, first discovered by him. Here in truth as 
soon as the mind has transferred from the astronomer to reflection about the heavenly bodies, these bodies 
are no less the immediate object of thought than the astronomer was before. Every object of the mind, 
therefore, appears to be immediate and, although there is a nexus and order of those things which enter the 
mind, we think about all immediately in their own order, for what it is to think by means of an intermediate 
object goes completely over my head” (p.970)
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5.5 THE ROLE OF SENSATIONS
We come now to our examination of Reid’s account of the role of sensations in 
perceptual belief. We begin with Reid’s account of the nature of sensations.
First, sensations, as we have seen, are not objects of the mind, and they do not have 
any objects; they are merely acts or operations. Second, sensations are not caused, in the 
strict sense of the word, by either the subject of those sensations or some external 
object.1 Sensations are involuntary operations, brought about by the Author of our 
nature (or some intermediary agent), where the antecedent conditions of a sensation, 
such as a smell, consist of a series of material impressions, originating with some 
external object.2 Third, there is no essential phenomenal characteristic of a sensation, 
Reid argues, of which we would not be conscious:3 “It is essential to a sensation to be 
felt, and it can be nothing more than we feel it to be. ” 4
Finally, the occurrence of a sensation in an agent S is constantly and immediately 
conjoined to the exertion of her powers of conception and judgment. For example, S’s 
touching a hard object is conjoined to a certain sensation’s arising in S.5 The having of 
this sensation is conjoined to the formation in S of a general conception of hardness 
(which, as we have seen, includes a conception of that object’s being hard). The 
formation of this conception is conjoined to the formation in S of the judgment that the 
hard object exists and that hardness is that individual attribute which produced her 
sensation.6
1 “Nor can we perceive any necessary connection between sensation and the conception and belief of an 
external object.” IP, p. 270. Ben-Zeev interprets Reid as rejecting the “causal theory of perception” on the 
grounds that Reid denies that material impressions are the “efficient causes” of sensations. (Ben-Zeev, “Reid’s 
direct approach to perception”, p. 102.) But, of course, Reid cannot plausibly be said to have rejected the 
causal theory of perception - unless that theory is taken to assume the regularity theory of causation. On the 
other hand, Reid, as I shall argue, would have rejected any causal theory of perception according to which the 
‘constant conjunction’ that holds between sensations and conceptions of and beliefs in external objects entails 
that sensations are temporally prior to those conceptions. They are ‘constantly conjoined’ merely in the sense 
that, under normal conditions, they will occur at the same time.
2 IP,p. 80.
3 Duggan raises the following problem: “My present sensation might have the characteristic of being the 
tenth sensation of that sort I have sensed in the past week. But surely it is not sensed as having that 
characteristic.” T. Duggan, “Thomas Reid’s Theory of Sensation”, Philosophical Review 69 (1960): p. 90, n3. I 
suggest that Reid limited his claim to the essential phenomenal attributes and relations of a sensation. ‘Being 
the ten til sensation I have sensed in the past week’ is clearly an accidental non-phenomenal relation.
4 HM, p. 170.
5 “Every variety we discern, with regard to taste, smell, sound, colour, heat and cold, and in the tangible 
qualities of bodies, is indicated by a sensation corresponding to it.” IP, p. 230,“some sensation attends every 
object they present to us” IP, p. 230; “The taste of a pine apple signifies both the Sensation we feel and that 
Quality in the pine Apple which occasions this Sensation. We perceive this Quality, we feel the Sensation 
which it occasions in us.” MS 4 /II/2 ,30.
6 “Thus when I taste a pine apple; I feel an agreable Relish, at the same time I perceive this to be owing to 
some quality of the pine Apple.” MS 4 /II/2 , 29,“Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the 
rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the
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There are four important qualifications we must make to this account. First, Duggan 
argues that Reid’s characterisation of (i) sensations as having all and only those features 
that we feel them to have and his claim that (ii) we do not attend to or notice all our 
sensations, are inconsistent.* 1 One solution might be to interpret Reid as making the 
following claim: Sensations have all and only those features that we feel them to have if 
and only if we attend to or notice them.2 3However, this option must be immediately 
ruled out by Reid’s explicit statement that we cannot fail to notice any essential 
phenomenal feature of any our sensations:
“It is impossible that there can be any fallacy in sensation: For we are conscious of all our 
sensations, and they can neither be any other in their nature, nor greater or less in their 
degree than we feel them. It is impossible that a man should be in pain, when he does not feel 
pain; and when he feels pain, it is impossible that his pain should not be real, and in its 
degree what it is felt to be; and the same thing may be said of every sensation whatsoever.’8
There are two important clarifications that we can make here, both of which will, I 
suggest, render Reid’s position consistent. First, how might Reid have understood cases 
in which we appear not to be aware of our sensations? For example:
“I find myself scratching one of my legs and come to realize that I am doing so for a reason - 
the leg is itching” .4 *
I suggest Reid would have distinguished between the phenomenal characteristics of a 
sensation and its functional characteristics. Now Reid’s statement that “it is essential to a 
sensation to be felt” rules out his holding that a sensation can function in such a way as 
to incline us toward performing an action, even though it fails to have any phenomenal 
characteristics. However, he might have held that sensations could incline us toward 
performing an action, even though its phenomenal features were of such weakness or 
indistinctness, in comparison with the present object of our attention, that we fail to 
notice its functional characteristics, that is, we fail to explain our actions by reference to 
them.
rose, which is the cause of this sensation.” IP, p. 227 (Note, Reid’s MS version of this text had the word 
“conceive” in place of “conclude”. MS 4 /I I /16,16); “when certain impressions are made upon our organs, 
nerves, and brain, certain corresponding sensations are felt, and certain objects are both conceived and 
believed to exist.” EP, p. 269.
1 T. Duggan, ed.. An Inquiry into the Human Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970): p. xvi.
2 Bourdillon, in response to Duggan, argues, in effect, for this solution. Bourdillon, “Reid’s account of 
Sensation”, p. 27-8.
3 IP, p. 290.
4 Christopher S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991): p. 119.
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The second clarification is this: Reid states in the Inquiry that “If we can only acquire 
the habit of attending to our sensations, we may know them perfectly.” 1 But how could 
this be so if we know all there is to know just by having them? I suggest that Reid’s 
view is this: when he states that our knowledge of sensations will increase in detail or 
distinctness in proportion to the degree that we reflect upon them, this is just because 
he takes it that our sensations themselves will increase in detail or distinctness in 
proportion to the degree that we reflect upon them.2
Now this interpretation will only make sense, I suggest, if we bring into play the 
notion of conceptual immediacy. Whilst our consciousness may directly present to us 
an awareness of a sensation, the kind of conception we form of its attributes and 
relations will depend on the degree to which we reflect upon it. But if we have 
conceptual immediacy with respect to our sensations, then our conception of them will 
be formed at the same time as they are directly presented to us; in which case, a sensation 
will be presented to our awareness as having precisely those essential phenomenal 
features that we conceive of it as having. But then it follows that the essential 
phenomenal features of a sensation will be either vague or distinct in proportion to the 
degree that we attend to i t 3 Thus, Reid’s view of the matter, I suggest, is this:
Ag3 S has a sensation x if and only if (i) S is conscious of x; and (ii) x has no
essential phenomenal attribute or relation F, such that S is not conscious of x 
as having F.
Second, Cummins argues that Reid is mistaken in taking belief to be an essential 
ingredient of perception, given that perception may occur without belief:
“When one knows antecedently that perspectival distortion is going to occur or when the 
circumstances are unusual and one’s perceptual object is peculiar, one does not believe that 
the perceptual object exists.” 4
Reid was not unaware of such cases. Indeed, he argued that belief in the object of 
perception is present only if “we are certain that we perceive it”:
1 HM, p. 170.
2 As Bourdillon notes, Reid held that “the very character of a sensation seems to change in proportion as 
we pay more or less attention to it.” Bourdillon, “Reid’s account of Sensation”, p. 35, n.28
3 Cf. Blumenfeld: “if we suddenly removed all other things [in our visual experience] which we were not 
attending to, we would notice that something was m issing. . .  there are characteristics which are not directly 
attended to, but we can’t say that to check on these would be to check on unnoticed characteristics, for these 
are noticed - they are merely vague.” David C. Blumenfeld, “On Not Seeing Double”, Philosophical Quarterly 9 
(1959): p. 264-65. Hill makes a similar observation (which is not to say that he would agree entirely with 
Reid): there are “cases in which a qualitative change occurs when one directs one’s attention on a sensation 
that has previously been at the margin of consciousness.” C. Hill, Sensations, p. 126.
4 Phillip Cummins, “Reid’s Realism”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1974): p. 326-27, n. 35.
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“There may be a perception so faint and indistinct, as to leave us in doubt whether we
perceive the object or not___But when the perception is in any degree clear and steady, there
remains no doubt of its reality; and when the reality of the perception is ascertained, the 
existence of the object perceived can no longer be doubted.” 1
In other words, those cases in which we are uncertain as to whether or not the object 
of an apparent perception exists are just those cases in which we are uncertain as to 
whether or not we really are perceiving it. Put another way, if we do not believe that the 
perceptual object exists, we will not believe that we are perceiving that object. Hence, if 
we knew antecedently that perspectival distortion would create an erroneous 
conception that some object x exists, we would not only refrain from believing that x 
exists, we would also refrain from believing that we had perceived x. Reid would 
therefore reject Cummins’s objection: for perception, as we ordinarily think of it, entails 
a belief in the object of perception.
Third, Cummins suggests that Reid is inconsistent in holding that (i) it is a first 
principle that the objects of perception exist, and yet admitting that (ii) there are cases 
of genuine perceptual error. 2 However, it is crucial that we are precise in locating the 
source of error that Reid (rightly) acknowledges. First, there are, in Reid’s view, no 
cases in which it can be said that some agent S perceives x at f, and x does not exist at t: 
He is quite explicit on this: “I acknowledge”, he states, “that a man cannot perceive an 
object that does not exist” .3 To suppose otherwise, Reid argues, would be to claim that 
S’s power of perception is fallacious, and “we have no reason to think that God has 
given fallacious powers to any of his creatures” .4 However, suppose that S’s power of 
perception is dysfunctional or that his cognitive environment is in some way 
inappropriate; and suppose that as a consequence, S takes himself to be perceiving x at 
f, when x does not exist at t. Now Cummins might analyse this scenario by saying that 
S’s perception of x at t was fallacious. Reid’s analysis would be that S did not have a 
fallacious perception at t. Rather, due to abnormal conditions, S formed a fallacious 
belief that he had a perception of x at t.
The fourth qualification is especially important: Reid held that the individual 
operations of sensation, conception, and judgment, though distinguishable by 
reflection, are essential ingredients or constitutive parts of one kind of operation, 
namely, perception.5
1
2
3
4
5
IP,p. 107.
Cummins, “Reid’s Realism”, p. 338.
EP. p. 390.
IP, p. 291.
E.g. “sensation, or feeling which is only a more refined kind of sensation, makes one ingredient.
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In other words, the series of conjoined operations listed below is not a temporal or 
linear series, whereby each operation is succeeded by the next. Rather they will all 
occur at the same time:
Ag4 S has a perception of some object x as being F at t if and only if (i) x is an 
external object existing at f; (ii) x is conjoined with S’s having a certain 
sensation y at t; (iii) S ’s having y is conjoined with the formation of a 
conception of F at t , and (iv) S’s forming a conception of F is conjoined with 
the formation of S’s judgments at t that (a) Fx exists, and (b) F is that attribute 
in x which is conjoined to y . * 1
Now the objects of perception are two kinds of individual attributes, primary and 
secondary qualities. These, Reid argues, are distinguished merely by virtue of the kinds 
of conceptions we form: the primary qualities are attributes in a body that occasion 
sensations in us that, in turn, lead to the formation of direct conceptions of those 
attributes; the secondary qualities are attributes in a body that occasion sensations in us 
that, in turn, are the occasion of relative conceptions of those attributes. Now as we have 
seen, a relative conception of some object x arises immediately upon our obtaining a 
distinct conception of something y to which x stands in a relation, such as ‘being the 
effect of’ or ‘being the subject of’. Moreover, a relative conception will not give us any 
conception of x itself; it merely informs us that there is something, namely x, that stands 
in a certain relation to y. In this case, our conception of some secondary quality F is 
relative just because the only conception of F that arises in us, is that F is the occasion of 
a certain sensation.2 In sum:
the perception of external objects” IP, p. 230. I thus agree with Pappas’ rejection of any interpretation of 
Reid’s view according to which he takes sensation to be “a mere correlate”, rather than “partly constitutive” 
of perception. See George Pappas, “Sensation and Perception in Reid”, p. 155. See also Ben-Zeev’s convincing 
comparison of Reid’s view with that of J. J. Gibson: “Both Reid and Gibson agree th a t. . .  while perceptual 
experience contains various features, these are not ordered in a linear, causal and temporal chain. In typical 
perceptual experience all these features are present, but, as Reid rightly maintains, in different circumstances
our attention may be focused on a different feature___A direct approach cannot assume that the perceptual
content is constructed by adding one perceptual feature (or atom) to another until the complete experience is 
produced.” Ben-Zeev, Reid’s Direct Approach to Perception”, p. 111.
1 This definition, Reid would claim, is true only of the actual world, and only under certain appropriate 
conditions: “I can conceive a Being that has Sensations of various kinds without any Perception. Perhaps this 
is actually the State of Children in the Womb and of Oysters & some other Animals. I can conceive also a 
Being that perceives all that we perceive without any Sensation connected with these Perceptions.” (Letter to 
Karnes, 20 Dec. 1778), Ross, p. 40. Robert Sleigh makes a similar point in “Reid and the Ideal Theory of 
Conception and Perception” Philosophical Monographs 3 (1976): p. 80.
2 “The only notion therefore my senses give is this. That smell in the rose is an unknown quality or 
modification, which is the cause or occasion of a sensation which I know well.” IP, p. 237; secondary qualities 
“are conceived only as the unknown causes or occasions of certain sensations with which we are well 
acquainted.” IP, p. 237; “the quality in the body, which is the cause or occasion of this sensation, is likewise 
reaL though the nature of it is not manifest to our senses.” IP. p. 243.
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F is a primary quality if and only if (i) F is an attribute of an external object, (ii) 
it is possible that, for some agent S, F is conjoined to a sensation x  in S, and x  
is conjoined to a direct conception of F in S.
D47 F is a secondary quality if and only if (i) F is an attribute of an external object, 
(ii) it is possible that, for some agent S, F is conjoined to a sensation x  in S, and 
x  is conjoined to a relative conception of F in S.1
The question that arises for us is this: when Reid speaks of that “gross and 
indistinct” conception of external objects which “Nature immediately presents to us”, is 
he referring here to sensations? Are we to think of sensations as giving us a direct 
awareness of an object, which is, at the same time, conjoined with a (direct or relative) 
conception of those objects? I suggest that this is precisely Reid’s view of the matter.
First, Reid held that, in general, (i) the sensations which are the occasion of our 
conception of external objects and (ii) those conceptions themselves, are not only 
“produced at the same time”, but “coalesce in our imagination”: more precisely, we 
“consider them as one thing”, we tend to “confound their different attributes”, and find 
it “very difficult to separate them in thought, to attend to each by itself” 2 In short, Reid, 
as Pappas suggests, seems to take “the phenomenal character of sensation to appear 
simultaneously, and without apparent distinction, as features of the external object of 
direct awareness.” .3 In sum, Reid holds that we have conceptual immediacy with 
respect to external objects.4
We can be even more precise by examining the distinct ways in which we form 
concepts of the primary and secondary qualities. Take, for example, Alston’s 
interpretation of Reid:
1 Bruce Silver argues, convincingly, that Berkeley had some influence on Reid’s account of primary and 
secondary qualities, in “A Note on Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision and Thomas Reid’s Distinction between 
Primary and Secondary Qualities” SJ Phä 12 (1974): pp. 253-63.
2 “Every different perception is conjoined with a sensation that is proper to it. The one is the sign, the 
other the thing signified. They coalesce in our imagination. They are signified by one name, and are 
considered as one simple operation. The purposes of life do not require them to be distinguished.” IP, p. 233; 
“The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never 
find them disjoined. Hence we are led to consider them as one thing, to give them one name, and to confound 
their different attributes. It becomes very difficult to separate them in thought, to attend to each by itself, and 
to attribute nothing to it which belongs to the other.” IP, p. 248.
3 Reported in W. P. Alston, “Reid on Perception and Conception”, p. 45. It should be noted that Pappas’ 
suggestion is intended to be a “modified Reidian view”. I am of course taking his suggestion, or something 
very like it, to be Reid’s own view.
4 This interpretation is similar to Ben-Zeev’s: “we do not find in [Reid’s] approach the traditional 
problematic transition from a sensory raw material which is completely noninformative (meaningless) to an 
informative (meaningful) perceptual stage. The very first perceptual (or sensory) stage is informative 
(meaningful).. . .  Sensation, in Reid’s mature view, is not a raw material awaiting cognitive processing, but 
refers to a noncognitive aspect of our p>erceptual experience." A. Ben-Zeev, “Reid’s Direct Approach to 
Perception”, p. 105.
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“What it is natural to refer to as an awareness of colours, warmth, and odours (or of objects as 
coloured, warm, and odourous) Reid construes as modes of feeling (awareness), as ways of 
being aware, directed on to no object beyond themselves. And these sensations are sharply 
distinguished by Reid from the conception and belief that constitute perception.’’1
Now Reid would agree with this interpretation, but only up to a point For he would 
argue that it fails to take account of the manner in which our conception of secondary 
qualities arises. It is true that our sensations, when analysed in abstraction, are to be 
sharply distinguished from our conception of the secondary qualities of colours, 
warmth and odours. However, we have only a relative conception of these secondary 
qualities. To be precise, we have no conception of colour, warmth and odour apart from 
the fact that they are those qualities in external objects that are the occasion for certain 
sensations. Indeed, Reid argues that this is precisely why secondary qualities are so 
often confused with the sensations that are occasioned by them. They are not merely 
antecedent conditions for some immediately succeeding conception of secondary 
attributes. The phenomenal character of sensations themselves “bear a capital part” in 
the conception we form of such attributes. In other words, what we are directly 
presented with in sensation is an awareness of objects as being coloured, warm, 
odourous, and so on. Hence, we have, by means of our sensations, conceptual 
immediacy with respect to the secondary qualities.2
What of the primary qualities? Surely objects are also directly presented to our 
awareness as being textured, shaped, and so on. The problem here, is that Reid did not 
consider sensations to “bear a capital part” in the conceptions we form of the primary 
qualities.3 However, he did think that those sensations which function as the occasion 
of primary qualities are such that, once they have performed their natural function, 
they “immediately disappear and are forgot” .4 Now the effect of this phenomenon, as
1 Alston, “Reid on Perception and Conception”, p. 44.
2 “We may see why the sensations belonging to secondary qualities are an object of our attention, while 
those which belong to the primary are not 1 The first are not only signs of the object perceived, but they bear 
a capital part in the notion we form of it. We conceive it only as that which occasions such a sensation, and 
therefore cannot reflect upon it without thinking of the sensation which it occasions: We have no other mark 
whereby to distinguish it. The thought of a secondary quality, therefore, always carries us back to the 
sensation which it produces. We give the same name to both, and are apt to confound them together.” IP, p. 
239.
3 “It appears as evident, that this connection between our sensations and the conception and belief of 
external existences cannot be produced by habit, experience, education, or any principle of human nature that 
hath been admitted by philosophers.” HM, p. 58; “no sensation can give us the conception of material things, 
far less any argument to prove their existence.” IP, p. 235.
4 “When a primary quality is perceived, the sensation immediately leads our thought to the quality 
signified by it, and is itself forgot.” IP, p. 240, cf. The sensation “carries my thought immediately to the thing 
signified by it, and is itself forgot, as if it had never been.” IP, p. 228; “the sensations belonging to primary 
qualities . . . carry the thought to the external object, and immediately disappear and are forgot. Nature 
intended them only as signs; and when they have served that purpose they vanish.” IP, p. 240.
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Reid describes it, would, once again, be that, in any act of perception, it would appear 
to us that external objects are directly presented to our awareness as being shaped, 
extended and so on. I suggest, therefore, that Reid took it that we also have, by our 
sensations, conceptual immediacy with respect to the primary qualities.
This concludes my attempt to show how Reid’s characterisation of certain 
conceptions as being “obscure” or “indistinct” might be rendered consistent with his 
view that a distinct conception is a necessary condition for epistemic justification.
6 THE PREJUDICES
We come now to Reid’s third necessary condition for knowledge. Following Bacon, 
Reid argues that there are four classes of prejudices, or causes of error: idola tribus, idola 
specus, idola fori and idola theatri I shall argue that each kind of prejudice is a belief that 
has the following three features: (i) it has ‘doxastic immediacy’ for us; (ii) it does not 
have ‘epistemic immediacy’ for us, and so, is not a self-evident belief; and (iii) it arises 
by virtue of the inclination of a ‘vicious doxastic habit’, and so, is such that we are 
accountable, to some extent, for its formation.
6.1 SELF-EVIDENCE
We begin with Reid’s notion of self-evidence. First, Reid identifies at least six “distinct 
and original kinds of evidence” ,1 each of which, he states, “may afford just ground of 
belief” :2
“the evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, the evidence of consciousness, the evidence
of testimony, the evidence of axioms, the evidence of reasoning” 3
Second, Reid holds that the first five kinds of evidence, in contrast to the evidence of 
reasoning, are such as give rise to what he calls ‘self-evident’ beliefs. We may define 
these as follows: Earlier we identified two kinds of immediacy in Reid’s thought, 
namely, presentational and conceptual immediacy. There are, however, two further 
kinds of immediacy:4
D« p has doxastic immediacy for S = df S believes that p at the same time that 
she forms a distinct conception of p.
D49 p has epistemic immediacy for S = df S is immediately justified in believing 
that p, that is, S’s belief is not justified by virtue of being inferred from some 
other justified belief (or set of beliefs).
1 HM, p. 32.
2 IP, p.272.
3 IP,p.272.
4 These formulations are similar to those found in Alston, “Reid on Perception and Conception”, p. 36.
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Reid’s analysis of a self-evident belief, then, may be given as follows:
Ags p  is self-evident for S if and only if p has both doxastic and epistemic 
immediacy for S
Likewise, a belief having the evidence of reasoning may be defined in terms of 
doxastic and epistemic mediacy, that is, where:
D50 p  has doxastic mediacy for S = df S believes that p only when she has formed 
a distinct conception of both p  and q, and logically inferred p  from q.
DS1 p  has epistemic mediacy for S = df S is mediately justified in believing that p, 
that is, S’s belief is justified by virtue of being logically inferred from some 
other justified belief (or set of beliefs).1 2
Thus,
A u  S ’s belief that p has the evidence of reasoning if and only if p  has both doxastic 
and epistemic mediacy for S.3
6.2 MERE DOXASTIC IMMEDIACY
We shall see that prejudices are propositions that have doxastic, but not epistemic 
immediacy for us: more concisely, they have ‘mere doxastic immediacy’ for us. By way 
of clarification, then, we need to examine Reid’s view of how such a phenomenon is 
possible: that is, how a proposition can have mere doxastic immediacy for us.
First, we need to clarify what is meant by epistemic immediacy. All justified beliefs 
are, for Reid, only prima facie justified. What he means by this is that they are justified 
only in the absence of undercutters and rebutters, that is, where:
1 “Self-evident propositions are those which appear evident to every man of sound understanding who 
apprehends the meaning of them distinctly, and attends to them without prejudice.” IP, p. 161; “(Self-evident 
propositions] are no sooner understood them they are believed. The judgment follows the apprehension of 
them necessarily, and both are equally the work of nature, and the result of our original powers. There is no 
searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another, it 
has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another.” IP, p. 555.
2 “when we speak of the evidence of reasoning as a particular kind of evidence, it means the evidence of 
propositions that are inferred by reasoning, from propositions already known and believed. Thus the 
evidence of the fifth proposition of the first book of Euclid’s Elements consists in this. That it is shown to be 
the necessary consequence of the axioms, and of the preceding propositions. In all reasoning, there must be 
one or more premises, and a conclusion drawn from them. And the premises are called the reason why we 
must believe die conclusion which we see to follow from them.” IP, p. 273.
3 “By Knowledge, I think, we mean. Belief upon good Evidence. We know what is self evident, & we 
know what we can give good Evidence for. But we sometimes believe upon bad Authority or from Prejudice; 
& such Belief is not called Knowledge. 1 All knowledge therefore implies belief; but belief does not imply 
Knowledge. I know what I distinctly perceive by my Senses; I know what I distinctly remember; I know 
when I am pained; I know that two & three make five. In all these cases the knowledge is immediate. There is 
no medium or proof, but there is belief upon good Evidence.” (Letter to Karnes, 1 Dec. 1778) Ross, pp. 37-38.
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Ag7 r is an undercutter for S’s belief that p if and only if a justifying factor for S’s 
belief that p is q, and not-q is the case.
Agg q is a rebutter for S’s belief that p if and only if q is the case, and if q is the case, 
then not-p is the case.1
Now we might think that a self-evident belief could have no undercutter if q is taken 
to be that proposition from which the agent infers her belief that p. But of course, a 
justifying factor, for Reid, need not be a belief. The justifying factors for self-evident 
beliefs would, for Reid, be (i) certain states of affairs, such as the faculty (or set of 
faculties) by which S’s belief-that p is produced at t functioning properly at t, (ii) S’s 
having a distinct conception of p, and (iii) S’s attending to p without prejudice. 
Moreover, Reid, being an externalist, would not suggest that a justifying factor for a 
self-evident belief is that S believes that any of (i)-(iii) either are or should be in place.
This is not to say that we have no cognitive access to whether or not a proposition 
has mere doxastic immediacy for us; and, as a consequence, it does not follow that we 
cannot divest ourselves of such beliefs. For if an agent is aware of the absence of any of 
the factors in (i)-(iii), then, under normal conditions, this will effect the sustenance of 
his belief. Suppose S forms a perceptual belief that p at t, but, as it turns out:
(i) he was hallucinating at t.
Now, as we have seen:
(ii) a perceptual belief is justified only if the faculty by which it is formed is 
functioning properly at the time.
Hence, (i) and (ii) together constitute an undercutter for his belief that p, whether or not 
S believes (i) and (ii). But if S does come to believe in (i) and (ii), then, under normal 
conditions, this will bring it about that he no longer believes that p. For his belief that p 
would no longer seem to him to be grounded upon the evidence of his senses; and so, it 
would not be within his power to continue believing that p.
To be quite clear about Reid’s position here, we need to rule out several claims: First, 
Reid does not hold that any belief that seems to us to be self-evident, is in fact so. That is, 
he rejects the following principle:
(a) p has epistemic immediacy for S only if p has doxastic immediacy for S.
1 These analyses are based on the following text: “all mankind have a fixed belief of an external material 
world, a belief which is neither got by reasoning nor education, and a belief which we cannot shake off, even 
when we seem to have strong arguments against it [i.e. rebutter], and no shadow of argument for it [either 
because it is self-evident, or because of an undercutter].” HM, p. 72.
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For, as we have seen, Reid argues that not all of those beliefs that we take to be self- 
evident are instances of genuine first principles. In other words, a proposition will have 
epistemic immediacy for us only if it satisfies the ‘marks’ of a first principle. It should 
be emphasized that this does not, as we have seen, entail that the justification of a self- 
evident belief comes by way of any inference from our having judged that it satisfies 
these ‘marks’. For, in that case, (i) the belief would not be epistemically immediate; and 
(ii) the inference would be epistemically circular. Second, Reid does not hold that:
0?) p has epistemic immediacy for S only if it seems to S that there are no 
undercutters or rebutters for p.
For, given Reid’s extemalism, it is quite possible that a person be mistaken about there 
being an undercutter for her belief and yet, she might be justified nevertheless, a good 
example of which being those philosophers who purport to be sceptical with regard to 
their senses. Again, a person might be justified in believing that p on the evidence of her 
senses, and yet she may not have even thought about whether or not there are any 
undercutters or rebutters for p. She may not have considered the question of whether or 
not her belief is justified, or what it would take for her belief to be justified. It might be 
“the perfection of a rational creature” that she countenance such second-order 
questions; but if this kind of reflection were required for the justification of her beliefs, 
she should have perished in her infancy for the lack of it.1
6.3 EPISTEMIC IMMEDIACY
We have seen, then, that it is possible for a proposition to have mere doxastic 
immediacy for us. But why should we think that there are any propositions that have 
epistemic immediacy for us? Reid’s response to this question comes by way of two 
arguments, both of which attempt to show that scepticism with regard to at least some 
propositions having epistemic immediacy for us would be inconsistent with the view 
that some propositions have epistemic mediacy for us.
First, Reid has often been read as claiming that self-evident beliefs (or beliefs in the 
instances of first principles) are irresistible for us, even in the face of undercutters and 
rebutters. But precision is crucial here. Reid does not hold that, if p is self-evident for S, 
then it is not within S’s power to continue to refrain from believing that p, even if seems
1 “we are merely animal before we are rational creatures; and it is necessary for our preservation, that we 
should believe many things before we can reason. How then is our belief to be regulated before we have 
reason to regulate it? has Nature left it to be regulated by chance? By no means. It is regulated by certain 
principles, which are parts of our constitution” IP, pp. 285-85.
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to S that there is some undercutter or rebutter for her belief that p> For example, 
suppose, after engaging in an lengthy and intricate philosophical train of reasoning, 
S comes to believe that her faculty of perception cannot be proven trustworthy. Since 
the evidence of her senses no longer seems to her to be evidence, she would refrain from 
believing in an external world, or at least not of the kind presented to her by her senses. 
It follows that the resistance of a self-evident belief is, in Reid’s view, quite possible. 
However, Reid also sets down an important rider. A genuine self-evident belief is 
resistible in just the same sense as swallowing one’s food or breathing is resistible. That 
is to say, just as our resistance of instinctive actions can only be sustained temporarily 
and in abnormal circumstances, so it is with our resistance of a self-evident belief. Like 
the inclination of instincts, a self-evident belief will soon reassert itself, either when 
normal circumstances resume, or when the agent is forced to decide between his 
continued resistance and his preservation or well-being. 1 2
Now the example we have given above, of an agent resisting the evidence of her 
senses, is especially interesting. For her reasoning is based upon the following 
principle:
Aw S is justified in believing that p if and only if p has epistemic mediacy for S.
Take, for instance, our belief in an external world. AK requires the following: (i) we 
must find some proposition (or set of propositions) p , such that we have a distinct 
conception of p , and our belief that p  is justified; and (ii) we must construct a sound 
argument, the premise of which is p and the conclusion, that there is an external world. 
However, suppose we discover that the only propositions that do not beg the question, 
and which satisfy condition (i), are those that describe our sensations. There are two 
problems here. First, no one, Reid would argue, has ever provided a sound deductive 
or inductive inference from sensations to an external world. But then, it follows from 
A89 that we are not justified in believing in an external world. The second problem is
1 As Michaud seems to think “Reid says that [first principles] are judgments of nature, original principles 
of belief, that reason can neither give birth to them nor destroy them .. . .  it is somewhat embarrassing that 
such strong and irresistible principles could ever be challenged, even by lunatics if not by sceptics.” Y. 
Michaud, “Reid’s Attack on the Theory of Ideas”, in M. Dalgarno and E. Matthews, eds. The Philosophy of 
Thomas Reid (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, PSS 42,1989): p. 16.
2 “My belief is carried along by perception, as irresistibly as my body by the earth. And the greatest 
sceptic will find himself to be in the same condition. He may struggle hard to disbelieve the informations of 
his senses, as a man does to swim against a torrent; but ah! it is in vain. It is in vain that he strains every 
nerve, and wrestles with nature, and with every object that strikes upon his senses. For after all, when his 
strength is spent in the fruitless attempt, he will be carried down the torrent with the common herd of 
believers.” HM, p. 164; “when they condescend to mingle again with the human race, and to converse with a 
friend, a companion, or a fellow-dtizen, the ideal system vanishes; common sense, like an irresistible torrent, 
carries them along; and, in spite of all their reasoning and philosophy, they believe their own existence, and 
the existence of other things.” HM, p. 33.
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that our belief in the external world has doxastic immediacy for us: that is, as soon as 
we find ourselves within a normal environment, we cannot help but immediately form 
beliefs in the existence of external objects.1
Suppose we argued that, even though we cannot divest ourselves of our belief in an 
external world, such a belief is nevertheless unjustified: for, by A89, no belief is justified 
unless is it formed on the evidence of reasoning .2 Reid would say that this reply is 
patently inconsistent. No belief can be formed unless it seems to the agent that there is 
evidence for that belief. The instant that it seems to S that she has insufficient evidence 
for p , is the instant that she will no longer believe that p. But if this is so, it must follow 
that, despite our apparent adherence to A89, it must seem to us that we have evidence 
for our belief in the existence of external objects: otherwise we would not form such 
beliefs. But since this evidence could not be the evidence of reasoning, it must be a self- 
evident belief. In short, those who find they cannot resist the evidence of their senses, 
and yet continue to accept Aw are so far forth inconsistent. They must believe either 
that there is no external world, or that A^ is false. But since no one can sustain the 
former belief, they must, on pain of inconsistency, accept the latter.3
6.4 FOUNDATIONALISM
Reid’s second argument for the existence of propositions that have epistemic 
immediacy for us is this: either there are some beliefs that are immediately justified, or 
there will turn out to be a circularity of justification or an infinite regress of justification, 
in which case no beliefs are justified. But the only beliefs that might count as being 
immediately justified are those that are self-evident that is, propositions that have both 
doxastic and epistemic immediacy for us. Hence, if we are to have any justified beliefs 
some propositions must have epistemic immediacy for us .4
1 “Many eminent Philosophers thinking it unreasonable to believe, when they could not show a reason, 
have laboured to furnish us with reasons for believing our senses; but their reasons are very insufficient, and 
will not bear examination. Other Philosophers have shewn very dearly the fallacy of these reasons, and have, 
as they imagine, discovered invincible reasons against this belief; but they have never been able either to 
shake it in themselves, or to convince others.” IP, pp. 273-74.
2 This, Reid thought, was Hume’s solution: “Our author indeed was aware, that neither his scepticism, 
nor that of any other person, was able to endure this trial, and therefore enters a caveat against i t . . . .  ‘all our 
reasonings concerning causes and effects, «ire derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is more 
properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature’.” IP, pp. 710-11; cf.“There is nothing 
so shameful in a philosopher as to be deceived and deluded; and therefore you ought to resolve firmly to 
with-hold assent, and to throw off this belief of external objects, which may be all delusion.” HM, p. 164.
3 “All we would ask of this kind of Sceptic is, that he would be uniform and consistent, and that his 
practice in life do not belie his profession of scepticism with regard to the fidelity of his faculties: For the want 
of faith, as well as faith itself, is best shown by works. If a Sceptic avoid the fire as much as those who believe 
it dangerous to go into it, we can hardly avoid thinking his scepticism to be feigned, and not real.” IP, p. 710.
4 Cf. W. P. Alston, “Two Types of Foundationalism”, in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989): p. 19.
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In more detail, Reid takes “just reasoning” to be a process whereby a person takes 
propositions she believes and connects them together into a sequence in such a way 
that, for each proposition p  in the sequence, there is some proposition (or set of 
propositions) earlier in the sequence that constitutes “just ground” for S’s belief that p> 
However, as Reid notes, such a process cannot continue backwards indefinitely. Take 
“synthetical reasoning”: we take a proposition (or set of propositions) p  and deduce 
from p  another proposition q and from that r, and so on “in a connected chain untill we 
come to the conclusion which is the end of our Reasoning” .1 2 If our belief in the 
conclusion is to be justified, then the belief that p  must be justified. But if the belief that 
p  is justified by being based on other justified beliefs, each of which are themselves 
likewise justified, an infinite regress results. Again, take “analytical reasoning”: if a 
person examines upon what evidence a proposition immediately rests, he will find 
either that it is supported by no other proposition, or that “it rests upon one or more 
propositions that support it”. If the latter, then:
“The same thing may be said of the propositions that support it; and of those that support 
them, as far back as we can go. But we cannot go back in this track to infinity. Where then 
must this analysis stop? It is evident that it must stop only when we come to propositions, 
which support all that are built upon them, but are themselves supported by none”. 3
Reid does not, unfortunately, tell us precisely why he thought an infinite regress 
would prevent justification;4 nor does he mention, in this context, the problem of 
circular justification. He does, however, state elsewhere that “reasoning in a circle 
proves nothing”,5 and we have seen this manifested in his rejection of epistemic 
circularity. But Reid clearly did hold that the only way to terminate the regress, and so 
provide justification, would be if there were some beliefs that are justified by something 
other than being grounded upon other justified beliefs. In other words, either some 
beliefs are immediately justified or no beliefs are mediately justified. Now beliefs that 
have doxastic immediacy for us are the only candidates for immediate justification. 
Hence, if we think that some propositions have epistemic mediacy for us, then we must 
also accept that at least some propositions have epistemic immediacy for us: that is to 
say, some beliefs must be self-evident. 6
1 Cf. Pollock, p. 47.
2 M S4/I/8a, 4
3 IP, p. 558; “we trace things backward untill we come to premises that are not founded upon any 
antecedent truth but upon our constitution” MS 4/1/8a, 4.
4 See P. K. Moser, Empirical Justification (Holland: D. Reidel, 1985).
5 IP, p. 605.
6 “without first principles, analytical reasoning could have no end, and synthetical reasoning could have
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6.5 DOXASTIC INSTINCTS
We have one more element to examine before we proceed to Reid’s account of the 
prejudices. We have suggested that the error of each kind of prejudice, arises just 
because a person takes a proposition that has doxastic immediacy for them also to have 
epistemic immediacy for them. Now Reid took there to be two kinds beliefs that have 
doxastic immediacy for us: those that arise by what I shall call ‘doxastic instincts’, and 
those that are formed upon the inclination of what I shall call ‘doxastic habits’. I shall 
argue, then, that all four kinds prejudices arise by way of the exertion of our voluntary 
intellectual powers to form beliefs upon insufficient evidence with a frequency 
sufficient to form a ‘vicious doxastic habit’. To reach this conclusion, however, we must 
first articulate Reid’s notion of a doxastic instinct.
First, we have seen that Reid distinguished between instinctive actions that occur 
only in infancy or early childhood, and those that occur in adulthood. There is a similar 
distinction he makes with regard to beliefs that are regulated by constitutional rules, or 
the first principles. Some are present from infancy, others continue into adulthood. 
Thus I shall use the phrase ‘doxastic infant-instincts’ to denote the former, and 
‘doxastic instincts’, the latter:
A90 S  has the doxastic infant-instinct I  to form or sustain belief B if and only if (i) S 
is inclined by I  toward forming or sustaining B , (ii) B is not an object of S’s 
will, (iii) B is indirectly necessary for her preservation or well-being, (iv) S’s 
intellectual development is such that (a) S could not yet have discovered that 
B is indirectly necessary for her preservation or well-being, (b) S could not yet 
have confirmed B,  (v) the agent could not have learned or otherwise acquired 
the habit of forming or sustaining B.
A91 S has the doxastic instinct I  to form or sustain belief B if and only if (i) S is 
inclined by I  toward forming or sustaining B (ii) B is not an object of S’s will, 
(iii) B is indirectly necessary for her preservation or well-being, (iv) S’s 
intellectual capacity is such that (a) S can discover that B is indirectly 
necessary for her preservation or well-being, (b) S may confirm B; (v) the 
agent could not have learned or otherwise acquired the habit of forming or 
sustaining B.
no beginning; and that every conclusion got by reasoning must rest with its whole weight upon first 
principles, as the building does upon its foundation." IP, p. 407. “if there were not first principles of belief for 
which no reason can be given, which are not acquired but natural original and constitutional. Synthetical 
reasoning could have no beginning, no bottom or foundation to rest upon; it would be merely hypothetical; 
and on the other hand analytical Reasoning would have no end nor could ever be brought to an issue.. . .  
There must therefore in all other Sciences, as well as Mathematicks, be Axioms into which all our reasonings 
in that science are resolved”. M S4/I/8a,4.
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Several comments on these analyses are in order: first, with respect to (iii), Reid 
appears to hold that beliefs are not directly necessary for an agent’s preservation or 
well-being: for, as immanent acts of the mind, they have no effect beyond their own 
exertion. However, every action that is directly necessary for an agent’s preservation or 
health, presupposes a certain belief in the agent: the action would not be performed 
unless the agent held the appropriate belief. It is in this sense, then, that a belief is said 
to be indirectly necessary for an agent’s preservation or well-being.
Second, with respect to (iv) (b), Reid appears to suggest that, in adulthood, we may 
confirm the epistemic credibility of beliefs that seem to us to be self-evident, either on 
theological or inductive grounds:1
“He who is persuaded that he is the workmanship of God, and that it is a part of his 
constitution to believe his senses, may think that a good reason to confirm his belief: But he 
had the belief before he could give this or any other reason for it.“2 3
“The credit we give to [the testimony of our senses] is at first the effect of instinct only. When 
we grow up, and begin to reason about [it],. . .  the credit given to the testimony of our senses, 
is established and confirmed by the uniformity and constancy of the laws of Nature.’*
However, this act of confirmation must be understood with great care. Given Reid’s 
rejection of epistemic circularity, any such confirmation must proceed by an internal or 
reflexive evaluation: for example, we might think that the “uniformity and constancy” 
of the relation we have found to exist between the presence of certain material objects 
and our having certain sensations and beliefs, is confirmation that the evidence of our
1 This view is very similar to that found in Alston’s epistemology of ‘doxastic practices’: “(1) By engaging 
in SP [i.e. the doxastic practice of sense-perception] and allied memory and inferential practices we are 
enabled to make predictions many of which turn out to be correct and thereby we are able to anticipate and, 
to some considerable extent, control the course of events. (2) By relying on SP and associated practices we are 
able to establish facts about the operation of sense perception that show both that it is a reliable source of 
belief and why it is reliable. Our scientific account of perceptual processes shows how it is that sense 
experience serves as a sensitive indicator of certain kinds of facts about the environment of the perceiver.” W. 
P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1991): p. 173.
2 IP, p. 275; “if we believe that there is a wise and good Author of nature, we may see a good reason, why 
he should continue the same laws of nature, and the same connections of things, for a long time: because, if 
he did otherwise, we could learn nothing from what is past, and till our experience would be of no use to us. 
But though this consideration, when we come to the use of reason, may confirm our belief of the continuance 
of the present course of nature, it is certain that it did not give rise to this belief; for children and idiots have 
this belief as soon as they know that fire will bum them. It must therefore be the effect of instinct, not of 
reason.” HM, p. 191; “This is one of those principles, which, when we grow up and observe the course of 
nature, we can confirm by reasoning. We perceive that Nature is governed by fixed laws, and that if it were 
not so, there could be no such thing as prudence in human conduct; there would be no fitness in any means 
to promote an end; and what, on one occasion, promoted it, might as probably, on another occasion, obstruct 
i t  I  But the principle is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning, and therefore is made 
a part of our constitution, and produces its effects before the use of reason.” IP, p. 603.
3 HM,p. 166.
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senses is a just ground of belief: that is, the instinct by which we form perceptual beliefs 
is, on the whole, reliable. But, of course, we must trust the deliverances of this very 
instinct to establish the uniformity of this relation.
So why should we take this kind of confirmation at all seriously? One good reason is 
that we can easily imagine a world in which we found things to be very different We 
might, for instance, have found that the majority of our instinctive perceptual beliefs 
are either inconsistent with one another, or with the output of some other faculty of 
mind.1 However, we do not find that this is the case in our world. The inconsistencies 
or errors that appear to be the product of our senses may be explained by reference 
either to (i) our having drawn “rash” conclusions from our immediate or original 
perceptual beliefs, whether explicitly or by the more immediate process of acquired 
perception,2 or (ii) to cognitive malfunctioning, an inappropriate cognitive 
environment, and so on.
Now there is a possible objection to this account of confirmation. The detection of 
inconsistency can only be achieved by the exertion of our faculty of reason; but then it 
would seem that we may confirm the reliability of our faculty of perception without 
employing that faculty itself. In short, the act of confirmation would appear not to 
involve any epistemic circularity, unless, of course, it is the faculty of reasoning we are 
seeking thereby to confirm.
However, whilst we may conclude that certain propostions p  and q are inconsistent, 
we cannot then go on to infer that the source of our beliefs in p  and q (say, the faculty of 
perception) is unreliable unless we are justified in believing the following propositions: 
(a) our faculty of reasoning is reliable; (b) p  and q are the deliverances of our faculty of 
perception; (c) our memory of (a), (b) and the deliverance of our faculty of reasoning 
with respect to the inconsistency of p  and q (and so forth) is reliable. But, with respect to 
(a), there is no non-circular confirmation available for the deliverances of the faculty of 
reasoning; again, we can only know (b) by the faculty of consciousness. But there is no 
non-circular confirmation available for the deliverances of either of these faculties; and 
of course the same will be true for (c) with respect to the faculty of memory.3
1 Cf. “If two perceptual beliefs contradict each other, at least one is false. The existence of even one pair is 
sufficient to show that SP is not perfectly reliable. A large number of pairs, relative to the total output, would 
show that SP is not sufficiently reliable to be source of justification for the beliefs it generates and hence that it 
is not rational to engage in it, or would not be rational if we had a choice in the matter.” (p. 170.); “a massive 
and persistent inconsistency between the outputs of two practices is a good reason for regarding at least one 
of them to be unreliable.” (p. 171) Alston, Perceiving God.
2 IP, p. 291ff.
3 “it seems to have been a common error of Philosophers to account the senses fallacious. And to this 
error they have added another, that one use of reason is to detect the fallacies of sense. ^ It appears, I think, 
from what has been said, that there is no more reason to account our senses fallacious, than our reason, our 
memory, or any other faculty of judging which Nature hath given us. They are all limited and imperfect; but
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The difference between infant and adulthood instinctive beliefs, is, then, merely that 
adults normally have the capacity to engage in an internal, reflexive evaluation of their 
doxastic instincts; and thereby, to determine the laws of nature according to which they 
operate, and the ends for which these instincts are necessary means. But this kind of 
evaluation cannot demonstrate the epistemic reliability of those faculties.* 1 At best, its 
conclusions can serve only to contribute to the rationality of the trust we cannot help 
but place in the reliability of our faculties.2
Third, with respect to (v), in the two analyses above, we have seen that some 
instinctive actions are such that the ability to perform them could only be the result of a 
process of education, imitation, reasoning and extensive practice leading to the 
formation of a habit; but since no such process either has or could have occurred, the 
action must therefore be instinctive. Now we have also seen Reid argue that some 
beliefs are such that, under normal circumstances, we might have expected them to 
arise only as a result of extensive deliberation or reasoning. But no such process either 
has or could have occurred; hence, her belief must be instinctive.
We may be more precise, however. Earlier we saw that there are three kinds of 
instinctive actions, each of which has a particular function or end for which it was 
designed. I suggest there are, in Reid, three kinds of instinctive beliefs individuated by 
the same analyses we gave for instinctive actions. The first kind of instinctive belief is 
designed to enable the agent to form beliefs that (i) she could otherwise form as a result 
of exerting a voluntary intellectual power, namely, deliberation, and which are (ii) 
required for her preservation, but which (iii) she cannot in fact form without first 
performing an act of deliberation that is of such complexity, that no human agent could 
make it an object of her will.
The second kind of instinctive belief is designed to enable the agent to form beliefs 
with a frequency that is required for her preservation or health, but which, if she had to 
take the time and effort required to will such beliefs, then she would not be able to form 
any other belief. Reid gives, as an example that captures both of these kinds of beliefs, 
our belief that the attributes we perceive belong to bodily substance:
wisely suited to the present condition of man. We are liable to error and wrong judgment in the use of them 
all; but as little in the informations of sense as in the deductions of reasoning.” IP, p. 301. Cf. Alston, Perceiving 
God, p. 176-77.
1 “the truth and fidelity of our faculties can never be proved by reasoning; and therefore our belief of it 
cannot be founded on reasoning.” IP, pp. 711-12.
2 Alston takes this kind of confirmation “to function as a way of strengthening the prima fade daim of a 
doxastic practice to a kind of practical rationality, rather than as something that confers probability on a daim  
to reliability.” Alston, Perceiving God, p. 174.
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“Sensible qualities make so great a part of the furniture of our minds, their kinds are so many, 
and their number so great, that if prejudice, and not nature, teach us to ascribe them all to a 
subject, it must have a great work to perform, which cannot be accomplished in a short time, 
nor carried on to the same pitch in every individual. We should find not individuals only, but 
nations and ages, differing from each other in the progress which this prejudice had made in 
their sentiments; but we find no such difference among men. What one man accounts a 
quality, all men do, and ever did.”1
The third kind of instinctive belief is designed to enable the agent to form beliefs 
with a speed or immediacy that is required for her preservation or health, but which, if 
she were to take the time necessary both to determine that she must form that belief, 
and will to form it, she would not be able to do so with the immediacy required. For 
example, take the instinctive belief that all fire bums. Now children normally form this 
belief upon having only one instance of experiencing the burning sensation occasioned 
by fire. But, dearly, while no inductive argument would justify such a condusion, if the 
child were to take the time and effort required to construct such an argument, based 
upon numerous experiences of being burnt by fire, before she consented to the general 
proposition that fire bums, the probability of her survival or health would decrease 
significantly.2
6.6 DOXASTIC HABITS
As we stated earlier, Reid holds that some propositions that have doxastic immediacy 
for us, arise by way of what I call ‘doxastic habits’. There are two kinds of doxastic 
habits: namely, imitative-habits and general-habits. Reid’s definition of ‘instinctive 
imitation’, applied to bdief, runs as follows:
DS2 Instinctive imitation = df  the formation of the belief that p  in drcumstance C 
toward which an agent is inclined by her observation of the frequent 
expression of the belief that p  in C by some person or group of persons, and 
which is not an object of her own deliberation with respect to p.
Now, as with habits of action, if an agent were to be inclined by a doxastic instinct 
toward imitating the beliefs of others merely once or twice in her lifetime, then she 
would not acquire an doxastic imitative-habit of forming the same kind of belief.
1 IP, p.258.
2 “Thus, a child who has once burnt his finger, by putting it in the flame of one candle, expects the same 
event if he puts it in the flame of another candle, or in any flame, and is thereby led to think that the quality 
of burning belongs to all flame. This instinctive induction is not justified by the rules of logic, and it 
sometimes leads men into harmless mistakes, which experience may afterwards correct; but it preserves us 
from destruction in innumerable dangers to which we are exposed.” IP, p. 457.
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However, if her instinctive imitation is a frequent occurrence, then, eventually, she 
would acquire a doxastic imitative-habit. Henceforth, her judgments would be inclined 
by the doxastic imitative-habit, rather than her previous instinct to imitate. Thus:
A92 S has the doxastic imitative-habit H of believing that p in circumstance C if 
and only if (i) H inclines S toward the belief that p in C without the exertion of 
will, and (ii) S was inclined by instinct toward imitating the belief that p made 
by other persons in C to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of H.
The formation of a doxastic general-habit requires that the agent consistently form 
the same kind of judgment in the same kind of circumstances; and this may well be the 
consequence of a general fixed purpose to exert her voluntary powers of deliberation 
and attention so as to bring it about that her judgment remains of the same kind with 
respect to a certain subject domain. This result may be achieved by either (i) failing to 
attend to or deliberate about any new evidence, such as might constitute an undercutter 
or rebutter for her belief; or by (ii) failing to attend to or deliberate about the original 
evidence upon which the agent first formed her belief, and which produced the general 
fixed purpose to judge likewise at any time in the future, that is, beyond the recollection 
that the evidence seemed to be sufficient at the time. This kind of doxastic habit, 
whereby a general fixed purpose produces a doxastic general-habit, Reid calls a “habit 
of the understanding“.1 Thus:
A93 S has the doxastic general-habit H of believing that p in circumstance C if 
and only if (i) H inclines S toward believing that p in C without the exertion 
of either her own deliberation or attention, and (ii) S was inclined by some 
general fixed purpose toward believing that p in C to a frequency 
sufficient for the acquisition of H.
6.7 VICIOUS DOXASTIC GENERAL-HABITS
It follows from this account, that an agent may be held directly accountable for the 
acquisition of a doxastic general-habit, and indirectly accountable for those beliefs 
toward which she is inclined by that general-habit. Moreover, she may be blameworthy
1 “When a man is come to years of understanding, from his education, from his company, or from his 
study, he forms to himself a set of general principles, a creed, which governs his judgment in particular 
points that occur. *1 If new evidence is laid before him which tends to overthrow any of his received 
principles, it requires in him a great degree of candour and love of truth, to give it an impartial examination, 
and to form a new judgment. Most men, when they are fixed in their principles, upon what they account 
sufficient evidence, can hardly be drawn into a new and serious examination of them. 1 They get a habit of 
believing them, which is strengthened by repeated acts, and remains immoveable, even when the evidence 
upon which their belief was at first grounded, is forgot . . . [This] may be called . . .  a habit of the 
understanding. By such habits chiefly, men are governed in their opinions” AP, p. 91
5 EPISTEMOLOGY 144
or praiseworthy for the kind of doxastic general-habits that she has acquired. For the 
acquisition of a doxastic general-habit involves the exertion of the voluntary operations 
of deliberation and attention; and, as we have seen, there are certain obligations 
attached to these intellectual obligations. More precisely:
A94 S will acquire a virtuous doxastic general-habit A with respect to believing 
that p in circumstances C if and only if (i) S has a general fixed purpose P to 
regulate her acts of deliberation and attention with respect to believing that p 
in C according to the obligations attached, and (ii) S adheres to P to a 
frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A.
An agent may also acquire a vicious or blameworthy doxastic general-habit by the 
consistent failure to resist adhering to the obligations that attach to attention or 
deliberation, thus producing a circumstance- or state-irresistible inclination to resist 
these obligations, which in turn will tend to incline an agent to do so to a frequency 
sufficient for the acquisition of a vicious doxastic general-habit:
A95 S will acquire a vicious doxastic general-habit A with respect to believing that 
p in circumstances C if and only if either (i) S has a general fixed purpose P to 
regulate her acts of deliberation and attention with respect to believing that p 
in C according to the obligations attached, and S fails to adhere to P to a 
frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A; or (ii) S merely violates the 
obligations of deliberation and attention with respect to believing that p in C 
to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A.
Now I suggest that this analysis of vicious doxastic general-habits captures precisely 
the intent of Reid’s account of the prejudices. Take the prejudices of idola specus: Reid 
states that these arise from “the particular way in which a man has been trained, from 
his being addicted to some particular profession, or from something particular in the 
turn of his mind” .1 Put in our terms, a person’s judgment may be erroneous just 
because, over time, his domain of interest or expertise has been such as to bring it about 
that he violates the obligations of deliberation and attention with respect to certain 
kinds of beliefs in certain circumstances to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of 
a vicious doxastic general-habit. For example, it is an obligation of deliberation that an 
agent does what is within her power to identify the arguments for and against some 
proposition p, and give equal consideration to each. But if the agent has confined his 
attention to the subject domain of her profession, it is likely that, if p lies outside of that
1 IP, p. 665.
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domain, she will identify arguments for and against p that arise from within the 
domain and which may therefore be irrelevant to the truth of p. For example:
“The mere Mathematician is apt to apply measure and calculation to things which do not 
admit of it. Direct and inverse ratios have been applied by an ingenious author to measure 
human affections, and the moral worth of actions.” 1
Again, a good example of vicious doxastic general-habits that arise from instinctive 
imitation is the set of prejudices that fall under Reid’s idola theatri: that is, prejudices 
that arise from the agent’s being exposed to or trained in a “false system” or “sect”, thus 
producing a habit of forming beliefs according to or consistent with the tenets of that 
system. That is, a person’s belief that p in C may be erroneous just because she has 
formed that belief by instinctively imitating the manner in which her immediate culture 
or peer group forms beliefs of that kind; and this has been such as to bring it about that 
she violates the obligations of deliberation and attention with respect to the belief that p 
in C to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of a vicious doxastic general-habit.2
Finally, most doxastic instincts, Reid suggests, are such that the application of 
deliberation and attention is eventually required, so as to modify or correct its 
deliverances. The failure to do so, results in the class of prejudices he calls idola tribus 
and idola fori. For example, we have a doxastic infant-instinct “to receive implicitly what 
we are taught”3. However, this instinct must, as we mature, be modified so as to take 
account of the prevalence of dishonesty and falsehood.4
Unfortunately, through laziness or indifference to truth we may fail to exert our 
powers of deliberation and attention, so as to judge for ourselves the weight we should 
give to authority; and instead, persist in adhering to the deliverances of this infant- 
instinct. The result is that we are likely to form a doxastic instinctive-habit, the 
deliverances of which are erroneous.5
1 IP, p.665.
2 “A false system once fixed in the mind, becomes, as it were, the medium through which we see objects: 
They receive a tincture from it, and appear of another colour than when seen by a pure l i g h t . . .  A certain 
complexion of understanding may dispose a man to one system of opinions more than to «mother; and, on the 
other hand, a system of opinions, fixed in the mind by education or otherwise, gives that complexion to the 
understanding which is suited to them.” IP, p. 669.
3 IP, p. 653.
4 “In all matters belonging to our cognisance, every man must be determined by his own final judgment, 
otherwise he does not act the part of a rational being. Authority may add weight to one scale; but the man 
holds the balance, and judges what weight he ought to allow to authority.” IP, p. 653.
5 “As there are persons in the world . . .  who may be called mere beggars with regard to their opinions. 
Through laziness and indifference about truth, they leave to others the drudgery of digging for this 
commodity; they can have enough at second hand to serve their occasions. Their concern is not to know what 
is true, but what is said and thought on such subjects; and their understanding, like their clothes, is cut 
according to the fashion. 1 This distemper of the understanding has taken so deep root in a great part of
5 EPISTEMOLOGY 146
6.8 OVERCOMING PREJUDICES
We have seen that there are several ways in which the agent may exercise the power of 
self-government over her instincts and habits. I suggest that these apply 
straightforwardly to doxastic instincts and habits. First, as we have seen, the inclination 
of an instinct or habit may, on any single occasion, be resisted by the exertion of will. By 
constant resistance, however, the agent may acquire an ‘opposing-habit’, and thus 
eliminate the doxastic instinct or habit in question. More precisely, where:
A% A is an opposing-doxastic habit with respect to some doxastic instinct or habit 
B for agent S if and only if (i) A inclines S toward believing that p in  
circumstance C, (ii) B inclines S toward believing that q in C (iii), since p and q 
are incompatible, S cannot believe both p and q in C at the same time.
and where:
A97 S may acquire an opposing-doxastic habit A with respect to some doxastic 
instinct or habit of belief B if and only if S exerts her will to resist the 
inclination of B to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of A\
Reid would hold that:
A9g S can eliminate some doxastic instinct or habit B if and only if S acquires an 
opposing-doxastic habit with respect to B.
This concludes my account of Reid’s three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for that degree of epistemic justification which constitutes knowledge.
mankind, that it can hardly be said that they use their own judgment in things that do not concern their 
temporal interest; nor is it peculiar to the ignorant; it infects all ranks. We may guess their opinions when we 
know where they were bom, of what parents, how educated, and what company they have kept. These 
circumstances determine their opinions in religion, in politics, and in philosophy.” IP, pp. 654-55.
Conclusion
The aim of this condusion is to present the key findings of the forgoing reconstruction 
of Reid’s epistemology, and to exhibit thereby its overall structure and coherence.
l.  MIND
The subject of knowledge is a substance, which we call ‘mind’, of which our conception 
is merely relative: that is, upon obtaining a direct conception of our intellectual 
operations, we immediately judge that they cannot exist without a subject to which 
they belong as attributes. Of this subject, we know only that it is that without which the 
operations cannot exist It can, however, exist apart from the existence of this or that 
individual operation: for these are accidental rather than essential attributes of mind. It 
is this feature that explains how it is possible for the mind to exist as a constant entity 
throughout the continuous succession of its operations.
That the mind exists continuously over time is self-evident for us: upon the 
remembrance of an event, we form the self-evident belief that we have had a continued 
existence since the time of that event, and were thus the subject of all the operations of 
which we were conscious in the intervening duration. It is also self-evident for us that 
no individual operation can be the attribute of more than one mind, and that anything 
that is not an attribute of a mind is external to it.
2. AGENCY
Our conception of any cause in nature is likewise merely relative: upon forming a 
distinct conception of an event, we immediately judge that there must be some efficient 
cause such that the event in question E is the effect of that cause. However, we have no 
grounds for thinking that any antecedent condition is such that E would not have 
occurred in its absence, and so we cannot identify it as being the cause of E. All we 
know of the cause, then, is that it bears the relation ‘being the cause of’ to E. 
Nevertheless, within a theistic metaphysic, scientific explanations may afford rational 
ground for predicting the occurrence of phenomena, that is, where those grounds 
consist of antecedent conditions and the relevant laws of nature.
Scientific explanations, however, are not to be confused with causal or teleological 
explanations. The causal explanation for some event in nature E is that God’s judgment 
regarding what is best upon the whole inclined him toward the exertion of his power of 
liberty so as to bring about a determination of the will to act according to the rule: if, at 
any future time or place, certain antecedent conditions occur, then bring about E. More 
generally, the only causes are agent-causes, whether created agents or the Divine
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Agent. Teleological explanations are, in Reid’s view, self-evident for us: our knowledge 
that some event E was brought about by the design and purpose of an agent C arises 
just in case we have a direct conception of E, we do not have a direct conception of the 
design and purpose of C and, upon attending to E, we immediately judge that E must 
have been brought about by the design and purpose of C.
An agent is free with respect to the production of an effect E by the exertion of an 
active power if and only if the determination of her will to bring about E is itself 
brought about by the exertion of her power of liberty: that is, where the exertion of the 
power of liberty is a basic act that enables the agent to bring about or not to bring about 
a particular determination of the will. Having the power of liberty over the 
determinations of the will is not sufficient for moral liberty however: the agent must be 
inclined toward the exertion of that power by a rational principle: that is, that principle 
of action the inclination of which involves the exertion of the agent’s judgment that one 
determination of the will is preferable to another, given that the willed action will tend 
to satisfy the ends of either prudence or duty.
3. PRINCIPLES OF ACTION
An agent is morally obligated to perform some action only if she has moral liberty over 
the determination of her will to bring about that action and she is not culpably ignorant 
of this obligation. An agent is morally praiseworthy (or blameworthy) in performing an 
action just when she judges that she ought to perform it (or not to perform it).
Two conditions must be satisfied if moral blameworthiness is to be properly 
ascribed to an agent on account of his failure to resist some animal principle (an 
appetite, affection, or passion) that is opposed to a rational principle: the agent must 
have judged that he ought to resist the animal principle; and the inclination of the 
animal principle must be within the agent’s power to resist. With regard to the second 
condition, no animal principle is either naturally or culpably irresistible. Hence, there is 
no animal principle opposed to a rational principle that an agent is not morally obliged 
to resist. However, there are degrees to which an animal principle is resistible or 
culpably irresistible for an agent; and thus moral praise- and blameworthiness are to be 
ascribed in due proportion.
Not all animal principles ought to be resisted; some will concur with or be 
indifferent to the rational principles. The purpose of both animal and rational principles 
is to incline us toward willing acts that are conducive to our preservation and well­
being. Both kinds of principle are required due to cases in which one is absent or 
dysfunctional, and so the other must operate independently; and where one cannot 
perform its function successfully or optimally without the modification or concurrence 
of the other.
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Every agent has a set of general fixed purposes: that is, determinations of the agent’s 
will to regulate her future actions by certain general rules, to the effect that if, at any 
future time or place in which certain circumstances occur, she will perform a certain 
action so as to bring about some general end. Three moral obligations are attached to 
general fixed purposes: first, such a purpose is to be formed just in case the agent 
judges that any action performed in accordance with that purpose would be the best 
and most approvable action; second, if the agent forms a general fixed purpose at a 
certain time, then she ought to act according to that purpose at any future time; third, if 
the agent encounters good evidence that acting according to a purpose she has already 
formed would not result in the best and most approvable action, then she ought to alter 
or retract that purpose.
An agent’s character is constituted by the kind of general fixed purposes he has, and 
by whether or not his general fixed purposes satisfy the moral obligations that attach to 
such purposes. If the agent exerts his liberty over that determination of the will which 
would regulate his future actions according to what he judges to be his duty or what is 
prudent, then his character is properly evaluated as both ‘wise’ and ‘good’. Again, if 
the agent intermittently fails to act according to his general fixed purposes, his 
character is properly evaluated as ‘fickle’ or ‘inconstant’. Thus we may explain why an 
agent is, in any instance, motivated by duty rather than, say, immediate gratification by 
reference to his general fixed purposes. However, the only explanation available for the 
kind of general fixed purposes that an agent has, is by reference to the exertion of his 
moral liberty.
Mechanical principles may be distinguished into instincts and habits. Instincts 
incline an agent toward the performance of an action in certain circumstances, without 
the exertion of his will or judgment, and which is present in him at birth. There are two 
kinds of instincts: those that function only in infancy, and those that continue to operate 
in adulthood. With regard to the former, an infant has the instinct to perform a certain 
action 0 in certain circumstances C just when the following conditions are satisfied: 
first, she must be inclined by that instinct toward performing 0 in C; second, (f) must not 
be an object of her will or judgment; third, performing </> in C must be necessary for her 
preservation or health; fourth, the agent’s intellectual development must be such that 
she could not yet have discovered that performing </> in C is necessary for her 
preservation or health, nor could she have yet have learned or otherwise acquired the 
habit of performing 0 in C. For instincts that continue into adulthood, only the fourth 
condition is altered: the agent’s intellectual capacity must be such that she can discover 
that performing 0 in C is necessary for her preservation or health, and she cannot, at any 
time, learn or otherwise acquire the habit of performing that 0in C.
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A habit is a principle of action which inclines an agent toward the performance of 
some action 0 in certain circumstances C, without the exertion of her will or judgment, 
and which is acquired by his frequent performance of <J> in C. There are two kinds of 
habits. An imitative-habit arises just when the agent is inclined by instinct to imitate the 
performance of <p in C, and she does so to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of a 
habit: that is, she is now inclined by habit, rather than instinct, to perform <j) in C. A 
general-habit habit arises just when the agent is inclined by some principle of action 
(other than the instinct to imitate) to perform 0 in C to a frequency sufficient for the 
acquisition of that habit.
Actions that are inclined by a habit are not directly voluntary; however the actions 
that must be performed with a frequency sufficient to acquire a habit, generally, are 
subject to the agent’s will. Hence, in this indirect way, habits are morally evaluable. 
Thus an agent may acquire a virtuous habit just when she has a determination of the 
will to regulate her future actions according to the rules of duty or prudence, and she 
adheres to this determination to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of the habit in 
question. Again, she may acquire a vicious habit where she fails to yield to the 
inclinations of some rational principle to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of 
that habit. Finally, it is within the agent’s power to eliminate vicious or virtuous habits, 
that is, by exerting her will to resist the inclination of that habit to a frequency sufficient 
for acquiring an opposing-habit.
4. JUDGMENT
Reid holds that a person judges or believes something just when he conceives of and 
mentally affirms it with a certain degree of strength or firmness, and that the object of 
belief is not a declarative sentence, but rather the meaning of that sentence. This view of 
belief is explicated by reference to Reid’s adverbialist theory of the operations of mind 
and his referential theory of meaning.
The grammatical predicates of propositions describing operations which fail to have 
an object merely characterise the kind or mode of operation thereby attributed to the 
subject of those operations. For propositions describing operations that do have an 
object, the grammatical predicates both characterise the mode of operation and pick out 
the object of that operation. For example, in the sentence T have a conception of a 
centaur’, the term ‘centaur’ picks out both the mode of conceiving and the object of that 
conception. Thus, a person believes that London is the capital of England just in case (i) 
the object of her belief is London’s-being-the-capital-of-England, (ii) she conceives of 
London in a London’s-being-the-capital-of-England way, and (ii) this act of conceiving 
is accompanied by a mental affirmation that is expressible by the declarative sentence:
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‘London is the capital of England’. On this account, the operation of conceiving and 
believing do not produce anything beyond themselves, nor does it entail or require that 
the object of conception or belief is a mental representation. A belief would be false, not 
due to some misrepresenting image in the mind, but rather due to the manner or mode 
of conception failing to agree with the object of that belief.
This adverbialist approach will not, by itself, fail to avoid a sceptical outcome, since 
any mode of conception might, for all we know, be unreliable or dysfunctional. It must, 
in other words, be accompanied by a suitable externalist theory of knowledge. Even so, 
the adverbialist account of the operations of the mind is epistemically superior to a 
representational account such as Idealism inasmuch as it does not entail scepticism.
The meaning of a word, in Reid’s view, is to be identified with its extension. The 
meanings of general terms are their corresponding universals (or sets of universals), 
that is, where universals are characterised as follows: first, a universal may be distinctly 
conceived by any intelligent being even if there were no instances of it; second, 
universals are the exemplars or models according to which God created every 
individual thing; third, each universal is entire in its instances without being multiplied 
or divided; fourth, each universal is eternal, immutable, and uncreated; and finally, 
each universal is the object of God’s conception. This account avoids the problem of 
terms that are not synonymous being co-extensive. For suppose the universals 
corresponding to non-synonymous general terms are actualised and the world is such 
that their instances coincide. Under this account, these terms would fail to be 
synonymous, since their meanings are to be identified with two distinct universals.
An agent can form a simple general conception of some individual attribute F just 
when she can distinguish and generalise F: that is, she must be able to judge that F is 
non-identical to the other attributes that belong to the same substance as F and that F an 
instance of the universal F-ness. The correct meaning of a general word uttered in 
certain circumstances is that universal (or set of universals) to which those members of 
a particular language-community who best understand the language would refer 
whenever they utter the same word in those circumstances.
Belief is an involuntary operation of mind. However, all involuntary intellectual 
operations are indirectly subject to the will inasmuch as they may be either resisted or 
directed by the exertion of the two voluntary operations, attention and deliberation - 
each of which carries its own set of obligations. Involuntary intellectual operations, 
such as belief, are therefore indirectly morally evaluable.
Reid identifies various kinds of self-evident beliefs by a list of general propositions 
he presents as ‘first principles’. These general propositions serve to pick out the various 
kinds of propositions, of which the objects of self-evident beliefs are instances. The
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belief in any such general proposition is not, therefore, to be regarded as self-evident. 
Rather it is, or ought to be based upon an inductive argument, the premises of which 
contain a list of occasions in which we have rightly taken its instances to be self-evident; 
that is, where we have established that the general proposition of which they are 
instances is a genuine first principle by virtue of its having satisfied the ‘marks’ of a first 
principle.
General propositions also serve to express the constitutional rules or laws of our 
nature, indicating what to believe in certain circumstances, and to what degree of 
strength, and so, may function in a scientific explanation of the operations of mind. An 
agent may be said to have such a rule as part of his constitution just in case he has not 
at any stage learned or otherwise acquired the rule, and it is internalized in him in such 
a way that, without the exertion of his will, it regulates the formation and sustenance of 
his believing in certain circumstances whether or not he thinks, declares or believes, 
before or during the formation of his belief, that his believing in those circumstances 
should be regulated according to the rule in question.
Causal explanations of belief require the following kind of description: a person 
believes according to a certain constitutional rule R just in case God’s judgment 
regarding what is best upon the whole inclines him toward the exertion of his power of 
liberty so as to bring about a determination of will to bring about a belief in the agent in 
accordance with R.
5. EPISTEMOLOGY
Evidence is both that which inclines the agent toward the formation of a judgment or 
belief to a certain degree of strength, and that which may (or may not) contribute to the 
belief’s epistemic justification. A person can form or sustain a certain degree of belief at 
a certain time when and only when it seems to her that there is a certain degree of 
evidence for the belief at that time, and this degree of evidence is proportionate to her 
degree of belief. Believing upon ‘good evidence’ obtains a positive evaluation from an 
epistemic point of view just because it fulfils the epistemic aim of believing something 
if and only if there is good evidence for its being true. A person’s belief has a greater 
degree of justification than some other belief just in case she holds the former to a 
stronger degree than the latter.
Reid is an externalist with respect to epistemic justification: that is, he holds that the 
agent need not be (or be capable of being) aware of those factors without which her 
belief would not be justified. However, the agent is accountable for ensuring that these 
justifying factors are in place to the extent that she has indirect influence upon her 
believings by means of the exertion of her voluntary intellectual powers.
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Mere belief may be distinguished from knowledge just when three necessary and 
sufficient conditions are satisfied: the agent must have a “sound understanding”, she 
must have formed a distinct conception of what she believes, and she must do so 
“without prejudice”.
With respect to the first condition, it is more probable than not, given a theistic 
metaphysic, that a person with a ‘sound understanding’ will form mostly true beliefs. 
More precisely, a person has ‘sound understanding’ with respect to a belief just in case 
(i) the intellectual power or faculty by which the belief is produced was designed to 
produce true beliefs, (ii) it is functioning properly at the time of the belief’s formation, 
(iii) it is functioning in an environment for which it was designed, and (iv) if these 
conditions are met, then it is more probable than not that the belief in question is true.
The second necessary condition of epistemic justification requires that we have a 
distinct conception of the object of belief. One difficulty with this condition is Reid’s 
claim that we can know the objects of “obscure” or “indistinct” conceptions, namely, (i) 
mere relative conceptions and (ii) the conceptions we obtain by our external senses and 
by consciousness. With respect to the problem of mere relative conceptions, our 
conception of the essential attribute of substance, namely, ‘being a subject o f is 
sufficiently distinct to enable us to distinguish it from other attributes; and so, it must 
be possible to form a general conception of that attribute; but general conceptions are 
distinct conceptions; hence, if we have a mere relative conception of a substance then 
we are justified in believing that it exists and that it is the subject of certain attributes.
With respect to the conceptions we obtain by our external senses and by 
consciousness, I take Reid to distinguish between presentational immediacy and 
conceptual immediacy: that is, an object has presentational immediacy for a person just 
in case the manner in which she conceives it is such that she is made directly aware of 
that object; and an object has conceptual immediacy for a person just in case the 
manner in which she conceives it is such that she forms a distinct conception of some 
attribute of that object at the same time that she is directly aware of it. If we only had 
presentational immediacy with respect to internal and external objects, then we would 
find ourselves with ‘obscure and indistinct’ conceptions. However, this is not the case. 
We have conceptual immediacy with respect to both the attributes of mind and the 
primary and secondary qualities of external objects; and this ensures that, if the 
relevant external justifying factors are in place, our conceptions of internal and external 
objects will be sufficiently distinct for epistemic justification.
The third necessary condition of knowledge requires that the belief is formed 
‘without prejudice’. There are four kinds of prejudices, each of which may be analysed 
as a belief that has the following three features: first, it has doxastic immediacy for the
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believer, that is, she forms the belief at the same time that she forms a distinct 
conception of its object; second, it does not have epistemic immediacy for the believer, 
that is, she is not immediately justified in believing it; and third, it arises by virtue of 
the inclination of a vicious doxastic habit: that is, although she might have formed a 
general fixed purpose to regulate her acts of deliberation and attention with respect to 
forming such a belief in certain circumstances, she has either (i) failed to adhere to that 
purpose to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of a virtuous doxastic habit; or (ii) 
she has violated the obligations of deliberation and attention with respect to forming 
that kind of belief in those circumstances to a frequency sufficient for the acquisition of 
a vicious doxastic habit. Moreover, she may have failed to do what she could to 
eliminate the vicious doxastic habit: she may not, that is, have attempted to acquire an 
opposing virtuous doxastic habit. Consequently, given the voluntary influence she has 
on the formation of the relevant doxastic habit, and so indirectly, on the formation of 
her belief, she is accountable, in due proportion, for its failure to satisfy the third 
condition.
APPENDIX 1: FIRST PRINCIPLES
The following is a complete listing of the general propositions explicitly referred to in 
Reid’s Intellectual Powers as ‘first principles’.
CONTINGENT
CP, “every thing of which I am conscious [exists]“ (IP, p. 578)
CP2 “the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call 
myself, my mind, my person“(IP, p. 581)
CP3 “those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are 
what we perceive them to be” (IP, p. 587)
CP4 “those things did really happen which I distinctly remember” (IP, p. 583)
CP5 “[we have] our own personal identity and [a] continued existence, as far back as 
we remember anything distinctly” (IP, p. 586)
CP* “in the phaenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like to what has 
been in similar circumstances” (IP, p. 603)
CP7 “we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our 
will” (IP, p. 589)
CPg “the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not
fallacious” (IP, p. 591)
CP9 “there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse” (IP, p. 
594)
CP10 “certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the 
body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind” (IP, p. 596)
CP„ “there is certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact and even to 
human authority in matters of opinion”. (IP, p. 601)
CP, 2  “There are many events depending upon the will of man, in which there is a 
self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances.” (IP, p. 602)
GRAMMAR
NPGi “every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or 
understood” (IP, p. 605)
NPg2  “every complete sentence must have a verb” (IP, p. 605)
NPgs “active verbs which denote some action or operation. . .  supposes a person” (IP, 
p. 605)
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LOGIC
NPU “any contexture of words which does not make a proposition, is neither true or 
false” (IP, p. 605)
N?l2 “every proposition is either true or false” (IP, p. 605)
NPU “no proposition can be both true and false at the same time” (IP, p. 605)
NPU “reasoning in a circle proves nothing” (IP, p. 605)
NPls “whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be truly affirmed of all the 
species, and all the individuals belonging to that genus ” (IP, p. 605)
ARITHMETICAL
NPA1 “two right lines can cut one another in one point only” (IP, p. 606)
ETHICS
NPE1 “an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one” (IP, p. 610)
NPe2 “a generous action has more merit than a merely just one” (IP, p. 610)
NPe3 “no man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder” (IP, p. 
610)
NP* “we ought not to do to others what we would think unjust or unfair to be done 
to us in like circumstances” (IP, p. 610)
METAPHYSICAL
NPM1 “the qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we 
call body, and . . .  the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which 
we call mind---- [and] every action must have an agent.” (IP, p. 612)
NPm2 ‘‘whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced it.” (EP, p. 613)
NPm3 “design and intelligence in the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from 
marks or signs of it in the effect” (IP, p. 621)
APPENDI X 2: MANUSCRIPT CATALOGUE
The following catalogue lists all the manuscripts that the author judged to be of 
relevance to Reid’s epistemology, and which were therefore used in the process of 
gathering the textual evidence upon which the present dissertation is based.
MS Pages Title /Subject Occasion Date
1/1/1 3 An Inquiry into the Human Mind . . .  
Chap 1. Introduction. Sect. 1.
Work -
The obligation of justice not derived 
from its utility.
Work? -
1/1/2 2 An Inquiry into the Human Mind . . .  
Book 2d. Chap. 1. Of Memory.
Work -
The Hypothesis of Ideas and Memory. Lecture
Outline
Dec.11-12
1/1/3 28 1. The Nature of Ideas; their use as mediums Work 
of thought or as representatives of objects.
-
2. Why Philosophers have supposed Ideas. 
Of Smell
Of Taste
3. Four meanings of the word “Idea”
1/1/4 8 A. Three Classes of Sensations.
1. Pleasure and Pain; 2. Smell, Taste, 
Sound, Heat Cold, Colour; 3. Hardness 
& Softness, Roughness & Smoothness, 
that which suggests Motion.
B. Simple Notions obtained by Sensations. 
1. A Mind; 2. Occult & Real Qualties;
3. A Subject of these Qualties; 4. Motion 
and Space.
Preface. Difficulties of an Inquiry Work -
Common Sense
Active and Intellectual Powers MSS
1 /n /l  81 Ch 1 (64.3 -) Continuation of 1/11/6.
Bk. 0 Ch2 0 f  the Influence of Incitements and Motives upon the Will.
Ch 3 Of Operations of Mind which may be called Voluntary.
Ch 4 Corollaries.
Essay 3^ Of the Principles of Actions
Part First Of the Mechanical Principles of Action
Ch 1 Of the principles of Action in general.
Ch 2 Of Instinct.
Ch 3 Of Habit.
Essay 3^ Part 2^ Of the Mechanical Principles of Action 
Ch 1 Of Appetites.
Ch 2 Of Desires. (-1345)
i /n /2 77 C h 2 ( - 134.6)
APPENDIX 2: MANUSCRIPT CATALOGUE 158
Bk.m
i /n /3
Bk. IV
i/n /4
Bk. V
i /n /5
Bk. IV
i /n /6  
Bk. vn
i/n /7  
Bk. vm
i/n /8
Bk. DC
C/i 3 O f benevolent Affection in General.
Ch 4 O f the particular benevolent affections. 
Ch 5 O f Malevolent Affection.
Ch 6 O f Passion.
Ch 7 O f Disposition.
Ch 8 O f Opinion.
78 E ssa y3 ^  P art 3? O f the R ational Principles o f Action. 
Ch 1 There are rational Principles of Action in Man.
Ch 2 O f regard to our Good on the whole.
Ch 3 Tne Tendency of this Principle.
Ch 4 Defects of this Principle.
Ch 5 O f the Notion of Duty, Rectitude, moral Obligation. 
Ch 6 O f the Sense of Duty.
Ch 7 O f Moral Approbation & Disapprobation.
Ch 8 Observations concerning Conscience.
Essay 4™ O f the Liberty o f  m oral Agents.
Ch 1 The notions of moral liberty & necessity stated.
Ch 2 O f the words Cause & Effect. Action & Active Power.
83 Ch 3 Causes of the Ambiguity of those words.
Ch 4 O f the Influence of Motives.
Ch 5 Liberty Consistent with Government.
Ch 6 First Argument.
Ch 7 Second Argument
Ch 8 Third Argument
Ch 9 OfArguments for Necessity.
Ch 10 The same Subject
Ch 11 O f the Permission of Evil.
96 Ch 1 (- 6735) Continuation of 1 /  II /  7.
Ch 2 Whether Morality be Capable of Demonstration. 
Ch 3 Of Probable Evidence
Ch 4 O f M r Humes Skepticism with Reagard to Reason.
Essay VIII O f Taste 
Ch 1 Of Taste in General.
Ch 2 Of the Objects of Taste & first of Novelty 
Ch3 Of Grandeur.
Ch 4 Of Beauty. (-7603)
78 Ch 4(760.3-)
Essays on the A ctive Powers o f the Human M ind  
Introduction
Essay 1 O f A ctive  Powers in General.
C h i O f the Notion of Active Power.
Ch 2 The same Subject.
Ch 3 O f M r Lockes Account of our Idea of Power.
Ch 4 O f M r Humes opinion of the Idea of Power.
Ch 5 Whether Beings that have No Will nor Understanding may have Active Powers. 
Ch 6 O f the Efficient Causes of the Phenomena of Nature.
Ch 7 O f the Extent of Human Power.
Essay 2d O f the W ill.
Ch 1 Observations concerning the Will. (- 645) Continued l / I I / l .
93 Ch 5 (-  5812)  Continuation of 1 /U /20.
Ch 6 First Principles of Necessary Truths
Ch 7 Opinions Ancient & Modern about first Principles.
Ch 8 O f Prejudices, the Causes of Error.
Essay VII. Of Reasoning
Ch 1 Of Reasoning in General, & of Demonstration. (- 673.4) Continued 1/II/5.
41 Essay I.
Ch 2 Principles taken for Granted.
Ch 3 O f Hypotheses.
Ch 4 O f Analogy.
Ch 5 O f the prover Means of knowing the Operations of the Mind.
Ch 6 O f the Difficulty of attending to the Operations of our own Minds.
Ch 7 Division of the Powers of the Mind.
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i /n /9
Bk.X
i / n / i o
Bk. XI
i / n /11
Bk. XII
i / n /12
B k .x m
i /n / i3
Bk.XIV
i /n / i4
Bk. XV
i / n / i 5  
Bk. XVI
i / n /16
B k .x v n
i /n /17
BkJCVIII
i / n /18
Bk.XDC
l/H/19
Bk-XX
40 Ch 8 O f the Social Operations of Mind
Book II  O f the Powers w e have by M eans o f our external Senses 
Ch 1 O f the Organs of Sense.
Ch 2 O f the Impressions of the Organs, Nerves & Brain.
Ch 3 Hypotheses concerning the Nerves & Brain.
Ch 4 False Conclusions drawn from the Impressions before mentioned.
Ch 5 O f Perception (-110.2)
40 Ch 5(110.2-)
Ch 6 What it is to account for a Phenomenon of Nature?
Ch 7 Sentiments of Philosophers about the Perception of external Objects & first 
Of the Theory of Father Malebranche.
Ch 8 O f the Common Theory of Perception & of the Sentiments of the 
Peripateticks & of Des Cartes.
Ch 9 O f the sentiments of M r Locke. (-150.4)
44 Ch 9 (1505 -)
Ch 10 O f the Sentiments of Bishop Berkeley.
C h l l  Bishop Berkeleys Sentiments of the Nature of Ideas.
Ch 12 Of the Sentiments of M r Hume.
Ch 13 Of the Sentiments of Antony Amauld. (-194.3)
40 Ch 13(194.3-)
Ch 14 Reflexions of the common Theory of Ideas.
Ch 15 Account of the System of Leibnitz.
Ch 16 O f Sensation.
C h l7  O f the objects of Perception & first, of primary and secondary qualities.
( -  237.3)
39 Ch 17 (237.3-)
Ch 18 O f other objects of perception.
Ch 19 O f Matter and Space.
Ch 20 Of the Evidence of Sense, & of Belief in general.
42 Ch21 Of the Improvement of the Senses.
Ch 22 Of the Fallacy of the Senses.
Book 3^  O f M emory.
Ch 1 Things obvious & certain with regard to Memory.
Ch 2 Memory an Original Faculty.
Ch 3 O f Duration.
Ch 4 O f Identity.
40 Ch5 M r Lockes Account of the Origin of our Ideas,
& particularly of the Idea of Duration.
Ch 6 M r Lockes account of our personal Identity 
Ch 7 Theories concerning Memory
Essay 4^* O f Conception.
Ch 1 O f Conception or simple Apprehension. ( -  360.3)
41 Ch 1 (3615-)
Ch 2 Theories concerning Conception.
Ch 3 Mistakes Concerning Conception. (- 399.6)
39 Ch 3 (399.6-)
Ch 4 Of the Train of Thought in the Mind.
Essay 5 O f Abstraction.
Ch 1 O f General Words. ( -  434.4)
64 C h i (4345-)
Ch 2 O f General Conceptions.
Ch 3 O f general Conceptions formed by analysing Objects.
Ch 4 Ofgenral Conceptions formed by combination.
Ch 5 Observations concerning the Names given to our general Notions. (475.1-2 
missing “see schedule 12 p. 18”)
Ch 6 Opinions of Philosophers about Universals.
42 Book 6 Of Judgm ent 
Ch 1 O f Judgment.
Ch 2 O f Common Sense.
Ch 3 Sentiments of Philosophers Concerning Judgment. ( -  541.6)
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i /n /2 0
Bk.XXI
40 Ch3 (541.7-)
Ch 4 Of first Principles in General.
Ch 5 The first Principles of Contingent Truths. (- 581.2) Continued in 1/II/7.
2/1/19 22 “The distinction between things in the 
mind and things external..
* *
2/m / i 7 Abstract of Inquiry - -
2/m / 2 18 Theory of Ideas IP Es II Ch 14
2/m /3 4 Of Secondary Qualities - -
2/m /4 8 Memory - -
2/m /5 22 Of Memory Discourse -
2/m /6 20 Of the Faculty of Imagination Discourse Feb 1766
Mistakes of Philosophers with regard 
to Simple Apprehension
- -
2/m /7 18 Of Common Sense - Cura Prima Work
2/m /8 17 Common Sense
2/m./9 8 Common Sense Discourse -
2/m /io 18 Common Sense Discourse -
2/ m / n 8 First Principles of Necessary Truths Discourse/ Society
2 /m /i2 43 Abstraction Discourse, Work (p.36)
2/ffl/13 10 Mind and Matter Discourse
2 /m /i4 14 First Principles of Contingent Truths Discourse /  Society
3/1/25 5 Priestlv - Natural Religion Notes 18 June 1774
Hartley - Ideas. Sensations. Brain. 
Pain & Pleasure, Assent, Truth, 
Mathematical method and Logic.
Notes 19 June 1774
3/D/3 13 First Discourse on Lord Bacon Discourse/Society post 1777
Discourse 2 Attention “ “
Of Conception « “
3/Ü/9 2 From Aristotle’s Catagories Notes -
3 /n /io 1 Collier - Existence of External World Notes 21 Feb 1771
3/II/14 6 Buffon - Classing. Dividing. Subdividing 
Natural Bodies; Mathematical and 
Physical Truth; Theory of the Earth;
The Generation of Ammals.
Notes
3/D/16 5 Of the Subjects of Active Power - -
Bonnet - Operations of the Mind. Nerves: 
Origin of Organized Body; Passions and 
Moral Sense; Sensation and Perception; 
Matter; Natural History, Nature and 
Duration of Animal Souls; Insects.
Notes
3/ID/5 4 Copy to Dr Price
Conception not the Test of Possibility 
Reasons for not answering Dr Priestly
Letter -
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3 /ID /21 4 Theory of Ideas - -
3 /H I/2 2 2 Theory of Ideas, Berkeley, Seat of the
Soul
-
3 /IÜ /23 4 H artley’s Theory of Vibrations; 
Perception; Seat of the Soul
- post 1773
3 /H I/2 4 2 Perception, Impressions, Ideas, Locke, 
Hum e, Aristotle, Peripatetics.
- post Y7T7
3 /IÜ /2 5 1 Bavle - Ideas, Volition, Liberty Notes -
4 /1 /1 1 Introduction to Lectures. 
The Ends of Education
Lecture -
Introduction to Lectures on - Lecture 
Fine Arts
-
4 /1 /2 4 N ature and Duration of the Soul, 
Leibnitz, Descartes.
- -
4 /1 /3 4 C ulture of the Powers of Judgem ent 12 pm  Lecture 29 Jan 1770
Reference to IP - Chap. 22, Book 1, 
“Fallacy of the Senses”
W ork -
Com m on Sense - -
4 /1 /4 11 O f Composition
On H um e’s Associating qualities of ideas 
O f the Essence o f U niversal
W ork
4 /1 /5 35 O f General Words or Terms 
O f General Conceptions
W ork
The Use of the Power of Abstracting 
and General Conceptions
The Opinions of Philosophers about 
General Conceptions
4 /1 /6 2 Pneumatology Part 2^ - 
O f the Culture of the M ind
Lecture Outline-
4 /1 /7 2 O f M emory Lecture Outline-
4 /1 /8 4 First Principles L ecture/ Outline 15 Jan
Gen Rules for directing us in the 
investigation of T r u th ; or Directions 
for the Conduct of the U nderstanding - 
1. To have a clear and distinct apprehension 
of what we judge o r reason about
Lecture 2 Jan
Culture of the Rational Powers Lecture Outline 7 Jan 1765
4 / I /8 a 4 2. To form right judgem ents 
concerning w hat we judge or reason about. 
Original and N atural Judgement.
L ecture/O utline-
Culture of the Rational Powers 
First Principles, Analytical & Synthetic
Lecture
Reasoning
12 Jan 1765
4 /1 /9 4 O f Inductive Reasoning Lecture 6 Feb 1765
Reasoning by Analogy & Examples Lecture Outline
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Gen Rules for Improving Rational Powers Lecture Outline
Culture of the Active Powers Lecture Outline 13,18 Feb
Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body &c M ind; Fine Art
Lecture 20 Feb
Sum m ary of Lectures on - 
Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body & M ind; Fine Art
Lecture 27 Feb
4 /1 /10 3 C ulture of N ature 
C ulture of Society 
C ulture of Education
Lecture 3 / Outline-
4/1/11 3 C ulture of the Senses 
1. Preserving the O rgans of Sense 
in a Sound and N atural State.
Lecture -
4 /1 /12 3 Culture of the Senses Lecture Outline
4 /1 /13 3 Introduction to Lectures on - 
N atural Theology, Morals, Jurispudence 
& Politics?
Lecture -
Sum m ary of Lectures on -
The Intellectual and  Active Powers, and  on
the N ature and Duration of the Soul.
4 /1 /14 2 Fancy 12 pm  Lect. 
Outline
6 Dec 1768
2 Disc, on Imagination Discourse -
4 /1 /15 3 O f the Improvement of the Faculty of 
Imagination
12 pm Lecture 10 Jan 1769
4 /1 /16 1 Induction - -
4 /1 /17 1 Idola Theatri Outline -
Reasoning, Induction Outline
4 /1 /18 5 C ulture of Society 
C ulture of Education
Lecture 4 -
4 /1 /19 1 Evidence, Dem onstration and Probable 
Reasoning
- -
4 /1 /20 3 Introduction to Lectures. Fine Arts. Lecture -
Im provem ent of Moral Character Lecture -
4/1/21 2 O f Probable Reasoning 12 pm  Lect. O utline 28 Feb 1768
O f Testimony 29 Feb 1768
The Extent of the Knowledge we have 
by Testimony
2 M ar 1768
4 /1 /22 1 O f Contrariety Outline -
4 /1 /23 3 Inductive Principle, Laws of N ature 
Causation, Reasoning and Physicks
- -
O f the Culture of O ur Active Powers Lecture -
4 /1 /24 4 Improvement of our Moral Perception 12 pm  Lect. O utline 11 Dec 1768
Im provem ent of Moral Character Lecture Outline -
O f the Culture of our Active Powers Lecture Outline 14 M ar 1770
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4 /1 /25 4 Conduct of the U nderstanding - 
Received Tradition a Cause of Error in 
Judgem ent
Lecture
4 /1 /26 4 Culture of Education Lecture O utline 19 Dec
Culture of the Senses Lecture Outline
O f the Im provem ent o f M em ory Lecture Outline 24 Dec
O f the Im provem ent o f Taste and G enius Lecture Outline 26 Dec
Im provem ent of H um an Knowledge Lecture Outline 16 Feb 1767
C ulture of the Senses Lecture Outline 16 Feb 1767
D em onstration and Probable Reasoning Lecture Outline 18 Feb 1767
4 /1 /27 2 Introduction to Lectures. L ecture/ W ork ? -
4 /1 /28 4 O f the Perception of H arm ony, Beauty, 
G randeur, N ovelty , W it, H um our. W hy  
these are called Secondary Perceptions and  
Reflex Senses by Dr. H utcheson.
Lecture Outline
W i th e r  there is any Standard o f Taste Lecture O utline
Judgem ent Locke, H um e Lecture Outline
4 /1 /29 18 Introduction to Lectures on -
1. Culture of the Mind
2. Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body & Mind
3. Fine Art - Eloquence
Lecture
4 /1 /30 28 C ulture o f N ature Lectures 2 & 3 -
4/1 /31 10 Culture of the Mind 
Culture of N ature
Lecture 1 / O utline 16 Dec 1765
C ulture of Society Lecture 2 / O utline 18 Dec
C ulture of Education Lecture 3 / O utline 23 Dec
O f the C ulture  of the External Senses Lecture 5 -
O f the C ulture  of M em ory Lectures 5 & 6 -
O f the C ulture  o f the Im agination Lecture 7 27 Jan 1766
O f the C ulture  o f the Im agination as it 
signifies that train of thoughts, Reflections, 
Em otions and passions w hich arises spon­
taneously in the M in d  while we are awake
Lecture 8 29 Jan 1766
4 /n / i 68 Pneum atology B Lecture 5 Nov 1765
4 /I I /2 84 Pneum atology A Lecture 1768
4/11/3 2 Continuation of 4 /II/1 9  
Com m on Sense, First Principles 
Enquiry into H um an Mind
4 /I I /4 2 A pp en d ix  to Pneum atology
Tne N ature and Duration of the Soul
Lecture Outline
4 /I I /5 4 Connections between Body and Mind 
Tone of Voice expresses Tem peram ent
Lecture -
Sensations Lecture 20, 21, 23 Nov
A / l l / 6 2 A dditions to Pnuem atology A Lecture
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4 /H /7 8 Space - -
O f  P ersonal Id e n t ity Title only -
M emory Lecture Outline 24 Dec
Im agination or Conception Lecture Outline 13 Dec 1764
H um e on the Association of Ideas Lecture O utline 14 Dec
Im a g in a tio n Lecture O utline -
T ra in  o f  T h o u g h t..d e sc r ib e d Lecture 25 O utline 10 Dec
O f  the  In flu e n c e  w h ich  the  vario u s degrees  
o f  S tr e n g th  in  these L a w s o f  A sso c ia tio n  
m a y  have in fo r m in g  the  C haracter, 
S tr e n g th  o f  R eason  a n d  G en iu s
Lecture 26 O utline 11 Dec 1765
4 /n /8 4 P n e u m a to lo g y  P art 1.
Sight, Touch, Hearing, Taste 
& Smell, M emory
Lecture O utline *
4 /n /9 16 Introduction to Lectures. Praver. 
The Ends of Education.
- -
4 /n / io 6 Introduction to Lectures. 
The Ends of Education.
- -
4 / n / n 4 P n eu m a to lo g y
Im agination, Of Pleasure and Pain
Lecture O utline -
4 /H /1 2 4 Read from the In q u ir y Lecture 20 2 Dec 1765
Pleasure and Pain Lecture 21 3 Dec 1765
Read Discourse on Memory Lecture 22 4 Dec
Read last part of Discourse on M emory 
concerning theories of Locke, Berkeley, 
H um e about Duration
Lecture 23 5 Dec
O f  D iv id in g  a n d  C la ss in g  T h in g s  &  
O f  C o m p o u n d in g
Lecture 27 12 Dec
O f  Ju d g em en t Lecture 28 13 Dec
R ea so n in g Lecture 29 16 Dec
Probable a n d  D e m o n s tra tiv e  R ea so n in g Lecture 30 17 Dec
H u m e ’s R e a so n in g  a g a in s t D em o n stra tio n Lecture 30 17 Dec
4 /n / i3 8 The Will, Active Powers Lecture 34 23 Dec 1765
4 /Ü /1 4 7 First Principles, Prejudices and the Causes 
of Error
Idola T rib u s - -
ldo la  Species - -
G enera l D efec ts o r fa u l t s  in  the R a tio n a l 
P ow ers w h ich  lore] to be g u a rd ed  a g a in s t
Lecture Outline -
G enera l B yasses Lecture O utline -
In d u c tiv e  R e a so n in g Lecture Outline 3 M ar 1766
G enera l O b serva tio n  on R ea so n in g  b y  
In d u c tio n
Lecture Outline 5 M ar 1766
Idola F ori Lecture Outline 5 M ar 1766
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4 /E /1 5 1 Acquired Perceptions Lecture 5 Dec 1766
4 /E /1 6 34 Theories concerning Perception L ecture/O utline 18 Nov 1768
The System of Leibnitz Lecture 22 Nov
Sensation Lecture 23 Nov
O f the Objects of Perception Lecture /  Outline 24 Nov
Objects of Sight Lecture /  Outline
O f the Distinction of Primary & 
Secondary Qualities
Lecture /  Outline 25 N ov 1768
Disorders of ou r Bodies which we perceive L ecture/O utline 28 Nov
by m eans of certain painfull sensations that 
are natural signs of them
Recapitulation of the above lectures Lecture /  Outline 29 Nov
O f Original and Acquired Perception Lecture /  Outline 1 Dec
Laws of Nature Relating to the Senses L ecture/O utline 2 Dec
Fallacies of the Senses L ecture/O utline -
Relative Notions Notes 23 Oct 1773
4 /II/1 6 a 2 Perception, Theory of Ideas - -
4 /H /1 7 8 Prim ary and Secondary Qualities Lecture 12 20 Nov
O f Visible Figure Lecture 12-13 20—21 N ov
O f Seeing Objects by Inverted Images Lecture 14 24 Nov
Limits of Vision Explained Lecture 14 24 Nov
O f Seeing Objects Single with Two Eyes Lecture 15-16 25-26 N ov
Sum m arv of Lectures on - 
The original perceptions which w e have by 
sight and the laws of nature by which we 
have those original perceptions.
Lecture 17 27 Nov
Proceed to Lectures on - Lecture
The Things which we learn by experience to 
perceieve by m eans of those things which are 
originally perceived.
Perception of the Distance of Objects from 
the Eye
Lecture -
Review of observations on Sensation and Lecture
Perception.
The train of operations by which we perceive Lecture 19 
external objects; and remarks on the mistakes 
of philosophers in this respect.
1 Dec
4 /H /1 8 8 Theory of Ideas - Locke, Berkeley, Hum e 
Theories of Perception
- -
4 /E /1 9 8 O f the Immateriality of The Soul Lecture 41 O utline 6 Jan 1766
O f the Place of the Soul Lecture 42 Title only 7 Jan 1766
The N ature D uration and Place of the Soul Lecture 
Continued in 4 /I I /3
20 Jan 1766
4 /H /2 0 1 Sum m arv of Lecture on - 
Train of T hought/Im agination
Lecture Outline 6 A pr 1772
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6/ 1/1
6/ 1/2
6/1/3
6 /1 /4
6/1/5
6/ 1/6
6 / 1/10
6/ 1/11
6/1/15
6/1/17
6/1/18
6/1/19
6/ 1/20
6/ 1/21
6/ 1/22
6/1/23
6/1/24
6/1/26
8
4
4
7
2
8
4
4
1
6
2
5
7
4
3
4
8
2
O f Imagination
O f the Train of Thoughts in the Human Mind 
O f Abstraction
O f Dividing and Classing Things 
Compounding
O f the Will & Principles of Action
The Understanding/ Pneumatology
1. Old and new systems
2. Powers & Principles of the Understanding
Discourse?
Discourse?
Outline
Outline
Outline
Outline
Lecture
Conceptions 
Original & Simple, 
Derived & Compounded
Theory of Ideas
O f the Meaning of the Word Idea
Conception Discourse/Society
Whether it be a true maxim that what we 
can conceive is possible & what is 
impossible cannot be conceived
Question 12 Discourse/Society
Are the Objects of the human Mind properly 
divided into impressions and Ideas and must 
every Idea be a Copy of a preceeding Impression.
The Power of Judging Discourse
Minutes of a Philosophical Club
The Self
Pnuematology Lecture
Knowledge acquired by Senses, Experience, 
Testimony reduced to Laws of Nature
relating to the Powers of the Human Mind
Pneumatology
Anatomy of the Mind
Pneumatology
Consciousness
Reflexion
Contemplation
Locke, Assent, Evidence
That we see objects at first single when 
our eyes are properly directed
Simple Perceptions which arise from 
Taste in Fine Arts. e.g. Music.
O f the Operations of Understatiding about 
its Perceptions and Notions - Abstraction, 
Compounding, Comparing Reasoning
Of the Will & Active Powers of Mind
Pnuematicks
Lecture/Outline
Lecture Outline 
Outline 
Outline 
Outline 
Work (p.3)
Lecture Outline
pre Sep 1782
1736
22 Oct 1748 
8 Dec 1766
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N ature and Duration of the Soul Lecture -
6 /1 /27 2 N ature and Duration of the Soul Lecture -
6 /1 /30 1 First Principles, Locke, Ideas Outline -
6 /II /3 4 Theory of Ideas - -
M emory - -
6 /II /4 16 Abstraction, General Notions,
General W ords, Universals, Disputes of 
Ancient Philosophers and Schoolmen.
Discourse *
6 /E /5 20 Train of T hought/Im agination Discourse -
Bruherus - Origin of the Theory of Ideas. 
Plato
Notes -
Nominalists Notes -
Com m on Sense Discourse -
6 /II /6 2 The Reasons o f In s istin g  so long upon 
these Theories about Perception
Notes -
6 /D /7 2 H um e’s theory of perception - -
6 / m / i 1 Idola Theatri - -
6 /m /2 4 Idola Theatri - -
6 /m /3 4 M r  H u m e’s notion o f Causes, his Reasons 
w h y  we cannot reason about a Cause o f the  
Universe, A nsw ered.
-
H is O bjections against the Evidence o f 
Testim ony w hich brought in favour of 
M iracles.
- -
Various K inds o f Evidence - -
6 /m /4 1 Im provem ent o f M em ory Lecture -
6 /m /5 8 H um e’s theory of Perception, Impressions - -
Campbell - argum ent aeainst Locke’s theory 
of Identity.
-
First Principles Lecture 1 Dec 1758
O f the Perception of H arm ony, Beauty - -
6 /m /6 4 Idola Tribus - -
Idola Fori - -
6 /m /7 2 Buffier - on Beauty. Notes -
Do our Ideas resemble the things they 
represent?
- -
On Supposition - -
6 /m /8 4 O f the Perception we have o f D istance Outline 1758
by S ight
O f the Perception o f E xtension by S ight Outline 1758
O f the Perception o f Tangible Extension Outline 1758
O f E xternal Existences O utline 1758
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6 /m /9 4 Judgem ent, Apprehension & Reasoning - -
Sensation - -
Operations of the Mind - -
6 /m /io 2 Theory of Ideas, Perception of external 
objects, Images in the Brain, H istory of.
- -
6 / m / n 1 Hook - on Ideas - -
6/D 3/12 4 Theory of Ideas, Hook, Locke, Berkeley, 
H um e
- -
6 /m /i3 1 Locke, Theory of Ideas - -
6 /IÜ /14 4 Locke, Belief, Judgem ent, Theory of Ideas- -
6 /m /i5 1 Descartes, Theory of Ideas - -
6 /m /i6 4 Hum e, Source of Ideas - -
Agent Causation, Liberty - -
6 /m /i7 8 Operations of the Mind - Descartes, Aristotle -
and followers, M alebranche, Locke.
6 /m / i8 4 Common Sense, First Principles - -
6 /V /3 4 1 Divisions - M easures, Substances, 
Things belonging to substances
- -
6 /V /3 5 2 Impressions upon nerves, brain, organs 
of sense, by  external objects.
•
7 /V / l 6 Introduction to Lectures on Pnuematologv Lecture -
1. Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body & Mind.
N atural Language Outline -
7 /V /2 1 London Review - Beattie’s Essav on Reid’s 
Inquiry
Notes -
7 /V /4 17 Introduction to Lectures on Pnuem atologv Lecture -
7 /V /1 6 4 Reasoning - Im provem ent, Probable and 
Demonstrative, M athematical and Meta­
physical, Direct and  Indirect Demonstration.
7 /V /2 3 8 Pneum atologv Lecture Outline -
7 /V /2 6 4 Errors of Judgem ent, Fallacies of Sense, 
Prejudice.
- -
8 /1 /1 14 Introduction to Lectures on Pnuem atologv Lecture -
1. Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body & Mind.
8 /1 /2 25 Introduction to Lectures - 
The Ends of Education
Lecture 1 Nov 1766
Eloquence Lecture -
O f Eloquence Lecture -
The Orator Lecture -
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E ndow m ents o f M in d  Necessary to form  
the O rator
Sum m ary of Lectures on - 
Connections and M utual Influences 
of the Body & Mind; Fine Art. 
Proceed to Lecture on Eloquence.
Lecture -
Lecture
8 /1 /3 15 Eloquence Lecture
8 /1 /4 2 The Passions in Eloquence Lecture -
8 /1 /5 7 O ration - Facetious Kinds Lecture -
8 /1 /6 12 Eloquence of the Pulpit Lecture -
Eloquence o f Conversation Lecture 6 M ar 1765
Eloquence o f the Pulpit Lecture -
8 /1 /7 2 Eloquence o f Popular A ssem blys Lecture -
Eloquence o f the Pulpit Lecture Outline -
Eloquence o f Conversation Lecture Outline -
8 /1 /8 1 Conclusion to Lectures - Lecture
on Various Kinds of Eloquence 
Proceed to Oration
-
8 /1 /9 2 Eloquence Lecture 11 M ar 1765
8 /1 /10 6 Oration Lecture -
8/1/11 2 Oration Lecture -
Elocution Lecture -
8 /1 /12 6 P u rity  o f Words Lecture -
8 /1 /13 6 Eloquence Lecture Outline -
8 /I /1 3 a 2 Eloquence Lecture O utline -
8 /1 /14 6 Eloquence Lecture Outline -
8 /1 /15 2 O f the Fine A r ts  or A r ts  o f Taste Lecture Outline -
Pneum atology Part 3^ - Lecture Outline 
Of the C onnections and M u tu a l Influences 
o f Body &  M in d  on each other
*
8 /1 /16 3 O pinions o f Buffier concerning Language Notes -
S truc ture  o f Speech Lecture Outline -
M u sick Lecture Outline -
8 /1 /17 2 Train of Thought - -
8 /1 /18 12 Structure of Sentence, Eloquence Lecture -
Personification Lecture -
A ction Lecture -
P ro n u n c ia tio n Lecture -
8 / n / i 8 O f Im agination - -
T o b e  prefixed to the Exam ination  o f M r  
H u m e ’s A cco u n t o f M em ory &  Im agination
- -
Im agination Outline -
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8 /E /2 2 Mistakes of Philosophers concerning 
Conception
- -
8 / I I /3 7 Ancient and M odern Accounts of Memory
Theory of Ideas - -
8 / I I /4 8 O f Conception - -
8 /E /5 16 O f Judging - -
O f Com m on Sense - -
8 /E /6 8 Theories C onecm ing  Judgm ent - -
8 /E /7 11 Sentim ents o f Philsophers concerning  
Judgem ent
- -
8 /E /8 21 O f Composition W ork -
8 /E /9 28 Theory of Ideas - -
8 / E / 10 8 T hings O bvious and certain w ith  regard 
to M em ory
W ork -
Duration, Extension, N um ber, Space, Time - -
8 / E / l l 8 O f M r  Locke’s D octrine concerning  
Personal Id en tity
W ork -
Theories C oncerning M em ory  W ork -
8 /E /1 2 8 O f M r  Locke’s A ccoun t o f the O rigin  
o f  our Ideas in general and of his A ccount 
o f the Ideas o f D uration in Particular
W ork *
8 /E /1 3 14 Pneum atologv Fine Arts Lecture -
Abstraction, Universals
O f Theories concerning Conception - -
Theories concerning the Conception o f 
Objects
- -
Theory of Ideas - -
8 /E /1 4 8 O f Id en tity - -
Theories concerning D uration and Iden tity - -
8 /E /1 5 46 The Perception of External Objects W ork -
O f the C om m on Theory o f Perception W ork -
O f the Sen tim en ts o f Bishop Berkeley W ork -
O f the Sen tim en ts o f M r  H um e W ork -
A ntony Arnauld vs. Malebranche W ork -
Ch 14 Reflexions on the common  
Theory o f Ideas
W ork -
Sensation W ork -
Prim ary and Secondary qualities W ork -
8 /E /1 6 6 Ch 20 O f the E vidence o f Sense &  
O f Belief in general
W ork -
8 /E /1 7 12 Ch 20 O f the Evidence o f Sense &
O f Belief in general - Later draft of 8 /E /1 6 .
W ork -
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8/H /18
8/H /19
8/Ü/20
8 /ü /2 0 a
8/H/21
8/E/22
8/II/23
8/H /24
8 / II/24a
8 / II/24b
8/H /25
8 /m / i
8 /V /l
8 /V I/3
12
8
3
8
9
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
4 
4
Ch 21 Of The Improvement of the Senses Work
Of Prejudices the causes of wrong judgment Work
Prejudice Work
The Fallacies of the Senses 
First Principles
How do we obtain the Idea of Tangible 
distance or extension; or the Idea of 
Hardness and Softness.
Definitions - Apprehension, Immediate 
Perception, Impression or Feeling,
Remembering, Simple Apprehension, 
conceiving, imagining
Axioms -The ingredients of remembrance 
and simple apprehension, Perception feeling 
remembrance imply the existence of their 
objects
Notion of extension, figure, motion.
Of The Fallacies of the Senses
Of the Use and Necessity of General Words 
in Language
Of the Conceptions annexed to General 
Words
Primary and Secondary Qualities 
Matter and Space 
Of Matter and Space 
Theory of Ideas 
Introduction - Active Powers
Work
Work
Work
Work
Work
Work
Work
Scheme of a Course of Philosophy Lecture Outline
Single and Double Vision
1759
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